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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
OVERVIEW 
The topic of this dissertation is the fact-finding 
stage of Oregon's public sector impasse resolution pro-
cedure. The use of fact-finding has dramatically increased 
because of the recent and rapid growth in public sector 
collective bargaining, and the resulting increase in pub-
lic sector strikes. 
Beginning in 1962 with John F. Kennedy's Executive 
Order 10988, a series of federal and state laws were passed 
granting and expanding collective bargaining rights to pub-
lic employees. 
Many of the state laws resemble the private sector 
model provided under the Labor Management Relations Act of 
1 1947 (Taft-Hartley); however, the use of the strike as a 
weapon to enforce bargaining in good faith and resolution 
of conflict has been limited for public employees because 
of the potential threat of disruption of public services and 
2 interference with the sovereignty of the government. Such 
anti-strike legislation, however, has not prevented public 
employee strikes. 
Public employee strikes are of particular concern to 
urban areas for it is within them that the vast majority of 
population resides, where public employees are concentrated, 
and where public services are vital to health, safety, and 
welfare of the citizens. 3 
A major area of controversy and challenge to the public 
sector, then, is to develop political substitutes for the 
strike (which is basically an economic threat) that are com-
patible with the collective bargaining and labor rights 
guaranteed the private sector, yet at the same time protect 
government functions from serious disruptions. 4 These sub-
stitutes usually have taken the form of mediation, fa~t-
finding, mandatory cooling-off periods, and interest arbi-
tration. However, the variety of ways in which these forms 
have been developed reflect the controversy over which form 
and/or combination of forms is the most viable method of 
. 1 . 5 lmpasse reso utlon. 
The state of Oregon is no exception to this endeavor. 
In October 1973 the Oregon State Legislature passed a com-
prehensive public employee collective bargaining act which, 
unlike the vast majority of states, includes the right to 
strike for all public employees, except those in the protec-
6 tive services of fire, police, and institutional guards. 
The law also sets up specific steps for impasse reso-
lution should collective negotiations break down. The steps 
form a procedure that is viewed as a filtering down process, 
with each step contributing significantly to the orderly 
2 
resolution of disputes, and reducing the possibility of pub-
lic employee strike. The steps follow the familiar pattern 
of mediation, fact-finding, and a cooling-off period. If 
these steps are unsuccessful they may be followed by strike, 
or compulsory interest arbitration for the protective 
. 7 
serV1ces. 
Now with over four years of experience, the fact-
finding phase of Oregon's impasse resolution process has 
become quite controversial. The personal views of union, 
management, and neutrals (mediators and fact-finders) differ 
considerably as to whether fact-finding does what it is in-
tended to accomplish. There have been recommendations pre-
pared for presentation to the next legislature that would 
abolish the fact-finding step in this elaborate impasse 
8 procedure. 
The controversy in Oregon reflects the controversy 
among the experts nationally, and the same situation with 
respect to academic research in this area prevails; that is, 
there has been little systematic investigation into the 
fact-finding process. 9 
THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the purpose, 
nature, and effectiveness of Oregon's fact-finding phase of 
impasse resolution. Because of the impact the home rule is-
sue has had on the use of Oregon's impasse procedures, this 
study will focus on those sectors where use of fact-finding 
3 
4 
has been extensive, consistent and unaffected by the home 
1 . 10 ru e ~ssue. This analysis of fact-finding represents the 
first comprehensive and systematic assessment of the impasse 
procedure to be undertaken in the state since the 1973 law 
was passed. Such analysis will identify the significant 
variables in the efficacy of fact-finding and will bring 
together practitioners' views on the viability of the pro-
cess. This latter dimension is critical in that the opin-
ions of these participants in the labor relations field will 
likely affect and shape future legislation on fact-finding. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
There are three ways in which this studl' is signifi-
cant. First, heretofore, little systematic research and 
analysis of fact-finding in Oregon has been undertaken. 
This study will establish a basic data base and serve as a 
basis for future research in Oregon and in other states us-
ing this type of impasse model. Secondly, this study will 
add to the base of knowledge accumulated nationally upon 
which further studies and models of public sector impasse 
resolution can be built and tested. Thirdly, the study will 
be of importance to Oregon policy makers who will be consid-
ering changes in the present portion of the state law relat-
ing to impasse procedure. 
These contributions should be placed within the context 
of the present and potential impact of collective bargaining 
and strike on the urban area. Because the growth of public 
5 
sector employee organization, collective bargaining and 
strike has been recent and rapid, the total political and 
economic impact is not known. However, the burden of strike 
on the public health, welfare and safety has been experi-
enced throughout the nation. It is of prime importance then 
to develop impasse resolution procedures and steps that con-
tribute to good faith bargaining while at the same time pro-
tect the public from the disruption of vital public services. 
It is within this context that this study is seen as signif-
icant and as a contribution to the public debate over the 
continuation of the fact-finding step in Oregon's impasse 
procedure. 
The Implication For Urban Areas 
The implication of public sector collective bargaining 
and the strike for urban areas may be seen as being derived 
from three areas of concern: (1) financial, (2) political, 
and (3) provision of vital services. 
First, the fiscal impact of bargaining is significant. 
This is because 60-75 percent (or more) of urban budgets 
consist of labor costs. ll This is not to suggest that bar-
gained wage increases are the sole, nor necessarily the most 
important cause of increased local governmental expendi-
tures; but that bargained wage and salary increases have had 
12 
a significant impact on urban budgets. Demetrois Caraley 
points out in his book City Government and Urban Problems 
that city services are declining in quality, although 
expenditures are increasing. He attributes this to the im-
pact of inflation, and the collective bargaining power of 
public employee unions. His rationale is that collective 
bargaining has increased labor costs while productivity has 
remained unchanged; the result being a decrease in the qual-
ity of services and degeneration in the quality of urban 
l 'f 13 1 e. 
Second, there is concern as to the impact of collective 
bargaining on the political process. Sterling Spero and 
John M. Capozzola express their concern, in The Urban Com-
munity and Its Unionized Bureaucracies, that public employee 
unions are co-determining public policy by exercising their 
power either through the route of collective bargaining or 
by their increased political influence on public offi-
. 1 14 Cla s. Arvid Anderson observes the same phenomena, but 
he expresses optimism about its impact. He believes that 
the collective bargaining process is "changing the estab-
lishment of government by orderly means," and has the poten-
tial of improving public service, and, therefore, society.15 
Third, is the concern over public employee strikes 
which can cause interruptions in the delivery of vital ser-
vices to urban citizens. Robert Walsh edited an anthology 
on the subject of public sector collective bargaining and 
the strike; he entitled it, perhaps appropriately, Sorry 
. No Government Today, Unions vs. City Hall. 16 Recent 
well published examples of such strike activity are the 1975 
New York interns' strike, the 1978 Memphis firefighters' 
6 
strike, and the 1976 New Orleans "Marti Gras" police strike. 
The scope of the impact of collective bargaining and 
the strike on urban areas can be viewed in terms of the 
growth in public employment, public employees organization 
and work stoppages over the last ten years. 
In 1955 less than one million government employ-
ees were members of labor organizations; by 1965 
this figure had reached l~ million. However, by 
1975 this figure had jumped to close to 6 million 
-- a 4-fold increase in just 10 years. Propor-
tionally the number of public workers organized 
is virtually double that of their private sector 
counterparts -- 45 percent versus 22 percent. 
In terms of numbers, government employees today 
reflect almost one out of three organized American 
workers, though comprising onl1 one-sixth of the non-institutional labor force. 7 
As of October 1974, 4.7 million of the nation's 9.2 
million full-time state and local government employees (or 
51.5 percent) belonged to employee organizations. This is 
a dramatic increase from 1962 when only 20 percent of the 
then 8 million state and local employees were unionized or 
b 1 d 
.. 18 
e onge to assoclatlons. 
Education has the largest degree of organization, with 
over 72 percent of all full-time teachers in independent 
school districts organized by 1974. This has an affect on 
the total numbers of organized employees because teachers 
accounted for about one-third of all full-time state and 
19 local public employees. 
In Oregon over 45.2 percent of the 621 state and local 
governments (except special districts) engage in collective 
negotiations and meet-and-confer discussions. The inclusion 
7 
of special governmental bodies (e.g. water, port, and rural 
fire districts) would increase the potential number of gov-
ernmental units involved in collective bargaining to 
1,447. 20 This study will generate more data as to the pres-
ent and potential penetration of governmental units by pub-
lic employee organizations in Oregon. 
As stated before, most state laws prohibit the strike, 
however, work stoppages, nonetheless, have been increasing 
at a rapid rate. Samuel M. Sharkey, Jr., points out that 
The public employee strike is the fastest-growing 
phenomenon in the labor relations field. About 
every three days in the first half of 1970, some 21 
city or county was hit by a walkout of its workers. 
Nationally, in 1960 there were 36 public sector strikes 
involving 28,000 workersj by 1972 this figure had increased 
to 381 strikes involving 130,871 workersj22 and by 1976 
(after a high of 490 strikes in 1975) 377 strikes occurred 
resulting in 1.7 million days of idleness and involved 
23 167,136 employees. 
During this period virtually every type of municipal 
service suffered strikes. 24 These strikes have interrupted 
essential services of the urban population, have caused 
"eleventh hour" settlements that have resulted in burden-
some wage settlements, and high-handed tactics by labor and 
public employers alike -- much to the detriment of the ur-
ban citizen and the social fabric. 25 It is within this 
context that this dissertation is considered significant to 
the urban area and within the discipline of urban studies. 
8 
METHODOLOGY 
This study is to be exploratory in method and is de-
signed to analyze the characteristics of the fact-finding 
system, the major actors, their actions, and attitudes. 
It is structured to provide more precise information on 
fact-finding, to generate additional questions and isolate 
and explore problems regarded as important by professionals 
working in the field. 26 The approach is empirical but is 
not intended to explicitly hypothesize causal relationships 
nor lend itself to prediction. The methods used will allow 
explanation about certain aspects of Oregon's public em-
ployee collective bargaining process and its impasse 
27 procedures. 
In short the study will try to answer the major policy 
question of whether the fact-finding step should be re-
tained in Oregon's impasse resolution process. Because it 
is within the context of a political problem, action and 
change, and because the findings are formulated for utility 
and may be useful to Oregon policy makers, this study is 
'd db' 1 l' h 28 conSl ere to e SOCla -po lCy researc . 
This study is multi-operational in that more than one 
method has been used to form the basis of the analysis. 29 
The following discussion is intended to provide an overview 
of the methodology; details may be found in the appropriate 
chapters and in Appendix A, entitled: Methodological Notes. 
9 
I. General Aggregate Data Collection 
In order to gain information on the actors involved, 
their actions, external factors, and the association be-
tween the selected variables, data were collected from the 
fact-finding records of the Oregon State Conciliation Ser-
vice. The study covers all fact-finding cases under the 
new Oregon law from 1974 through 1977 and involves two-
hundred and thirty-nine fact-finding cases (n=239). The 
data were categorized into 19 variables within limits of 
10 
available data, time, and monetary considerations, and their 
potential usefulness to this study (according to the survey 
research and discussion with practitioners). Analysis of 
the aggregate data was conducted by utilizing univariate 
and bivariate statistical techniques. More specific infor-
mation regarding the aggregate data may be found in Chapter 
V, and in Appendix A. 
II. Elite or Authoritative Survey 
Data generated from this method were used to translate 
pratitioners' knowledge and attitudes about fact-finding 
into a form which can be utilized as part of the litera-
30 ture. A personal interview was used to administer the 
survey, and the questionnaire consisted of both closed-ended 
and open-ended questions. The sample included mediators, 
fact-finders, and labor and management representatives. 
The sampling technique employed in the interview schedule 
was non-random because the universe of fact-finding cases 
11 
was known and it was assumed that all persons and/or cate-
gories of experts were not equally experienced nor important; 
and, indeed, some have more insight into the process and much 
, I' f ' 31 t' 1 d 1 . more lmpact on po lCY ormatlons. De al e exp anatlon re-
garding these interviews may be found in Chapters VI and VII, 
and in Appendix A. 
III. Fact-Finding Reports 
The author gained access to fact-finding records and in 
many instances copies of the completed reports. These re-
ports provided information as to the types and numbers of 
issues involved and the parties' actions. 
SUMMARY AND FORMAT 
This study will describe the fact-finding process in 
terms of the actors and their actions. It presents a cen-
sus of the opinions of practitioners in the field to ascer-
tain their views on the effectiveness of the process. 
Furthermore, it will provide conclusions as to how the pro-
cess may be improved. The usefulness of this study will be 
in terms of its contribution to the current information base 
upon which further investigation can occur, and in particu-
lar, to policy makers who will be considering changes in 
the present state law. 
The format of this study consists of seven chapters 
(excluding the Introduction) as outlined below: 
Chapter II provides the historical background that 
12 
places current trends in public sector collective bargaining, 
impasse resolution, and the strike into national context. 
This chapter discusses the pros and cons for public sector 
collective bargaining, important federal and state laws, and 
statistical data on the public sector unions and the role of 
the strike in the public sector. 
Chapter III explains Oregon's public sector labor rela-
tions act and provides information regarding the present and 
potential penetration of governmental units by bargaining 
units in Oregon. 
Chapter IV discusses the nature, purpose and theory of 
public sector impasse resolution, and places emphasis on the 
role of fact-finding and its place in impasse resolution. 
Chapter V describes Oregon's impasse procedures and 
provides an analysis of the fact-finding stage in terms of 
its use, the parties involved, their actions, and some ex-
ternal factors. 
Chapter VI presents and analyzes the views of the neu-
trals (mediators and fact-finders) that are involved in 
Oregon's fact-finding process. 
Chapter VII presents and analyzes the views of the 
parties (both labor and management) involved in Oregon's 
fact-finding process. 
Chapter VIII relates the conclusions and evaluations 
regarding the success of Oregon's fact-finding process. 
Furthermore, recommendations are suggested that may aid in 
making the process more effective. 
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CHAPTER II 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
THE NATIONAL SCENE 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an historical 
background of public sector collective bargaining and a bas-
is for comparison for the remaining chapters. This will bE 
done by looking at the nature and importance of public sec-
tor collective bargaining and impasse resolution nationally. 
This chapter will deal with such basic questions as: What 
is collective bargaining? What are the major philosophical 
objections to extending collective bargaining rights to pub-
lic employees? How has the growth of public employment af-
fected employee organization? What has been the evolution 
and impact of Federal and state legislation permitting pub-
lic sector bargaining? And, finally, what role does the 
strike play in public sector bargaining? 
The General Aspects of Collective Bargaining 
The U. S. Department of Labor defines collective bar-
gaining as: 
. . . negotiations in which both management and 
employee representatives are equal legal parties 
in the bargaining process and decisions are 
reached jointly through bilateral negotiations. 
The end result of collective negotiatioys is a 
mutually binding contractual agreement. 
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The purpose of collective bargaining is to establish 
and maintain mutually acceptable rules and practices to 
guide the parties' actions and obligations in work-related 
situations. The resulting written agreement, or contract, 
becomes the basic rules governing the relationship between 
management and employees. Collective bargaining is an al-
ternative to unilateral control by management. In the U. S. 
the parameters of collective bargaining are set by law and 
the parties bargain within that legal framework. The pur-
ported advantages of the process are four-fold. First, it 
encourages mutual understanding by both sides, thus reduc-
ing conflict and disruption of production. Second, it is a 
way of achieving democracy in the workplace. This is be-
cause the process allows for participation of the workers in 
their own governance. Third, employee organizations are a 
vehicle for worker political representation. Fourth, the 
process is a way to equalize power between employer and em-
ployees. That is, it is seen as a way to insure fairness 
2 between labor and management. 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE OVER PUBLIC 
SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The arguments for withholding from public employees 
the legal right to engage in collective bargaining have 
traditionally rested on three major aspects unique to the 
public sector: (1) the sovereign nature of the state, 
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(2) the separation of powers doctrine, and (3) the structure 
of government financing. 
Sovereignty 
The sovereignty argument rests on the reasoning that in 
our democratic republic, ultimate power and authority {sov-
ereignty} is vested with the people and exercised in trust 
by and through the government. Government, then, has sole 
authority that cannot be shared with a segment of the people 
without violating the trust for all people. Some restriction 
of this authority is necessary in a democracy in order to 
"d "3 aV01 oppress1on. 
iJith respect to public employee labor relations, this 
logic leads to the ideological view that collective bar-
gaining with a small portion of the people consists of re-
linquishing sovereignty (authority) and the renouncement of 
responsibility (trust) by the government. This argument is 
also used for practical reasons by those who fear the impact 
of collective bargaining on government efficiency, manage-
4 
ment prerogeratives, and possible work stoppages. 
Opponents of the sovereignty argument point out that 
the government has long exercised the traditionally recog-
nized right to enter into contract with individuals (e.g., 
doctors and teachers), and to argue that government cannot 
contract collectively is difficult to defend. Furthermore, 
it is pointed out that if government really has sovereignty, 
it can do what it wishes, including bargaining with 
employees. 5 
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In spite of its inherent logic and ideological attrac-
tions, the sovereignty issue has been put to rest for prac-
tical reasons. The current position of the Federal and many 
state governments is that they can agree to bargain when 
given a mandate from the people in the form of specific le-
gislation. Such legislation is seen as a practical means 
of avoiding public employee labor strife, and disruption of 
public services. 
Separation of Powers 
This technique of governing diffuses power among three 
levels of government (federal, state and local), and three 
branches at each level (executive, legislative and judi-
cial). This is in contrast to the private sector where 
power to formulate and execute company policy resides with 
central management. 
The practical problem posed by separation of powers is 
illustrated by the question: with whom does the employee 
organization bargain? The legislative branch determines pay 
and other economic benefits, and adopts basic civil service 
and personnel rules. The executive branch administrators 
have much discretion over administration of personnel poli-
cies. The civil service has had jurisdiction over the merit 
system of hiring, firing and promotion. The courts may 
override any of these units if misapplication of law is 
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involved. Furthermore, various levels of government affect 
employee wages and working conditions; for example, pensions 
may be set at the state level for all public employees with-
in the state, safe working conditions may be set by Federal 
law, while salary levels for local government employees are 
set at the local level. 
In short, the separation of powers doctrine provided in 
our system adds confusion and makes collective bargaining 
difficult at best. 6 
There are also related concerns with respect to public 
finance. 
Public Finance 
There are differences between the financial and market 
structures of the public and private sectors. Some think 
these differences are significant enough to warrant prohi-
bition of a full transplant of the private sector collective 
bargaining model into the public sector. Wellington and 
Winter present this view in a most cogent and comprehensive 
manner in their book The Unions and the Cities. 7 
The argument centers on the idea that in the private 
sector market competition restrains excessive labor demands. 
If increases in labor benefits are greater than productivity 
increases, prices of the product will increase, the final 
result is a decrease in quantity demanded and a decrease in 
employment. Also the substitution effect means that exces-
sively high cost labor will be replaced by lower cost 
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capital (machines) as management seeks their ultimate goal of 
profit. Furthermore, management can seek non-union labor in 
other parts of the country or overseas. Thus, according to 
this view, excessive union demands and social costs are con-
strained in the private sector by market forces. 8 
The economic structure of the public sector, according 
to Wellington and Winter, differs from the private sector 
in two ways that lead to different results. First, the de-
mand for city services is inelastic as the city has a mo-
nopoly on those servies; and, second, the separation of 
powers doctrine leads to public management being fragmented. 
The results are that unions have the capacity to develop an 
abnormal amount of power compared to other segments of the 
con~unity due to the following reasons. First, the union 
can exert political pressure (e.g. lobbying) because it is 
an interest group involved in the political process. 
Second, because the demand for public services is inelastic, 
the citizen (consumer) has no choice but to suffer if a 
strike occurs. In fact, citizens may push the public of-
ficials for a quick settlement in order to avoid discomforts 
caused by a strike. Third, even if a strike occurs, the 
citizen still has to pay for the service. Thus, substitu-
tion is not possible without undue hardship on the citizen's 
standard of living. Fourth, public management cannot easily 
search for capital to replace high cost labor because of the 
political problem posed by unemployment, the lack of the 
profit motive, as well as the inability to borrow 
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satisfactory technologies. Fifth, generous pension plans 
may be given in order to forestall immediate budgetary prob-
lems, which, in turn, may contribute to future budget cri-
sese Because of all of these conditions, unions in the 
public sector are seen to have a disproportionate share of 
power relative to other interest groups, which is a threat 
to the power structure as we have known it. 9 
There is the opposing view that the differences in the 
economic, social, and political costs of collective bargain-
ing in the public and private sectors are not substantial 
enough to warrant the two being treated differently. A sum-
10 
mary of the major points of the argument follows. 
First, in terms of economic power, the U. S. economic 
structure is oligopolistic rather than competitive; that is, 
~ few firms dominate every major market. These firms do not 
engage in serious price competition, rather they compete in 
advertising, packaging and service. These firms deal with 
national unions that are usually industry-wide. Negotia-
tions then, cover most firms, thus concessions to labor are 
passed on to the consumers, who have no real substitutes 
" f"' 1 b d" ""1 11 S1nce most 1rms a or costs an pr1ces are S1m1 are 
The point is that the social costs of collective bargain-
ing in the private sector are much more significant than 
f "d 12 many 0 ten conS1 ere Therefore, it seems neither rational 
nor reasonable to deny privileges to public employees under 
the guise that social costs and forced redistribution of 
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income through public sector collective bargaining are much 
more significant than in the private sector. 
Second, the assumption that the profit motive is fore-
most in private management minds, and results in efficiency 
and resistance to labor, is questionable. Much research 
shows that although profit is a goal, maximum profit is not. 
Other goals such as company growth, prestige, and market 
stability lead management to make decisions that do not max-
imize profit and do not promote maximum efficiency. Thus, 
in the private sector, the profit motive does not promote 
the efficiency and resistance to labor demands to the ex-
tent that is suggested. 13 
Third, the concept t~at private sector labor privileges 
would give public labor too much power reflects a particular 
value and bias. There are volumes of respectable data docu-
menting the abnormal political power wielded by the business 
sector. Many political economists who reflect the position 
of J. K. Galbraith's The New Industrial State would welcome 
more labor power and view it as positive and "counteravail-
ing" to abnormal management power, thus strengthening the 
d . 14 emocratlC process. In short, while it is true that col-
lective bargaining would give public employees more power, 
the question of whether this is undesirable is open to 
debate. 
Fourth, is the pressure of public opinion. The pub-
lic's willingness to tolerate abuse of public employee 
unions is limited. In fact, one can further suggest that 
the separation of powers can hurt unions as much as help 
them because even if management negotiates too much away, 
public pressure could force re-negotiation. 
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Fifth, the potential staying power a public agency 
possesses can be a significant hindrance to the abuse of 
power by a public employee union. This is because the pub-
lic agency is a monopsony (one buyer) that will still re-
ceive general tax revenues in spite of the disruption of 
services. 
Sixth, it may be that the only way to prevent strikes 
in a democratic society is to embrace and improve upon the 
collective bargaining process, and provide acceptable al-
ternativesto the strike. IS 
Thus it is felt that the assumptions underlying the 
view that would deny collective bargaining rights on a fi-
nancial basis are not as realistic, and the implications 
drawn from them not as useful as they purport to be. Cer-
tainly the issue of strike is one that has to be coped with 
in innovative ways to prevent serious employee unrest and 
disruption of public services. However, this has also be-
come true for the private sector as the economy has become 
more sophisticated and private employees and unions strive 
to protect themselves against the full cost of a strike. 16 
Alternative Views 
There is the alternative view that powerful public em-
ployee collective bargaining may force many long needed 
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reforms. When more is given, more can be legitimately asked 
in return (e.g., smaller classes may be allowed, but teacher 
accountability required). Faster application of technology 
to public services may also occur as management is forced 
to consider efficiency. Tenure systems may be modified or 
abolished. Employees of higher quality can be demanded. 
More professional input into decision-making can maker serv-
ices better and more successful. Innovative and more re-
sponsible budgeting techniques and planning have to be 
adopted by management to promote fiscal stability. Finally, 
more involvement of employees in the process can promote 
overall efficiency.17 Private enterprise has already dis-
covered that the paternalistic, hierarchical organization 
models are proving unable to cope with the rapidly changing, 
highly technological world in which we live. 18 In sum, 
there is good reason to think the pressures of powerful 
public employee collective bargaining may provide more posi-
. th . It 19 tlve an negatlve resu s. 
This philosophical debate, however interesting, does 
not detract from the reality that public sector bargaining 
does exist and has become a topic of great interest and 
concern to all levels of government, the public, and labor 
relations experts. This interest and concern stems from the 
recent and rapid growth in public employment and the changes 
in public sector collective bargaining law and increased 
employee organization. 
THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND REASONS 
FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION 
Public Employment 
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Presently there are about 15.4 million civilian public 
employees. The state and local levels of government account 
for over 12.5 million employees, and the federal level for 
2.8 million. Nearly one-half (5.1 million) of the full-
time employment at the state and local level is in the edu-
cation sector. 20 
Local governments account for 7.6 million, or 72 per-
cent, of the full-time employment total. This is a dramatic 
increase from 1967 when the local government full-time em-
ployment was 5.5 million. The average percentage increase 
in state and local government employment between 1967 and 
1977 was 3.5 percent per year.21 Along with this extensive 
and explosive change in the numbers of public sector em-
ployees, carne change in their relationship with the public 
employers. 
General Reasons for Public Employee Organizations 
The increase in public employee unionism may be at-
tributed to a series of forces that culminated in the 
1960's. These forces are briefly discussed below. 
First, economic inequality between private and public 
employees became more pronounced and obvious with the in-
crease in demand for public services. This demand dramati-
cally increased the numbers of public employees, many of 
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whom were younger and more militant. Without an equivalent 
rise in public expenditure, the result was a lag in labor 
compensation between the public sector and private industry. 
Second, the effectiveness of confrontation tactics in the 
political sphere by the civil rights and peace movements, 
and organized labors' step-up in recruitment and work stop-
pages (such as the New York City teachers' strikes of the 
early '60's and the U. S. Postal strike of 1970), demon-
strated to public employees that the traditional union ap-
proach could be effective in improving their lot. Third, 
was the general acceptance of unionism in society and the 
increased sympathy of the public toward extending the same 
labor rights to public employees as had been enjoyed by the 
22 private sector since the Wagner Act of 1935. Fourth, 
there is no doubt that John F. Kennedy's 1962 Executive 
Order 10988 was a landmark decision in encouraging public 
employee unionism, as it had spill-over effects on state and 
local legislation beyond the Federal level for which is was 
intended. 23 
THE EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW 
Federal Law 
Executive Order 10988 was the first overall official 
Federal level policy on union-management relations. While 
some agencies such as the Postal department and TVA had well 
developed collective bargaining systems since the 1930's, 
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most federal bargaining dates from this 1962 Executive 
Order. B. V. H. Schneider summarizes what appear to be the 
Order's most important contributions: 
••• [it] formalizes practices already in exis-
tence in ~any departments; grants rights to em-
ployee organizations and makes these rights 
effective by various compulsions on management; 
reduces considerably the possibility of discrim-
ination because of union activity; strengthens 
grievance procedures; creates a central labor-
management policy; lays down uniform rules for 
all departments, and clearly delineates lines of 
management authority and responsibility within 
agencies and between agencies and the Civil 
Service Commission. 24 
Although E. o. 10988 was a landmark in public sector labor 
relations, it gave "federal unions little more than 'meet-
and-confer' discussion rights. ,,25 
After several years of experience, both labor and man-
agement expressed dissatisfactions with parts of E. o. 
10988. As a result of recommendations by President 
Johnson's 1968 "Wirtz Committee," and President Nixon's 
1969 "Special Study Committe," further amendments were made. 
The suceeding Executive Order 11491 issued by Richard Nixon 
in 1969 (and further amendments in 1971) made important 
changes in E. o. 10988. Eugene C. Hagburg and Marvin J. 
Levine summarize these changes: 
It instituted exclusive recognition as the only 
form of union recognition. It also removed from 
the individual federal agencies and departments 
much of the authority they had retained for labor 
management affairs during the seven years of E. o. 
10988, vesting this authority instead in a coor-
dinated federal labor relations system, with the 
Department of Labor now playing much the same role 
in the Federal sector as does the NLRB in the pri-
vate sector. Executive Order 11491 also broadened 
the scope of negotiability in several areas of 
working conditions. It also permitted agencies to 
negotiate agreement providing for binding neutral 
arbitration of employee grievances. Other types 
of third party intervention now include mediation, 
fact-finding and binding interest arbitration super-
vised b~ the FMCS and the Federal Service Impasse 
Panel. 2 
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In 1975, Executive Order 11838 was issued was President 
Ford. This order further amended E. O. 11491. It broadened 
the scope of negotiations, and mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining. It also changed procedure to encourage agency-
wide bargaining, and added vigor to negotiated grievance 
procedures. 27 
The Impact of Federal Law 
These Executive Orders encouraged union organization, 
and by 1975 more than one-half of all federal employees were 
represented by labor organizations holding exclusive repre-
sentation rights. The six largest unions involved at the 
Federal level are the American Federation of Government 
Employees (AFGE}i the National Federation of Federal Em-
ployees (NFFE) i the National Treasury Employees Union 
(NTEU); the National Association of Government Employees 
(NAGE}i the Metal Trades Council (MTC) i and the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists (lAM). Table I indicates 
that by 1975 these six unions were involved in labor agree-
ments covering approximately 3,000 recognized unions and 
some 960,000 federal employees. 
The growth in federal sector collective bargaining can 
be seen in Table II. It shows that federal employees in 
TABLE I 
Exclusive Recognitions and Agreements by Major Union, November 1975 
Recognition Employees Units Under Employees Percent 
Union Units Represented Agreement Covered Covered 
1. AFGE 1,724 670,029 1,223 589,613 88 
(WG 205,496) 
(GS 464,533) 
2. NFFE 690 136,071 521 116,465 86 
(WG 32,674) 
(GS 103,397) 
3. NTEU 101 83,868 100 83,778 100 
(WG 502) 
(GS 83,366) 
4. NAGE 333 77,878 236 72,134 93 
(WG 33,484) 
(GS 44,394) 
5. MTC 51 58,629 49 58,560 100 
(WG 55,382) 
(GS 3,247) 
6. lAM 96 32,859 90 32,362 98 
(WG 29,392) 
(GS 3,467) 
TABLE II 
Total Employees in Exclusive Units and Covered by Agreement, 1963-1974 
Employees in Exclusive Units 
Employee, 
Wage System General Schedule Covered by 
Total Employees Employees Employees Agreement 
----_._--- --.-----~ .. 
Yeara Total Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number P.rcen, 
1963 180,000 
1964 230,543 12 110.573 
1965 319,724 16 241,850 
1966 434,890b 21 226,150 40 179,293 15 291,532 
1967 629,915 29 338,660 54 291,255 21 423,052 
1968 797,511 40 400,669 67 396,842 28 556,962 
1969 842,823 42 426,111 72 416,712 29 559,415 
1970 916,381 48 429,136 81 487,245 ·35 601,505 
1971 1,038,288 53 437,586 84 600,702 42 707,067 
1972 1,082,587 55 427,089 83 655,498 46 753,247 
1973 1,086,361 56 404,955 84 681,406 47 837,410 
1974 1,142,419 57 406,000 82 736,419 48 984,553 
a 1963-1966 statistics are based on figures as of midyear; 1967-1974 figures are as of November. 
UWage system ann Qeneral schedule combined dn oM equal total due to unavailability of information. 
. -
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Source: Cited in Eugene c .. Hagburg, and- Marvin J. Levine, 
Labor Relations (St. Paul: West, 1978), pp. 177-178. 
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exclusive bargaining units increased from 180,000 in 1963, 
to 1,142,419 by 1974. Presently over one-half of all eli-
gible federal employees are covered by collective agree-
ments, and there are indications that this percentage could 
increase within the near future. 28 Furthermore, the union 
activity at the federal level has had spill-over effects on 
the state and local levels of government. 
state Laws 
Before 1962 no state had passed a law granting compre-
hensive labor rights to public employees as guaranteed the 
private sector under the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts. 29 As 
a result of E. o. 10988, its succeeding amendments, and the 
general reasons previously mentioned, a series of state laws 
and succeeding amendments have been passed that, unlike the 
federal government, resemble the private sector model pro-
vided under the National Labor Relations Act. 30 
A detailed analysis and comparison of various state 
laws will not be presented in this dissertation. Rather, 
summary information is presented to show the recent develop-
ment of public employee bargaining legislation in various 
states, the wide variety in philosophy, scope, and coverage 
of their laws, and the impact of such legislation on public 
employee unionism and bargaining. 
Presently forty-one states (82 percent) have some type 
of labor relations policy that recognize all or some of pub-
lic employees' right to organize and be represented for the 
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purpose of collective bargaining. In virtually every state 
in the Union and the District of Columbia there are public 
employee organizations engaged in collective negotiations 
d/ d f d · . 31 an or meet-an -con er lSCUSSlons. 
In the absence of Federal law or guidelines, the laws 
of each state vary. In 1978 Hagburg and Levine summarized 
them as follows: 
Ten states have enacted "comprehensive" statutes 
covering all public employees, state, county and 
municipal: Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon and 
Pennsylvania . . 
Sixteen states (Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin) have com-
prehensive laws mandating broad-scope collective 
bargaining on wages, hours, and conditions of employ-
ment for state and local government employees . . 
Five states (Michigan, Nevada, Oklahoma, Vermont, 
and Washington) have mandatory, comprehensive, full-
scope bargaining laws for local government employees 
alone . . . 
One state (Alaska) has a mandatory, comprehensive 
full-scope bargaining law for state employees, while 
leaving local government bargaining to the option 0 
political subdivisions .... 
Three states (Delaware, Vermont, and Washington) 
have a limited form of collective bargaining for 
state employees which excludes wages and fringe 
benefits from the scope of bargaining . 
Delaware has a comprehensive law for local gov-
ernment whose governing bodies opt for coverage . . 
Three states (California, Kansas, and Missouri) 
have mandatory meet-and-confer laws covering state 
and local government employees . .. A number of 
states have laws for selected groups such as teach-
ers, firefighters, police and nurses. 
The remainder of states have either permissive 
meet-and-confer laws or else lack labor legisla-
tion for public employees. A few, like Ohio with 
its punitive Ferguson Act, have no strike la~~ but 
make no provision for collective bargaining. 
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The variation in state laws has resulted in a broad range of 
approaches to the scope of bargaining, union security, 
grievance disputes, neogitations, and impasse resolution. 
The few states' laws which have given public employees a 
limited right to strike (Alaska, Pennsylvania, Hawaii, 
Montana [nurses], Vermont and Oregon [excluding protective 
services]) also vary in terms of their approach to work 
stoppages. 33 
The Impact of State Laws 
The impact of state legislation on public employee 
unionism and bargaining is demonstrated in the Tables 111-
VIII. 
Table III provides membership data on the three largest 
unions at the state and local level. It does not include 
the National Education Association (NEA) which is the larg-
est state and local employee organization. This profession-
al association has 1.8 million members. The largest union 
is the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME), with 750,000 members, followed by the 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) with 475,000 members 
and the International Association of Fire Fighters, with 
175,000 members. Table III also shows that AFSCME and the 
AFT more than tripled membership in the 1964-1976 period. 
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One of three state and local employees belong to one of 
h . 34 these t ree un~ons. 
TABLE III 
MEMBERSHIP OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIONS, 1964-1976 
(in OOO's) 
UNION 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
AFSCME 234.8 281.3 364.5 444.5 529.0 648.2 750.0 
AFT 100.0 125.0 165.0 205.3 248.5 444.0 475.0 
NAFF 115.4 115.0 132.6 146.1 160.3 171.7 175.0 
TOTAL 450.2 521.3 662.1 795.9 937.8 1,263.8 1,400.0 
Source: U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, 1976, Washington Post, September 8, 1976. 
Table IV provides data on the percent of full-time 
state and local government employees who belong to employee 
organizations. It shows that in 45 states between 25 and 
70 percent of full-time public employees, including teach-
ers, are organized. Table V indicates that distribution of 
organized employees is skewed heavily toward local govern-
ments, as over 3.7 million or 79 percent of the organized 
employees are at the local level. 
Table VI considers the full-time employees organized by 
function and level of government. It indicates that at the 
local level, fire protection and teachers have the highest 
proportion of organized employees, with 71.6 percent and 
TABLE IV 
DISTRIBUTION OF STATES BY PERCENT OF 
FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES ORGANIZED 
Number of States 1 by type 
Percent of full-time of employee 
employees organized All Teachers All other 
employees . only employees 
Total •••••••• 51. 51 51 
Less than 25 ••••••• 3 
-
22 
25 to 39.9 ••••••••• 22 1 8 
40 to 54.9 ••••••••• 11 6 12 
55 to 69.9 ••.•.•.•• 12 26 7 
70 to 84.9 •••.••••• 4 13 2 
85 or more ••••••••• 
-
5 -
- Represents zero. 
lIncludes the District of Columbia. 
TABLE V 
ORGANIZED FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES, BY 
LEVEL AND TYPE OF GOVERNMENT 
Level and type of 
government 
Total ••••••••••••••• 
State govelnments ••••••••• 
Local governments ••••••••• 
Counties •••••••••••••••• 
Municipalities •••••••••• 
Townships ••••••••••••••• 
Special districts ••••••• 
School districts •••••••• 
Organized full-time 
employees 
Number Percent 
4,736,962 100.0 
991,634 20.9 
3,745,328 79.1 
502,163 10.6 
1,075,727 22.7 
124,208 2.7 
119,035 2.5 
1 924 195 40.6 
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Labor Management Re-
lations in State and Local Governments: 1976 (Washington, 
D . C . : GPO, 1978), p. 1. 
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72.1 percent respectively, of full-time employees belonging 
to employee organizations. 
Table VII provides data on governments with a labor re-
lations policy. It shows that 12,327 local governments 
(15.8 percent of the total) have labor relations policies 
and are engaged in collective negotiations and/or meet-and-
confer discussions with employee representatives. This 
figure increases to 21 percent when special districts are 
excluded as they are not heavily involved in collective 
negotiation and/or meet-and-confer discussions. Table VIII 
provides data on state and local government labor management 
agreements by type and level of government. It shows that 
over 96 percent of the labor-management agreements occur at 
the local level. 
In summary, presently 41 states and 9,064 local govern-
ments have 25,242 bargaining units as of October, 1976. 
These 25,242 bargaining units represent some 4.7 million 
employees or almost 50 percent of the full-time state and 
local government employees. School districts have the most 
agreements and organized employees, while special districts 
have the least. 
The political and economic impact this recent surge in 
collective bargaining has had, and will have, on state and 
local government is not yet totally understood. One spe-
cific issue that has generated considerable concern and 
controversy centers on the rights of public employees to 
strike. 
TABLE VI 
PERCENT OF FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES ORGANIZED, 
BY FUNCTION AND LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 
IBtate and 
state Local local Function govern- govern-govern-
ments ments 
ments 
Total •••••••••••• 49.8 38.2 54.1 
For selected functions: 
Education •••••••••••• 58.3 28.6 64.9 
Teachers ••••••••••• 68.6 34.3 72.1 
Other •••••••••••••• 37.9 25.6 44.8 
Highways ••••••••••••• 44.3 53.5 36.0 
Public welfare ••••••• 41.3 39.3 43.0 
Hospltals •••• ~ ••••••• 39.5 47.7 30.3 
Police protection •••• 54.3 51.8 54.7 
Local fire protection 71.6 
-
71.6 
Sanitation other than 
sewerage •••••••••••• 49.2 
-
49.2 
All other functions •• 36.9 36.2 37.3 
- Represents zero. 
TABLE VII 
GOVERNMENTS WITH A LABOR RELATIONS POLICY, 
BY LEVEL AND TYPE OF GOVERNMENT 
Government. 
Level and type of Number of reporting a labor 
government govern- relations policy 
ments 
Number Percent 
Total ••••••••• 78,268 12,368 15.8 
State governments ••• 50 41 82.0 
Local governments ••• 78,218 12,327 15.8 
Counties •••••••••• 3,044 671 22.0 
·Municipalities •••• 18,517 2,175 11.7 
Townships ••••••••• 16,991 840 4.9 
Special districts. 23,885 654 2.7 
School districts •• 15,781 7,987 50.6 
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Labor Management Re-
lations in State and Local Governments: 1976 (Washington, 
D . C.: GPO, 19 78), P . 1- 2 . 
37 
TABLE VIII 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS, BY LEVEL AND TYPE OF GOVERNMENT 
Total Contractual Memoranda of 
Level and Type agreements understanding 
of Government 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Total ............. 27,418 100.0 20,922 100.0 6,496 100.0 
State governments ........ 1,052 3.8 708 3.4 344 5.3 
Local governments ........ 26,366 96.2 20,214 96.6 6,152 94.7 
Counties ............... 2,204 8.1 1,750 8.4 454 7.0 
Muni ci pa Ii ti es ......... 6,154 23.8 4,939 23.6 1,575 24.2 
Townships .............. 2,559 9.3 2,286 10.9 273 4.2 
Special districts ...... 1,017 3.7 705 3.4 312 4.8 
School districts ....... 14,072 51.3 10,534 50.3 3,538 54.5 
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Labor-Management Relations in State and Local 
Governments:1976, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), p. 4. 
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THE ROLE OF STRIKES 
Public sector strikes have been deemed inappropriate 
(unlawful) by the Federal and most state governments. These 
laws, however, have not prevented strikes, and recently it 
has become one of the most pressing issues in public sector 
labor relations. 35 The question persists whether public em-
ployees ought to have the right to strike, and if not, what 
substitute institutions or procedures can be developed that 
will lead to a balance of power between employee and employ-
er, yet still protect the public interest and democratic 
process. 
Theoretical Background 
In the private sector the strike has long been accepted 
as the last stage in an exercise in power by the employees 
to secure increased wages and improved working conditions. 
It is seen as an instrument of force that brings about a 
balance of power between employer and employee and thus 
strengthens the cGllective bargaining process. Furthermore, 
it allows the parties to impose the economic costs-of dis-
agreement on one another, as the termination of work ad-
versely affects workers' incomes and the production and 
sales schedule of the employer. It is the economic loss, 
or threat of economic loss, posed by a strike that induces 
both parties to alter their stances and adopt more reason-
bl b .. 36 a e argalnlng postures. 
40 
Because of market forces and the fact that strikes are 
seldom industry or nationwide, the spill-over costs to 
society are generally seen as not seriously burdensome. 37 
There are, however, circumstances when private sector 
strikes can be detrimental to public health and safety. Be-
cause of those circumstances private sector strikes can be 
enjoined under the national emergency provision of the Taft-
Hartley Act. Thus, the private sector does not have an un-
, , d 'h t t 'k 38 l1m1te r1g t 0 s r1 e. 
Labor relations experts conclude that the strike is 
necessary in the private sector in order to balance power 
between employer and employee, and in order to be consis-
tent with the democratic ideal of voluntarism. Further-
more, it is concluded that generally the strike is not an 
overriding burden to the public interest. However, this 
view does not prevail for the public sector. 39 
Rationale for Prohibition of Public Sector Strikes 
Many of the arguments against public employee strikes 
follow the same reasoning as those against public employee 
bargaining, which were discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Briefly, because there are no substitutes for public ser-
vices (such as water, sewer, garbage, fire, and police) the 
demand is inelastic, and therefore, a strike would place 
unusual burdens on the citizens. This gives the union 
power beyond what they would have in the private sector 
where the market prevails. Also because of the separation 
41 
of powers, the union and public can exert political pressure 
on city officials. This pressure curbs the staying power of 
the agency involved, leads to quick settlements, and results 
in an imbalance of power to the union's advantage. 40 
There are those who also argue that a strike (seen as 
an economic weapon) is not "sportsmanlike" in the public 
arena, where politics determines the allocation of scarce 
41 public resources. And, of course, there is the sover-
eignty argument which stresses that public employees should 
not be able to strike because of possible threat to the 
42 
sovereignty of the government. 
counterarguments 
The arguments that advocate the right to strike for 
public employees are just as persuasive. First, in our 
democratic republic all citizens are to have the same op-
portunities, and to treat public employees as "second 
class" citizens is not at all consistent nor is it accepta-
43 ble to democratic ideals and the people. Second, there 
are no reliable studies that show that there is a signifi-
cant difference between the elasticity of public and pri-
d d . 44 vate sector goo s an serVlces. Third, private sector 
strikes result in social and economic costs, just as public 
sector strikes do. Either both should be legal or illegal, 
as it makes little sense to separate them on the basis of 
. 45 
soclal costs. Fourth, the private sector does exert po-
litical pressure as well as economic pressure during strikes 
as well as in their everyday decision-making; to believe 
otherwise would be naive. 46 Fifth, there appears to be no 
42 
marked difference between the ability of public and private 
sector officials to accept long strikes. 47 Sixth, it is 
claimed that without the right to strike, a balance of power 
cannot be accomplished between public employees and public 
employers; that is, if the employer in the end can say "take 
it or leave it; but if you strike, you go to jail," then the 
48 
whole purpose of collective bargaining is destroyed. 
Probably because both sides' arguments contain grains 
of truth, middle-of-the-road positions have emerged that 
purport to encourage good faith bargaining by the use of 
some negative pressures. One such view does not condone 
public sector strikes carte blanc, but seeks political sub-
stitutes for the strike such as mandatory mediation, fact-
f ' d' d 'bl I ' t b't t' 49 ln lng, an POSSl e compu sory lnteres ar 1 ra 10n. 
Another view suggests that public employee strikes should be 
allowed according to the degree of vulnerability of the pub-
lic. For example, protective services (police and fire) 
50 
should not be allowed to strike; however, teachers could. 
Still another approach would be progressive work stoppages, 
where the numbers of employees and hours involved in a pub-
lic employee strike would increase in specifically desig-
nated stages so as to progressively exert pressure on both 
'd 'th t ' It h bl' 51 Sl es Wl ou a severe JO to t e pu lC. 
Presently, only six states give a limited right to 
strike to public employees. Most states have adopted the 
43 
middle-of-the-road position, legislating various combina-
tions of "political" substitutes for the strike. Yet strike 
activity persists. However, before reviewing strike activ-
ity an alternative view shall be considered. 
An Alternative View 
In the author's opinion the mainstream of labor rela-
tions experts have bogged themselves down in a futile de-
bate. The u. s. economic structure is highly complex, 
inter-related, and concentrated. The role of government is 
so pervasive, and there are so many relationships between 
the private and the public sector that it is very difficult 
to tell where one begins and the other ends; and therefore, 
where the general public interest begins and ends. 
Strikes in both sectors cause externalities (spill-over 
effects) beyond their immediate realm (e.g., coalminers' 
strike of 1977-1978, or the Memphis firefighters' strike of 
summer 1978). Because of these externalities, it is becom-
ing increasingly apparent that the strike, whether in the 
private or public sector, is an outmoded means of settling 
labor disputes. This is why political substitutes such as 
impasse resolution techniques, are being sought to replace 
the strike, or at least make the strike the last rather 
than the first resort. 52 
At the root of the problem is the push by employees for 
more participation in the decision-making process both in 
the private and public sectors. Therefore, political 
44 
substitutes for the strike are stopgap measures that help 
avoid chaos, but do not deal with the root of the problem. 
The challenge then, in the long run, is developing institu-
tional arrangements that incorporate labor into the deci-
sion-making process, thus de-emphasizing and even eliminat-
ing the role of strike (and strike substitutes), since labor 
views and needs would have been recognized before major con-
flict arose. This view is in its infancy; however, there 
are public and private administration practitioners and 
h " "d 1 h 1"" 53 t eorlsts attemptlng to eve op suc po lCles. 
Recent Strike Activity 
As stated before, most state laws prohibit strikes; 
however, work stoppages have been increasing at a rapid 
rate. For example, nationally, in 1960 there were 36 pub-
lic sector strikes involving 28,000 workers; by 1972 this 
figure had increased to 381 strikes involving 130,871 
workers, and by 1976 (after a high of 490 strikes in 1975) , 
337 strikes occurred resulting in 1.7 million days of idle-
54 
ness, and they involved 167,136 employees. 
Table IX relates 1976 data on state and local govern-
ment work stoppages. It reveals that school districts ex-
perienced the largest number of strikes, 155 or 41 percent 
of the total stoppages, and the most days-of-idleness 
(638,878). Municipalities had 121 strikes or 32 percent 
of the total stoppages, that involved 66,839 employees and 
resulted in 524,515 days of idleness. 
TABLE IX 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES, BY LEVEL AND TYPE OF GOVERNMENT 
Employees involved Duration (days) Days of idleness 
Number of (employees x days) 
Level and type of government work Average Average Average stoppages Total per Total per Total per 
stoppage stoppage stoppage 
Total ••••••.•••••••• _ •••••• 377 167J 136 443 3,320 8.8 1 J 653 J 791 4 J 386.7 
State governments ••.••••••••••••• 27 28,125 1,042 293 10.9 124,458 4,609.6 
Local governments •••••••••••••••• 350 139,011 397 3,027 8.7 1,529,333 4 J 369.5 
Coun ties •.•.•.•....•••••.•••••• 40 13,305 333 377 9.4 163,514 4,087.9 
MUnicipalities ••••••••••••••••• 121 66,893 553 716 5.9 524,515 4,334.8 
Townships ••••.••.•••••••••••••• 9 174 19 100 11.1 1,269 141.0 
Special districts •••••••••••••• 25 10,086 403 292 11.7 201,157 8,046.3 
School districts ••••••••••••••• 155 48,853 315 1,542 9.9 638 J 878 4,121.8 
-----------
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Labor Management Relations in State and Local 
Governments: 1976 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), p. 5. 
"'" U1
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Table X shows that education was the government func-
tion most affected by strike; however, virtually every type 
of service seems to have been affected to some degree. 
Most work stoppages during this 12 month period oc-
curred during the renegotiation phase of an existing labor 
contract and three-fourths of all stoppages concerned dis-
putes of an economic and/or hours-of-work nature (similar to 
issues in the private sector). The most frequently-used 
method to resolve these disputes (38.3 percent of all cases) 
was direct negotiations between the parties. Resolution in-
volving a third party ended 25.5 percent of all stoppages 
{the majority by mediation}; slightly less than 15 percent 
of all cases were ended by court injunction, and about 21 
percent by other means such as volunteer return by employ-
ees or dismissal of employees engaged in the work 
55 
stoppage. 
Given the rate and magnitude of public sector strike 
activity, and the resulting damage to the urban citizen and 
social fabric, labor relations experts have developed poli-
tical procedures that are intended to replace the strike. 
These substitutes, referred to as impasse resolution proce-
dures will be discussed at length in Chapter IV, after an 
examination of the legal setting and extent of public sec-
tor collective bargaining in Oregon in the next chapter. 
TABLE X 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES BY FUNCTION 
Employees involved Duration (days) Days of idleness 
Number of (employees x days) 
FunCtion work Average Average 
stoppages Average Total per Total per Total per 
stoppage stoppage stoppage 
Total •••••••••••••••••••••• 377 167,136 443 3,320 8.8 1,653,791 4,386.7 
Education •••••••••••••••••••••••• 184 84,466 459 1,740 9.5 915,725 4,916.8 
Teachers ••••••••••••••••••••••• 146 58,230 399 1,355 9.3 595,210 4,016.8 
Other •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 98 26,236 268 1,061 10.9 320,515 3,270.6 
Highways ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 65 6,619 102 590 9.1 62,021 954.2 
Public welfare ••••••••••••••••••• 17 7,796 459 195 11.5 81,843 5,161.2 
Hosp! tals •...•...•...•..••.••.••• 17 25 , 513 ] , 501 242 14.2 123,039_ 7,237.6 
Police protection •••••••••••••••• 27 3,004 111 132 4.9 7,430 275.2 
Fire protection •••••••••••••••••• 21 1,181 56 51 2.4 2,641 125.8 
Sanitation ••••••••••••••••••••••• 40 3,107 78 239 6.0 18,285 457.1 
~ll other functions •••••••••••••• 118 35,450 300 i,010 8.6 436,801 3,701.8 
Source: U. S- Bureau of the Census, Labor Management Relations in State and Local 
Governments: 1976 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), p. 5. 
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CHAPTER III 
TIlE LEGAL SETTING AND EXTENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN OREGON 
In spring 1973, the Oregon State Legislature passed 
a comprehensive public employee collective bargaining act 
which included a limited right to strike. The intent of 
this act was to provide a uniform basis for collective bar-
gaining among all state and local public employees while 
protecting the public from the interruption of government 
services. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the evolu-
tion, the purpose, the major provisions, and the major legal 
controversies surrounding the law. This discussion will be 
followed by a description of public sector employment in 
Oregon, and a study of the present and potential penetra-
tion of collective bargaining in Oregon's various govern-
mental units. 
Evolution of the Law 
Oregon's present collective bargaining law is a result 
of an evolutionary process. As early as 1959, the Oregon 
legislature passed an AFL/CIO-sponsored bill that would give 
~ 
extended collective bargaining rights to public employees 
and allow public employers to bargain with employees. This 
54 
bill was vetoed by Governor Hatfield. Again in 1961, a per-
missive collective bargaining bill was introduced that pro-
vided for use of the State Conciliation Service in the 
event of negotiations impasse. This bill did not get out 
f "t 1 o comml tee. 
In 1963, an AFL/CIO-sponsored bill was passed that be-
carne the forerunner of present Oregon law. This bill was 
permissive in that it did not mandate, but authorized, col-
lective bargaining for public employees. It also authorized 
parties to use the State Conciliation Seivice in case of an 
impasse in negotiations and prohibited strike by public em-
2 ployees. The bill provided no new mechanics for employees 
to select their bargaining agent, and its permissiveness re-
suIted in the establishment of very few bargaining units in 
local government, and none in the state service. 3 
In 1965, the Oregon Education Association (OEA) , a 
National Education Association (NEA) affiliate, sponsored a 
bill to remove school teachers from the 1963 statute and 
place them under a meet-and-confer law. This bill became 
law and encouraged employee organization and collective bar-
"" " hId" " 4 galnlng ln sc 00 ~strlcts. During the same session, the 
legislature passed an amendment to the 1963 law that was 
backed by the Oregon State Employees Association (OSEA). 
This act required any unit of government that had a civil 
service commission to establish and administer procedures 
for certification and elections of bargaining units. 5 This 
in effect mandated collective bargaining in the state 
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government and five counties that had civil service commis-
sions. By mid 1966, OSEA had established itself as bargain-
ing representative for about 9,400 state employees in 37 
agency-wide units, and had arrived at collective bargaining 
agreements with the state. However, collective bargaining 
at the local level was a confused issue, and only one civil 
service city (Milwaukie) adopted procedures under the 1965 
amendment. 6 The more populous cities such as Portland and 
Eugene, adopted their own ordinances covering public employ-
ee collective bargaining. 
In 1969, the State Civil Service Commission was abol-
ished, and state-level personnel management was centralized 
in a personnel division under the Governor's Executive De-
partment. A new agency, the Public Employees Relations 
Board (PERB), was given responsibility to administer quasi-
judicial review functions over the administration of the 
merit system. PERB was also given responsibility for admin-
istering the collective bargaining law for state employees 
and for local government who chose to place themselves under 
state law. PERB also inherited the State Conciliation Serv-
ice from the State Bureau of Labor. 7 Further proposed 
amendments included changes in definitions of "collective 
bargaining" and "employment relations" similar to the Taft-
Hartley Act. Also PERB was to have jurisdiction over unfair 
labor practice and contract violations complaints, as well 
as settlement of negoitations impasse, including fact-
finding with recommendations. A last minute change in the 
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definition of "public employer" resulted in the bill being 
interpreted as permissive by local governments. The impact 
was that collective bargaining at the local level was not 
considerably stimulated. 8 
The 1971 legislature broadened the subjects that were 
covered under the teachers' meet-and-confer law, and placed 
classified school employees under that law. By this time 
several local governments were bargaining with their employ-
ees under a variety of local ordinances, while some local 
governments refused to bargain with their employees. 9 
The Redden Committee 
Because of the lack of uniformity among city and county 
ordinances, and the recognition that public sector collec-
tive bargaining was here to stay, Governor McCall appointed 
a three-man task force in 1972 to study the problem of col-
lective bargaining at the state and local level and to de-
velop legislative recommendations for the 1973 legisla-
10 ture. 
This task force (The Redden Committee) presented its 
recommendations in the form of House Bill 2263 (R. B. 2263), 
to the House and Senate Committees on Labor and Industrial 
Relations in the spring of 1973. The task force's most sig-
nificant proposed changes in the 1969 law were: First, that 
all public employees and all State and local governments 
(including school and special districts) would have the 
right to bargain and enter into bargaining agreements. This 
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reflected the committee's thought that public employees 
"should be welcomed to the world of the first class citizen" 
and that a single inclusive act would produce more rational 
methods to deal with public employee relations. ll Second, a 
number of unfair labor practices were specified and a board 
granted authority to rule on complaints and seek court en-
forcement of its orders. Third, the machinery was provided 
for bargaining-unit determination and impasse resolution. 
The committee proposed positive legislation as the "best way 
to harness and direct the energies of public employees, 
h ., h' k' d' t' ,,12 eager to ave a VOlce ln t elr wor lng con 1 lons. 
H. B. 2263 emerged from the house committee considera-
bly amended and liberalized. It provided for major changes 
in the 1969 law and reflected considerable research on other 
state laws (in particular Michigan, Wisconsin and Hawaii). 
It incorporated a very progressive labor relations philoso-
phy and procedure because it used much language from the 
13 Taft-Hartley Act. 
By summer 1973, the legislature had passed H. B. 2263 
with amendments that included a limited right to strike for 
all public employees except those in protective services. 
It was considered by many labor relations experts to be a 
model law. An attempt was made to refer the law to the pub-
lic for a referendum vote; however, the attempt failed. The 
law became effective in October, 1973. 14 
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The Purpose of the Law 
The intent of the law appears in the legislature's 
policy statement under ORS 253.656. First, it declares 
th~t the people of the state have a fundamental interest in 
the development of harmonious relations between qovernment 
and its employees. Second, it is recognized that collective 
bargaining is one way to alleviate labor problems. Third, 
it embraces the concept that in both the private and public 
sectors protection of labor rights and negotiations by law 
safeguards the public from the impact of uncontrolled labor 
strife. Fourth, it states that a redress of power between 
public employers and employees was in order. Fifth, it ac-
cepts the state's obligation to protect the public from dis-
ruption of governmental services. Sj.xth, it is intended to 
provide a uniform basis for organizaticn recognition, nego-
.. . d . 1 . 15 tlatlons an lmpasse reso utlon. 
In summary, the Oregon State Legislature passed a law 
that provides a uniform basis for ~ll public employers and 
employ~es to engage in collective bargaining as a means to 
promote improvement of labor relations and to protect the 
public interest. The purpose of the following section is 
to discuss the major features of the law. 
Major Provisions of Oregon Law 
The law grants the Employee Relations Board (ERB) the 
power to administer the law. The composition of the board 
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was changed by an amendment in June, 1977. This amendment 
(H. B. 2676) was in response to the need for full-time ERB 
members, in lieu of part-time members, to handle the in-
creased workload and provide more professional and careful 
consideration of the decisions required by the board. The 
amendment reduced the ERB from five part-time to three full-
time members, who are trained or experienced in labor man-
agement relations. It also requires the Governor to con-
sider the interests of labor, management, and the public in 
k · . f h b d h . 16 rna lng appolntments 0 t e mem ers an c alrpersons. 
Representation Matters. If a question of representa-
tion exists, and a valid petition from an employer, a labor 
organization or public employees has been received, the ERB 
must conduct a hearing to determine the bargaining unit, 
conduct secret ballot elections, and certify the winner as 
the exclusive bargaining representative. The hearings may 
be waived if all parties agree to the bargaining unit and 
1 t · 17 consent to an e ec lon. 
In order to request an election, a labor organization 
must represent 30 percent of the employees. Any other union 
wishing to be on the ballot must represent at least 10 per-
. 18 
cent of the employees. The law prohibits an election for 
one year from the time of the last election in order to in-
bl b 'l' 19 sure reasona e sta 1 lty. 
Unfair Labor Practices. The law charges the ERB to in-
vestigate any complaint of an unfair labor practice com-
mitted by a labor organization or a public employer. If, 
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in the board's opinion, such a practice may exist, a hearing 
is held within 20 days of the written complaint. The board, 
after the hearing, has the power to issue orders of cease 
and desist, reinstate employees with or without back pay, or 
.. hI. 20 dlsmlSS t e comp alnt. 
Negotiation and Scope of Bargaining. The law requires 
the certified labor organization and the public employer to 
meet at reasonable times and bargain in good faith over eco-
nomic benefits and employment relations. 2l "'Employment re-
lations' includes, but is not limited to, matters concerning 
monetary benefit~, hours, vacations, sick leave, grievance 
22 procedures, and'other conditions of employment." 
The law does not attempt to establish negotiation time 
limits that coincide with the July to July fiscal year bud-
getary deadlines that are required by laws of public employ-
ers. Problems relating to this will be discussed in later 
chapters. 
Miscellaneous Provisions. The law provides that the 
parties may agree to submit to binding arbitration on grie-
23 
vances and conditions and terms of a contract. It man-
dates a dues check off and permits fair-share agreements and 
24 the agency shop. 
Impasse Resolution. The· law sets up mandatory steps 
for impasse resolution should collective negotiations break 
down. The steps follow the familiar pattern of mediation, 
fact-finding, and a cooling-off period. If these efforts 
are unsuccessful they are followed by compulsory arbitration 
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for the protective services, or strike for all other public 
employees. Mediation services are provided by the State 
Conciliation Service which is under the auspices of ERB. 
Fact-finding and arbitration services are paid for by the 
parties. The Conciliation Service maintains fact-finding 
and arbitration lists and administers the selection process 
when such services are needed. 25 Figure 1 is a flow chart 
showing the basic steps in the impasse resolution process. 
Details of this process will be discussed in Chapter V. 
COOLING-OFF 
PERIOD ................ __ .\ 
/ ~ 
STRIKE 
or 
FACT-FINDING 
,....?' 
INTEREST 
ARBITRATION 
(For Protective 
Services) MEDIATION 
~ 
IMPASSE 
,,-?f 
NEGOTIATIONS 
Figure 1. The Oregon Impasse Resolution Process 
Strike. Oregon's law grants a limited right to strike 
to all public employees, except those in the protective 
services (police, fire, and institutional guards). Thirty 
days after a fact-finding report has been made public, and 
10 days after notice of intent to strike has been submitted, 
1 'k 26 emp oyees may strl e. 
When a strike is occurring or is about to occur, a pub-
lic employer may petition the circuit court for an injunc-
tion, provided it is demonstrated such a strike is a "clear 
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and present danger or threat to the health, safety or wel-
fare of the public." If the court issues an injunction, it 
must submit the dispute to final and binding arbitration 
within 10 days of the injunction. 27 
The law prohibits certain types of strikes. Employees 
not in the appropriate bargaining unit involved in the dis-
pute are prohibited from striking. Employees cannot strike 
without first utilizing the impasse procedure (mediation, 
fact-finding, the 30 day cooling-off period, and 10 day in-
tent to strike notice). Also, strikes over a grievance of 
f " I b " hOb" d 28 un alr a or practlce are pro 1 lte . 
Major Legal Controversies Surrounding the 1973 Law - The 
Home Rule Issue 
Application of the law has resulted in much contro-
versy. The controversy centers on the home rule issue. 
The Oregon Constitution prohibits the State Legislature 
from enacting, amending or repealing any city charter,29 and 
prohibits state legislation on matters of "county con-
30 
cern." In Heinig v. Milwaukie, the Oregon Supreme Court 
held that the State Constitution prevents state legislature 
enactment on matters of "local concern." This decision in-
validated a statute which would have required all cities to 
establish a civil service system for firemen. "Unfortunate-
ly, the opinion provides minimal and conflicting criteria 
for determining 'local concern' in other situations.,,31 
This case has provided a basis for local governments to 
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challenge the application of the State Legislature's 1973 
collective bargaining act. 
In 1974, the City of Beaverton filed suit challenging 
application of the state collective bargaining law to cities 
and counties that have horne rule status. The city argued 
that although its local labor relations ordinance was in 
conflict with state law, collective bargaining was a matter 
of local concern and that the state law was unconstitutional 
as it applied to a city. The case was remanded back to the 
Employees Relations Board in order to attempt to determine 
what areas of labor relations are of predominantly local 
d h h f . d 32 concern an t e ones t at are 0 state-wl e concern. 
ERE conducted and completed hearings of this subject by 
April, 1976. However, an ERB order was not issued due to 
another Supreme Court decision to set aside, on technical 
grounds, a similar case involving the city of Hermiston. 
This case is still pending. 33 
During January 1978, the Supreme Court ruled on another 
case (involving employee pensions) that established a new 
standard with respect to horne rule when, in LaGrande/Astoria 
v. PERB, it was held that 
. a state 1aw with social, economic, or other 
regulatory objectives would prevail over local law 
if it does not interfere with the local c~rnrnunity's 
freedom to choose its own pol~tical form. 4 
The court agreed to reconsider this case and heard oral ar-
gument. Since that reconsideration the decision has been 
seen to address itself to the horne rule issue as it applies 
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to retirement and insurance for police and fire workers, and 
11 . b .. 35 not to co ectlve argalnlng. 
Because this series of Supreme Court decisions did not 
result in a definitive ruling, many ERE rulings involving 
unfair labor practices and representation disputes were not 
issued because until the home rule issue was resolved, any 
such rulings would be opinion and non-binding. As a result, 
Oregon's collective bargaining law is accepted only by those 
home rule counties and cities that want to accept the law. 
However, ERB acts as if it has authority and exercises its 
powers unless its actions are appealed. Some home rule 
counties and cities have-utilized the mediation and fact-
finding services of ERB by mutual agreement of the parties, 
and on a voluntary basis. 36 
Because no outstanding court ruling has decreed this 
law unconstitutional, the ERB recently issued a backlog of 
orders to several home rule cities in cases involving unfair 
labor practices and representation disputes. If these 
orders are challenged or ignored by the cities, the court 
will probably be asked again to rule on the constitutional-
ity of the law. 37 In the meantime, labor has worked and 
continues to work within these constraints until the issue 
is settled. 
The consensus of local officials is that their major 
concern is not collective bargaining rights or the right to 
strike, but rather, the portion of the law which mandates 
compulsory binding arbitration for police and fire 
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scrvices. 38 Although these court actions have not stopped 
organizational growth and effective collective bargaining, 
they may have been slowed in areas such as special districts 
and small cities. Furthremore, until the court makes a 
definite ruling on the constitutionality of the law, public 
employee labor policies will not be as comprehensive nor as 
consistent as the legislature intended. 
OREGON'S PUBLIC SECTOR 
Composition 
Following the national trend, public employee organiza-
tion and collective bargaining have been increasing in Ore-
gon since the passage of the state's comprehensive bargain-
ing statute in 1973. 
Table XI provides data on public employment in Oregon 
by level of government and function from 1974 through 1977. 
While the total state and local government employment in-
creased by 16,700 through these years, or almost 12 percent, 
that pattern of increase was n6t uniformly found in all 
areas. 
Non educational employment at the state and local level 
showed the greatest growth during this period, with increases 
of 19 percent and almost 18 percent respectively. 
Educational employment grew just over 2 percent at the 
state level and almost 9 percent at the local level; both are 
below the 12 percent average growth for all public 
Level of 
Government 
State Total 
TABLE XI 
NUMBERS OF OREGON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: 
BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT AND FUNCTION 
DECEMBER 1974 - DECE~1BER 1977 * 
YEAR 
'74 '75 '76 '77 
46,800 49,900 51,000 52,000 
State Education 22,100 22,900 23,300 22,600 
State Non-
Education 
Local Total 
24,700 27,000 27,700 29,400 
95,000 100,300 103,200 106,500 
Local Education 60,300 62,900 64,800 65,600 
Local Non-
Education 34,800 37,400 38,400 40,900 
State and Local 
Total 141,800 150,200 154,200 158,500 
Federal 26,200 26,900 27,004 27,000 
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Percen-
tage 
Change 
74-77 
11.1% 
2.3% 
19.0% 
12.1% 
8.7% 
17.5% 
11.7% 
3.0% 
Source: Phone interview with Don Stewart, Chief, Research 
and Statistics, Oregon State Employment Division, 11 April 
1978. 
*Annual average including part-time, temporary, CETA and 
seasonal employees. 
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employment in Oregon. This perhaps reflects the passage of 
the post WW-II baby boom and the changing composition of 
demand for educational services. This also may be one fac-
tor that is contributing to the relatively high degree of 
public sector unionism in the education sector of Oregon 
that will be explained in the next section. 
In summary, Tably XI shows that Oregon's public sector 
labor relations law covers over 150,000 public employees; 
some 50,000 are at the state level, while over 100,000 are 
39 
at the local level. By function, education represents the 
greatest number of those employees, as 62 percent of local 
and 44 percent of state employees are involved in the educa-
tion sector. 
Organized Employees 
Recent Bureau of Census studies show a substantial num-
ber of Oregon's public employees are organized. Table XII 
presents data on the percent of Oregon public employees who 
belong to labor organizations. These statistics show that 
57.5 percent of state full-time equivalent (PTE) employees 
and 61.8 percent of local PTE employees were organized in 
1975, whereas the percentages were 50.1 percent and 66.3 
percent in 1976~ This reflects a 9.5 percent decline in 
state and an 8.2 percent gain at the local level. The larg-
est percent increase in organization during the 1975-76 
period came in special districts at the local level -- over 
20 percent increase -- and in municipalities over 15 percent. 
TABLE XII 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED EMPLOYEES, BY TYPE OF GOVERNMENT, 
OCTOBER 1975 AND OCTOBER 1976 
State and type of iovernaent 
OREGON 
STATE GOVERNMENT • • 
LOCAL GOvERN'~NTS ••• 
COUNTIES ••••• 
MUNICIPALITIES •• 
SPECIAL DISTRICTS. • •• 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS • • • • 
Tbtal full-time eaployment 
October October I Percent I 
1975 1976 change 
311 386 35 72ij 3.9 
76 707 77 290 0.8 
12 929 12 608 -2.5 
12 647 12 3'6 -2.5 
5 619 6 006 6.9 
45 512 ij6 340 1.8 
Full-tlae eaployees who belong to an employee o~anlzatlon 
Percent October 1975 October 1976 c.:han~e 
I October 1975 to !iWllber 
I 
Percent NUilber Percer. t October 
1976 
19 780 57.5 17 896 50.1 -9.5 
-.7 373 61.8 51 259 66.3 8.2 
5 867 ij5.ij 5 5261 'I3.B I -5.8 6 ij'l' 50.9 7 '117 60.1 I 15.1 2 55ij ij5.5 3 076 51.2 20.'1 
32 509 71.ij 35 2ijO 76.0 8.'1 
Source: U. S. Bureau of Census, Labor Management Relations in State and Local Govern-
ment~: 1976 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), p. 15. 
Note: Data are Bureau of Census estimates. 
0\ 
OJ 
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The latter increase is especially significant given the 2.5 
percent decrease in municipal employment for the same 
period. 
Table XIII compares organized employees by function. 
This table shows that in Oregon, teachers were the most 
organizec at the local level in 1976 (78.8%), followed by 
firefighters (68%) and policemen (61%). At the state level 
the most organized workers in 1976 were non-teaching educa-
tion workers (72.1%), followed by highway personnel (66.4%), 
hospital employees (53.7%) and teachers (51.1%). The great-
est growth in employee organization at the local level in 
the 1975-76 period was in hospitals with an incredible 254 
percent increase! At the state level, the greatest gain was 
in police protection (state police) -- 66.7 percent; all 
other functions experienced a decline in employee organiza-
tion. 
Table XIV provides an overview of the impact of collec-
tive bargaining in Oregon. It shows the state and local 
governments with labor relations policies, bargaining units 
and represented employees by type of government in October, 
1976. Of the 1,447 governments in Oregon (including school 
and special districts), 312 are engaged in collective nego-
tiations and/or meet-and-confer discussions. This involves 
612 bargaining units, and results in 624 labor agreements. 
These data reveal the significance of public sector collec-
tive bargaining in Oregon. In order to assess the potential 
Source: 
ments :. 
Note: 
TABLE XIII 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED EMPLOYEES, BY FUNCTION, 
OCTOBER 1975 AND OCTOBER 1976 
S ta t p and type 01 iovel13JlOll t 
OREGOH 
STATE GOVERNMENT • • • • 
EDUCATION. . 
TEACMERS •• 
OTHER •••• 
HIGHWAYS ••• 
PUBL IC ;VELf" ARE 
HOSPITALS ••• 
POL IC E PIIOTECT ION. • • • • • 
ALL OTHER f"UNCTIOHS. 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. 
EDUCATION •• 
TEACHERS ••• 
OTHER. • • • • • • • • 
HIGHWAYS • • • • , • • 
PUBLIC WELf"ARE • 
~OSPITALS. • • • • • • • • • • • 
POLICE PROTECTION ••••••• 
rJR£ PROTECTION •••••••• 
Total full-t.t .. e.plo)'JMnt 
rull-Ilile' ecployepJ: _bo beolong to an ~.ployC'e Ofl(anlEaUOD 
I 
Percent 
October 1975 Octo~r 1976 chana., 
'----------,-----------r-------1----------lr---------t-----------r--------loe.Obrr lV75 ~ '0 
Octobf.r Percent Huaber Percent October 1878 1975 
31! 3B6 I 
9 9171 
I! 3811 
5 533 1 
3 69B I 3 11110 
'I 528 
1 1151 11 6BB 
76 7071 
115 512, 
31 7951 
13 717 
3 635 
'1711 
2 DOl! 
II 310 
2 722 
35 7211: 
9 921 I 
'I 292 I 
5 629 i 
) 5110 I 
3 902 
II 61121 
1 155 
12 5611 I 
77 290 
116 3110 f 
32 B2B 
13 512 
3 575 
liB'! 
1 693 
II 079 
2 650 
I 
).9 I 
IZI I 
-2.1 i 
1.7 
-4.3 i 
13.'1 " 2 5
3.6 
7.51 
O.B I 
1.B , 
3.21 
-1.5 
-1.7 
2.1 
-15.5 
-5.11 
-2.6 
19 7BO 
6 59" 
2 262 
/I 'J2 
2 5ll 
1 967 
2 802 
3 
5 881 
117 373 
'2 509 23 '179 
9 030 
2 1118 
120 
1611 
2 672 
I 
57.51 
66.5. 
51.6\ 
78.3, 
68.5 
57.2 i 
61. 9 1 0.3 
50.) 
61.8 
71.4 
7'.8 
65.8 
59.1 
25.3 
17 896 
6 255 
2 195 
II 060 
2 350 
1 593 
2 1191 
5 
5 202 
51 259 
'5 2110 I 
25 862 
9 378 
2 OBI 
160 
581 
2 IIB3 
50.1 
63.0 
51.1
1 
n.l 
66.11 
110.8 
53.7 
0.11 
111.'1 
-9.5 
-5.1 
-3.0 
-6.J 
-7.2 
-19.0 
-11.1 
66.7 
-11.5 
8.2 8." 10.1 
J.9 
-3.1 
ll.J 2'".' 
-7.1 
-10.9 
SANITATION OTHER THAN S~ERAGE • • •••• 2611 
17 786 
llO 
1B 139 
25.0 
2.0 
2 02' 
180 
7 557 
8.2 
62.0 
711.3 
68.2 
'12.5 
1 BO' 
199 
8 712 
66.) 
76.0 
78.8 
69.11 
58.2 
)J.l 
311.3 
60.9 
68.0 
60.3 
118.0 
10.6 
ALL OTHER f"UNCTIONS ••••••• 
U. 
1976 
S. Bureau of Census, 
(Washington, D.C.: 
15.' 
Labor Management Relations in State and Local Govern-
GPO, 1978), P. 28. 
Data are Bureau of Census estimates. 
-....J 
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TABLE XIV 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LABOR RELATIONS POLICIES, BARGAINING UNITS, AND 
REPRESENTED EMPLOYEES, BY STATE AND TYPE OF GOVERNMENT: OCTOBER 1976 
Itell 
OREGON 
~uMSER C' GOVERNMENTS, 1972. 
bDVERNME~TS wITH LABCR RELATIONS 
POLICIES, TOTAL •••••• 
By TYPE OF POLICYI 
COLL~CTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ONLY ••• 
~EET ANU CONFER DISCUSSIONS ONLY • 
BOTH CO~LECTIVE ~EGOTIATIONS AND 
MEET AND CONFER DISCUSSIONS ••• 
TOTAL EHDLOY~ENT • • • • •• 
FULL-TIME EHPLOYEES ONLY. 
AvERAGE OCTOBER EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME 
t~?LOYE£S • • • • • • • • • • • 
EMP~CVEES COvERED BY CONTRACTUAL 
AGREEHE~TS. • • • • , • • 
~u~6ER OF BARGAINING UNITS , , • 
~uH~ER OF EMPLOYEES IN BARGAINING 
U~ITS • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 
IN GOVERNMENTS nITM COLLECTIVE 
~EGOTIATIONS ONLY ••••••• 
IN GOVERNMENTS ~ITH HEET AND CONFER 
ONLY •••••••••••••••• 
IN GOVER~HEhTS WITH BOTH COLLECTIVE 
NEGOTIATIONS AND HEEi AND CONFER. , 
PERCENT OF EMPLOYEES IN BARGAINING 
UNITS • • • • • • • • • • • • •••• 
IN GOVER~MENTS WITH COLLECTIVE 
NEGOTIATIDNS ONLY ••••••••• 
IN GOVERNMENTS WITH MEET AND CONFER 
ONLY •••••••••••••••• 
IN GOVERNMENTS WITH BOTH COLLECTIVE 
NEGOTIATIONS AND MEET AND CONFER •• 
- represents zero 
Stot .. Ind 
local 
governments 
1 ijij7 
)12 
HII 
61 
107 
156 237 
11) 01~ 
1 058 
80 02ij 
612 
87 185 
ij2 690 
ljij7 
ijij 0~8 
55,8 
27.3 
0.3 
28.2 
Sht .. 
gov· .. rnment 
1 
51 586 
35 nil 
1 1113 
21 131 
63 
25 566 
25 566 
'19.6 
ij9.6 
Tohl 
1 '1116 
311 
111'1 
61 
106 
1011 651 
77 290 
1 01'1 
58 893 
549 
61 619 
ij2 690 
'Iij7 
18 1182 
58.9 
110.8 
0.'1 
17.7 
Counties 
36 
28 
16 
2 
10 
111 285 
12 608 
97ij 
7 375 
70 
8 019 
'I 568 
21 
3 '130 
56.1 
32.0 
0.1 
211.0 
Locil governm .. nts 
~'un1Cl­
pIli ties 
231 
39 
23 
) 
1) 
15 260 
12 336 
1 0.,8 
7 001 
116 
7 380 
ij 7211 
I'll 
2 515 
'18.'1 
31.0 
0.9 
1('.5 
TOlr'nships Spec 10 1 I Schoo I districts district. 
826 
)1 
17 
II 
10 
7 551 
6 006 
1 111 
2 957 
37 
2 996 
1 307 
19 
670 
39.7 
17.3 
0.3 
22.1 
353 
213 
88 
52 
7) 
(,7 555 
ij6 3110 
1 000 
III 5(,0 
326 
~) 2211 
32 091 
2(,6 
10 8('7 
611.0 
117.5 
. 0.11 
16.1 
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Labor Management Relations in State and 
Local Governments: 1976 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), p. 52. 
Note: Data except for bargaining units are census bureau estimates. -...J I-' 
number of possible bargaining units, an impact or penetra-
tion study has been generated. 
Impact Study 
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To aid in assessing the importance and potential im~ 
pact of collective bargaining in Oregon, it is useful to 
compare actual bargaining units with the number of possible 
bargaining units. Because there is no centralized bureau 
in Oregon that calculates this information, and because 
census data are usually two years out of date, and because 
census data are based upon samples rather than a full count, 
this study has provided estimates of penetration informa-
tion. The information sought is the potential numbers of 
bargairiing units by level of government, considering func-
tions at each level, and the percent of those potential 
bargaining units that have been organized. The percentage 
is referred to as the percent or degree of penetration. 
Some assumptions about the number of potential collec-
tive bargaining units in each type of governmental unit have 
been made in order to calculate the degree of penetration. 
These assumptions are based upon the practical knowledge of 
experienced practitioners in Oregon labor relations and on 
the population of each unit. Furthermore, actual bargaining 
unit data is based upon the most recent Oregon figures, 
practitioners' estimates, and in some cases the 1976 Bureau 
40 
of Census report. 
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Assumptions are made regarding the potential number of 
bargaining units in state, county, city, school district, 
IED, community college, and higher education, based on func-
tions in each of these government, units. 
1. The state has an actual 83 bargaining units with a po-
tential of 108 units. 
2. Counties are categorized by population size into three 
groups and have potential units as follows: 
Counties 
under 50,000 
over 50,000 
Within SMSA's 
Number of Bargaining Units 
2 units (e.g. sheriff and all 
other) 
4 units minimum and 5 units 
maximum (e.g. sheriff, nurses, 
parks, roads, clerical, and 
health) 
5 units minimum and 7 units 
maximum (e.g. sheriff, parks, 
roads, clerical, health, cor-
rections, and court employees) 
3. Cities are categorized by population and have potential 
units as follows: 
Cities 
under 1,500 
1,500-2,500 
2,500-10,000 
10,000-50,000 
Salem (83,170) 
Number of Bargaining Units 
zero units 
1 unit 
2 units (fire and police) 
4 units minimum and 5 units 
maximum (e.g. fire, police, 
parks, roads, and clerical) 
4 units minimum and 6 units 
maximum (e.g. fire, police, 
parks, roads, and clerical) 
Cities 
Eugene (100,450) 
Portland (384,500) 
Number of Bargaining Units 
4 units minimum {e.g. fire, 
police, parks, roads and 
clerical} 
12 units (actual) 
4. School Districts are categorized by Average Daily 
Membership (ADM): 
Districts 
ADM under 9,000 
ADM over 9,000 
Portland 
Number of Bargaining Units 
2 units (faculty and staff) 
2 units minimum and 3 units 
maximum (e.g. faculty, staff 
and patrol) 
has an actual of 4 units with 
a potential of 6. 
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5. Intermediate Education Districts (lED) are categorized 
by the population of the counties in which they are located: 
Districts 
In counties under 
50,000 
In counties over 
50,000 
Within SMSA's 
Number of Bargaining Units 
1 unit 
2 units 
2 units minimum and 3 units 
maximum 
6. Community Colleges have a potential of two units 
{faculty and staff}. 
7. Higher Education (which is included in the state 
figures) has a minimum and maximum of two units per campus 
(faculty and staff) in the state colleges, and a maximum of 
five units per campus in the universities (e.g. faculty, 
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staff, graduate students, supervisors, and other miscellan-
eous groups such as T.V. operators, guards or nurses). 
8. Special Districts are categorized by the population of 
the area in which they exist. 
Within SMSA's 
All others 
Data Sources 
1 unit minimum and 2 units 
maximum. (This is conserva-
tive as some have much more 
than that. e.g., Port of 
Portland negotiates 8 con-
tracts) 
1 unit 
The categories and numbers of each type of government 
are taken from a computer printout from the Department of 
State dated 11/03/75. 41 Population categories were deter-
mined by use of the July 1, 1977, Population Estimates of 
Counties and Incorporated Cities of Oregon, published by 
the Center for Population Research and Census, Portland 
State University, Portland, Oregon. 
Actual .unit estimates reflect the most recent data and 
estimates from agencies and labor relation practitioners in 
Oregon. Where this is unavailable, the most recent U. S. 
Bureau of Census estimates are used. 42 
The Results 
The aggregate data generaged from these assumptions are 
reflected in Table XV. This table compares the potential 
number of bargaining units with the actual number of units 
by the type of government and population. The last column 
TABLE XV 
ACTUAL AND POSSIBLE BARGAINING UNITS BY TYPE OF GOVERNMENT, BY POPULATION IN OREGON 
I 
Actual I Estimated 
Possible Individual Units Units Percent Penetration 
Number Least I Most ! 
in Possible Total Possible Total 
Category ndividual Least Individual Most Highest Least ~LP~C>f __ Gc-"e_rn:nent _~19 ~l_u~i ~s _____ Po_ss).b~eE~ni ts I Possible 197B Penetration Penetration 
State Total 1 85 B5 lOB lOB B3 98% 77% 
(includ~ng higher 
education) 
Counties Total 36 lOB 125 70 65% 56% 
Und"r.50,OOO 23 2 46 2 46 
Over 50,000 7 4 2B 5 35 
Within SMSA 5 5 25 7 35 
Multnomah 1 9 9 9 9 
City Total 239 253 2B3 116 46% 41% 
under 1,500 127 0 0 0 0 
1,500 - 2,500 37 1 37 1 37 
2,500 - 10,000 46 2 92 2 92 
10,000 - 50,000 26 4 104 5 130 
Salem (B3,170) 1 4 4 6 6 
Eugen<:> (loa, 450) 1 4 4 6 6 
Portland (384,500) 1 12 12 12 12 
Education Total 369 721 734 700 97\ 95% 
(PS + lED) 
Public Schools 340 6B2 690 
ADM under 9,000 333 2 666 2 666 
ADM over 9, 000 6 2 12 3 18 
Portland 4 4 6 6 
UD 29 39 44 
In co. ur.der 
50,OGO 19 1 19 1 19 
In co. over 
50,000 5 2 10 2 10 
Within SMSA 5 2 10 3 15 
Conrnunity College 13 2 26 2 26 26 100% 100% 
Higher Education B 2 16 3 24 15 94% 63% 
(Counted in State) 
Special Districts 
Total 930 937 l,13B 93 10i 8% 
Within SMSA's 201 1 201 2 402 
All Others 728 1 728 1 728 
Port of Portland 1 8 8 1 8 
-...J 
All State and Local 0\ 
Government Total 1,596 2,141 2,348 1,103 
shows the percentage of penetration. The table shows the 
minimum number of individual public employees bargaining 
units at the state and local level to be about 2,100, with 
a conservative maximum figure of about 2,400. 
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The education sector has the highest percent of pene-
tration by collective bargaining units. Specifically, pub-
lic schools have between 95 percent and 97 percent of the 
potential bargaining units already bargaining; community 
colleges are 100 percent penetrated, and higher education 
at least 62 percent penetrated, and possibly as high as 94 
percent penetrated. With the exception of higher education, 
there is little if any room for collective bargaining growth 
in Oregon's education sector. This level of organization 
may be due to several factors, including the national power 
of the NEA, decline in enrollment, and the long experience 
with meet-and-confer laws that stimulated school districts 
bargaining years before the other sectors. 
The state is second highest with at least 77 percent 
and possibly 97 percent penetration. This is due to the 
1965 law that encouraged collective bargaining at the state 
level. 
Counties have the third highest rate of collective bar-
gaining, with a minimum of 56 percent and a maximum of 70 
percent of the potential bargaining units already in exist-
ence. It is expected that when, and if, the Oregon Supreme 
Court makes a definite ruling in favor of the constitution-
ality of the 1973 state law, that county penetration will 
78 
increase very rapidly. Although data relating penetration 
and population is ~ot available, it is theorized that the 
more populous counties (such as Multnomah, Washington and 
Clackamas) presently are organized to a higher degree than 
the less populous counties, thus future increases in organ-
ization and collective bargaining would most likely take 
place in counties that are not presently within a Standard 
Metropolitan Service Area (SMSA). 
Cities are between 41 percent and 46 percent penetra-
ted. This is most likely due to the impact of the horne rule 
issue. It is expected that once this issue is resolved, 
a very rapid increase in organization and bargaining units 
will take place at the city level. It might be further the-
orized that because the cities have resisted complying with 
the law that it is within the city sector that many future 
labor relations problems may exist. 
Table XV shows that special districts have the least 
amount of penetration by bargaining units, with about 10 
percent. Because many are so small, and diverse, it is 
expected that special districts will remain relatively the 
least organized, even when substantial growth is considered. 
Implications 
The amount of resources needed by public employers in 
Oregon to engage iri collective bargaining, and all its as-
pects, is substantial (especially considering the costs of 
negotiation and impasse resolution). When one considers 
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the changes in management techniques necessary, along with 
budgetary aspects, one can appreciate the concern over the 
effectiveness of Oregon's collective bargaining law and the 
vast changes it is bringing about. 
Of particular concern to Oregon, as with the rest of 
the nation, is the effectiveness of the impasse resolution 
procedure as away to avoid public sector strikes. The next 
chapter will deal with the theoretical aspects of impasse 
resolu·tion so that Oregon's impasse procedure may be placed 
in a theoretical or philosophical context. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE GENERAL NATURE AND THEORETICAL BASIS OF 
IMPASSE RESOLUTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
This chapter will investigate the purpose, theory, and 
nature of impasse resolution. The three basic types of im-
passe resolution -- mediation, fact-finding, and interest 
arbitration -- will be covered, along with a brief discus-
sion on various combinations and hybrid forms of the three. 
However, the emphasis will be placed on fact-finding -- the 
central topic of this dissertation. 
The Purpose 
Impasse is defined as: "A situation in collective bar-
gaining which occurs when the employer and the union, both 
1 
negotiating in good faith, fail to reach agreement." In 
the private sector such disputes, or impasses, have tradi-
ticnally been resolved through use of mediation services or 
by the exercise of economic power in the market place, with 
the unions' ultimate weapon being the strike and the em-
ployers' the lockout. 
Because of its negative impact on the public interest, 
use of the strike has almost universally been deemed inap-
propriate in the public sector. The challenge has then been 
to develop procedures that will facilitate reaching a set-
tlement of an impasse, within the framework of voluntary 
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collective bargaining between public employers and employ-
2 
ees. Impasse resolution procedures, then, are designed to 
encourage the resumption of good faith bargaining and pro-
gressively introduce a higher level of intervention by some 
neutral third party.3 Legislators considering impasse reso-
lution are advised by Roy Wesley not to "make impasse reso-
lution machinery too attractive, available and unrisky or 
the parties will give up on the hard work of bargaining and 
turn their dispute to others. ,,4 His statement reflects our 
nation's commitment to free collective bargaining as a ve-
hicle operating within a framework of law for the parties 
to resolve their problems voluntarily, rather than to sub-
mit to government imposed settlements. 
In short, impasse resolution procedures have been de-
veloped as political substitutes for the strike, with the 
intention of protecting government functions from serious 
disruption and at the same time granting public employees 
similar labor rights guaranteed private sector employees 
under the Taft-Hartley Act. 
Before discussing the modes of impasse resolution, it 
must be emphasized that even under the best of conditions 
impasse procedures will not always work and that the public 
must accept the fact that some public sector strikes will 
occur. Recent United States experience has shown that out-
lawing public sector strikes has not prevented them. This 
suggests that the strike should be ullowed as a tool of 
last resort after all alternatives have been fully explored.5 
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The three basic forms of public sector impasse resolu-
tion are mediation, fact-finding, and interest arbitration. 
These terms are defined below: 
Mediation, often referred to as conciliation, 
"mean[s] the use of a neutral third party(s) as 
intermediary to assist in the resolution of a 
dispute without the authority to impose a 
~ettlement."6 
Fact-finding, "involves the appointment of a re-
spected, neutral third party who is chosen to 
study the facts underlying a dispute and to issue 
a report with specific recommendations for a fair 
settlement. "7 
Interest arbitration occurs when a neutral third 
party adjudicates over the terms and conditions 
of employment and where the decision is binding on 
both the contending parties. 8 
These strike substitutes, or alternatives, take a variety of 
forms which reflect the level of government, state laws, and 
the controversy over which form and/or combination of forms 
is the most viable method of impasse resolution. 9 
IMPASSE RESOLUTION LAW 
Federal Sector impasse resolution procedures, which 
cover employees of the Executive Branch (excluding postal 
employees), are set forth in Section 16 and 17 of E.O. 
11491. 10 Section 16 charges the Federal Mediation Service 
(FMCS) to "provide services and assistance . . . in the 
resolution of negotiation disputes . . . and under what cir-
cumstances and in what manner it shall offer services." 
These services include preventive mediation (assistance by 
a neutral third party prior to impasse) and mediation. 
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Section 17 provides further procedures if mediation fails. 
In this case the Federal Service Impasse Panel (FSIP), may 
at the request of either party or on its own initiative, 
consider the matter, and may determine that fact-finding or 
arbitration is necessary as a final step. Federal employees 
are prohibited from striking by section 19 of the same act. 
In the case of fact-finding, the FSIP makes recommen-
dations based upon the fact-finders' report; and if the 
parties do not accept their recommendations or settle with-
in thirty days, the FSIP can require binding arbitration. ll 
Because the parties do not know in advance exactly what 
mechanism the FSIP will recommend, the parties are encour-
aged to continue to bargain rather than to rely on a third 
1 h " d" 12 party to reso ve t elr lspute. 
The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 allows postal 
employee unions and the federal government to adopt their 
own procedures for impasse resolution; however, if such 
procedures are not established or are ineffective, the FMCS 
will establish a tripartite fact-finding panel that reports 
findings with or without recommendations. If no agreement 
is reached after fact-finding and the parties have not de-
cided upon arbitration, a tripartite arbitration board will 
d b " d" d "" 13 ren er a ln lng eC1Slon. 
Anthony V. Sinicropi and Thomas P. Gilroy summarize 
federal level impasse resolution by stating that: 
. . . E. O. 11491 and the Postal Reorganization Act, 
stress the use of voluntary arrangements by the 
parties supported by the use of mediation, fact-
finding and arbitration where voluntary arrange-
ments fail. The postal procedures rely heavily 
upon the "outside neutral" while the Executive 
Order includes the use of a permanent impasse 
~tructure through the use of the FSIP and the 
FLRC.1 4 
State legislation dealing with impasse resolution, as 
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mentioned before, reflects a wide diversity of institutional 
arrangements. A Department of Labor Publication reported in 
1972 that: 
. at least thirty-four states had enacted le-
gislation with interest dispute procedures in 
public employment . .. [They] range in em-
ployee coverage from one specific occupational 
group, such as teachers to statutes with compre-
hensive coverage . . . . At least twenty-five 
states provided in some way for mediation of ne-
gotiation disputes . . . . The provisions for 
mediation differ among and within states with 
respect to how the procedure is initiated, who 
provides the service, the use of one mediator 
or a panel, the relationship of mediation to 
other impasse procedures, and provisions for 
payment of costs . . •. At least twenty-three 
states authorize the use of fact-finding~ . . . 
As with mediation, there is considerable vari-
ation in the relationship of fact-finding to 
other procedures within states . . . . Twenty-
three states had legislation authorizing vol-
untary or compulsory arbitration for the reso-
lution. of some or all outstanding issues in 
certain public sector disputes . . . . Eleven 
states •.. provided for compulsory arbitra-
tion of certain interest disputes. lS 
Appendix D summarizes the type of state interest dis-
puteprocedures provided by various state laws. 
The diversity of state impasse procedures is reflected 
in the differences between th~ three West Coast states. 
Oregon law provides a uniform impasse procedure that re-
quires mediation, fact-finding, and a cooling-off period; 
these are followed by compulsory interest arbitration for 
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the protective services and strike for all other public em-
16 ployees. 
The state of Washington has an extremely fragmented 
legal framework for public sector collective bargaining. 
The impasse procedures vary greatly among the eight laws 
that cover different categories of public employees. The 
Washington State Public Employment Relations Commission 
(PERC) does not administer all of the laws. 17 For example, 
non-uniformed personnel in cities, counties, and special 
districts are required to use PERC mediation, while uni-
formed personnel (police and fire) are required to use 
mediation, and may invoke a fact-finding panel, and may 
invoke interest arbitration. The right to strike is not 
18 granted. State community colleges may use PERC mediation 
and fact-finding services upon consent of both parties. 
h · f . k 1· 19 h T ere lS no re erence to a strl e po lCy. In t e 
Washington State Ferries System either party may invoke 
PERK final and binding arbitration,20 while there is no ref-
erence to impasse· procedure covering state civil service 
. . 21 
employees. In short, in the State of Washington collec-
tive bargaining laws and impasse procedures differ accord-
ing to governmental levels and function. 
California, like Washington, does not grant the right 
to strike to public employees, and the impasse procedure 
22 
varies with the type of government. For example, parties 
involved in municipal disputes may appoint a mutually agree-
able mediator,23 while teachers are required to use the 
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state mediation and fact-finding services. 24 In California 
disputes involving state employees are covered by a Govern-
or's Executive Order. The governor's representatives issue 
a written report on differences between the parties and this 
report is made public. 25 
This brief overview of the Oregon, Washington, and 
California approaches to impasse resolution serves to demon-
strate that states are experimenting with wide varieties of 
types and combinations of impasse resolution. These exper-
iments are based upon particular characteristics that 'each 
type is purported to possess. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPASSE RESOLUTION 
Mediation 
Mediation, which is also used extensively in the pri-
vate sector, is the most non-controversial and acceptable 
form of impasse resolution procedure because it is compati-
ble with voluntarism. It is at the mediation stage of im-
passe resolution that most disputes are resolved. 26 The 
mediator serves as a go-between who "has no power of com-
pulsion but only of persuasion~ and therefore aids parties 
in reaching their own compromises through the collective 
b .. '27 argalnlng process. 
In order to fulfill this role, the mediator meets with 
both sides, jointly or separately, in order to assess the 
issues, explore possible compromise, and advise the parties 
on how to sell proposals to their constituents. Roy Wesley 
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states that "He [The mediator] is not concerned with fair-
ness or justice of the solution. His objective is to reach 
one, period.,,28 
In order to accomplish this goal, a mediator must have 
the confidence of the parties. Their confidence is based 
upon a m~diator's ability to assume a posture of complete 
neutrality. Robert G. Howlett, when discussing the role of 
the mediator, concluded: 
A mediator did not force anyone to do anything. 
He shared, but never betrayed confidences. Like a 
closed-mouth mistress, he eased frustrations; and 
like the experienced lady of the brothel, did not 
need the passion of an advocate. 29 
Mediation, however, is not always successful for two 
reasons. The first involves the shortage of competent med-
iators, the second the parties' attitudes. 
Arnold Zack attributes the shortage of competent media-
tors to the lack of familiarity of public sector problems by 
private sector mediators. The shortage is aggrevated by the 
cyclical pattern of public sector bargaining, which results 
in many negotiations reaching impasse in the same state at 
thE: same time. 30 Such shortages of competent mediators may 
leave the parties in a position where a mediator is not 
available, or worse yet, where the mediator causes more 
problems than he helps solve. 
The second problem is summarized by William Bo' Gould, 
who states that "mediation cannot achieve anything if the 
parties refuse to budge from their respective positions. 
The best of mediators cannot unsnarl recalcitrant parties 
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and untractable issues."31 
There are several alleged reasons for such extreme 
positions. First, the uniqueness of the public sector gives 
both employer and employee more staying power than in the 
private sector.- Second, because collective bargaining is 
relatively new to the public sector, both parties may be 
inexperienced and naive about the process; and in the em-
ployers' case, even hostile toward collective negotiations 
with the employees over whom the public employer previously 
has had unilateral control. 32 Third, both parties may be 
encouraged to hold back settlement in hopes that fact-
finding or arbitration will bring a more favorable settle-
ment. 33 
When the mediator is unable to persuade the parties to 
reach a settlement, he may recommend or invoke fact-finding 
or another procedure (depending on the local or state law). 
Fact-Finding 
Like mediation, fact-finding, is an extension of 
the consultation process since it keeps open the 
possibility for voluntary settlement between the 
parties. However, the process goes beyond media-
tion and involves formal recommendations. The 
recommendations are not binding on the parties, 
but are designed to serve as the basis for further 
consultation and agreement. 34 
The process of fact-finding has received much attention 
and has been the recipient of much controversy, in part be-
cause there has not been extensive experience with it in 
the private sector, and because only recently has it had 
heavy use and evaluation in the public sector. 35 Although 
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this heavy use is recent, fact-finding did not originate 
with the public sector in the 1960's. Jacob Finkelman 
states that "fact-finding became part of the labor-manage-
ment process in Canada as long ago as 1907.,,36 In the U. S., 
present fact-finding procedures are derived from the Emer-
gency Board procedures that cover the private sector under 
the Railway Labor Acts of 1926 and Taft-Hartley Act of 
1947. 37 Presently some thirty states require fact-finding 
in one form or another. 38 
The theory behind the fact-finding process is that of 
the issuance of findings and recommendations along with pub-
lic pressure will force the parties to drop extreme posi-
tions and to settle voluntarily. George Hilderbrand views 
fact-finding as a very effective mechanism because the hear-
ing provides a public forum to discuss the issues and air 
differences, and the recommendations serve as a guide to the 
parties and as an information source to the public, who may 
influence governmental leaders toward rational decision 
k . 39 rna l.ng. 
However, fact-finding may occur under several different 
circumstances that yeild different results. One circum-
stance is fact-finding without .recommendation, another cir-
cumstance is fact-finding with recommendations. Each may 
occur before or after an impasse. 40 These different cir-
cumstances relegate the fact-finding process to the nebulous 
category of "neither fish nor fowl." On the one hand, 
fact-finding may more resemble mediation if the hearings 
93 
are informal, the fact-finder engages in mediation as well 
as finding facts, and especially if no recommendations are 
issued. 41 On the other hand, it may more resemble arbitra-
tion if the hearings are formal or quasi-judicial, mediation 
is absent, and recommendations are issued. 42 William B. 
Gould states that "the fact-finding process necessarily par-
takes of both the mediatory and judicial disciplines . 
The process is a fluid one about which drawing of hard and 
fast lines is still an audacious act.,,43 
Because of this fluidity, there is much controversy 
about what fact-finding is and ought to be, and what it does 
and does not accomplish. The issues involved in this con-
troversy will now be discussed. 
Structural and Process Issues in Fact-Finding 
Recommendations or Facts. This issue refers to the 
concept that the word "fact-finder," in its purest sense, 
would limit the fact-finders' role to finding and publishing 
the facts. The reasoning is that once the fact-finder makes 
recommendations, his role shifts from that of a finder-of-
facts to one of interpreting facts and exercising value 
judgements. 44 Because of this shift in role, it has been 
suggested that fact-finding involving recommendations be 
called "advisory" arbitration (because judgement is involved 
and recommendations are not binding) . 
Be that as it may, it is generally accepted that fact-
finding without recommendations (in an impasse situation) in 
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both the private and public sectors is not likely to be very 
successful. This is because the establishment of facts does 
not necessarily provide a basis for compromise between the 
parties, and the publication of facts may not be of much 
interest to the public, given the complexity of most labor 
d ' 45 lsputes. 
Fact-Finding Without Recommendations. There are, how-
ever, circumstances where fact-finding without recommenda-
tions may prove to be very useful. One circumstance would 
be in a situation where a neutral party would be appointed 
well in advance of negotiations to develop factual back-
ground. for use by the bargainers. Fact-finding in this case 
is seen as potentially very useful because as the scope of 
bargaining expands and the issues become more complicated 
and technical, competent experts are needed in whom both the 
'h f'd 46 partles ave con 1 ence. 
Another such circumstance would be fact-finding with-
out recommendation on issues, but with procedural direc-
tions. This would be useful to aid parties, in light of the 
facts, in getting back on the road to negotiations by rEvis-
'h f b " 47 lng t e structure 0 argalnlng. 
In cases that involve impasse, however, Robert G. 
Howlett reflects the general feeling in his now often quoted 
statement that "fact-finding without recommendations is 
about as useful as a martini without gin.,,48 
Fact-Finding with Recommendations. The rationale behind 
fact-finding with recommendations involves three principles. 
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First, the impact of public opinion, whether real or poten-
tial, is more likely to be brought to bear upon the parties 
after a respected neutral makes recommendations for a "fair' 
settlement. Because neither party desires public hostility, 
rejection of such a report may invite criticism from news-
papers and other sources; thus the parties feel a push be-
hind the fact-finder's recommendations. 49 Whether this is 
realistic will be discussed later. 
Second, the fact-finders' recommendations allow parties 
who have taken extreme positions to back down without losing 
face. In this case the fact-finder collects his fees, leaves 
his report, and becomes (in the words of practitioners) a 
"scape goat" or "per deim fall guy." This role occurs when 
the negotiators explain to their constituents that the fact-
finder recommended something other than their bargaining 
position; the parties, then, may appeal to their constitu-
ents (the public and union members) that it would appear to 
be unreasonable if the fact-finders' report is rejected; and 
thus both sides are able to compromise without losing face. 50 
Third, the fact-finders' recommendations can be equit-
able and innovative enough to gain support by both parties, 
thus ending the impasse without the use of the strike. 51 
From this stem two other major issues involving the fact-
finders' actions and the type of recommendations the fact-
finder makes. 
Adjudication or Mediation. This issue may be simply 
expressed by the question: "Ought the fact-finder to engage 
96 
in mediation during the fact-finding process?" 
Robert Howlett is convinced that if there has been ef-
fective mediation, the role of the fact-finder should be 
primarily judicial because mediation efforts by fact-finders 
have the following negative impacts: 
(1) It destroys the confidential nature of media-
tion; (2) some qualified fact-finders (arbitrators), 
who have no collective bargaining experience, are 
not skilled in mediation; and (3) our mediators felt, 
quite properly, that mediation by an ad hoc mediator 
after a staff mediator had completed his work carried 
an implication that the staff mediator had not per-
formed his job . . . . 
The debate over whether to combine mediation and 
fact-finding appears to arise principally from those 
jurisdictions that do not have an established, com-
petent mediation staff .... 52 
Harold P. Seamon also supports the view that fact-
finders should generally not engage in mediation. However, 
he would allow the fact-finder to encourage the parties to 
resume negotiations (and even recess the hearing for that 
purpose) if the fact-finder senses that the parties may be 
53 
able to settle certain issues by themselves. 
There are, however, some who think fact-finders should 
and, indeed, have to mediate. William Simkin states "Where 
fact-finding has been successful, I would suggest, but cannot 
prove, that the fact-finder has mediated -- deliberately, in-
stinctively, or surreptitiously.,,54 James C. Hill in refer-
ence to contract disputes, supports Simkin by saying: 
.... [fact-finding] is essentially an extension of 
the mediatory process, in which the fact-finder 
seeks to fashion a recommendation which is accept-
able to the parties, or at least within the area 
of their expectations. 55 
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In discussing the Michigan experience with fact-finding, 
Bejamin W. Wolkinson and Jack Stieber report the parties 
were generally opposed to fact-finder mediation and conclud~ 
that unless the parties request mediation or mutually agree 
that further mediation would be useful, fact-finders should 
°d dO ° 56 aVOl me latlon. 
In the process of attempting to conclude this debate, 
Robert J. Jossen found that most states' statutory language 
did not provide a clear indication as to the nature of fact-
finding, and that just because most fact-finding reports are 
written in the form of an adjudication procedure, one should 
not assume that m~diation was not involved. Jossen also 
found that the role of the fact-finder varies depending upon 
a number of variables, including the fact-finder's back-
57 ground, bias, and perception of what his role ought to be. 
Jean T. McKelvey, concurring with this view, further sug-
gests that lilt [fact-finding] may often be a mixture of both 
[adjudication and mediation] with a large infusion of poli-
tical and strategic considerations. lisa 
It is apparent that this disagreement among experts as 
to whether fact-finding ought to be adjudication, mediation, 
or both, depends upon the states' law, socio-economic struc-
ture, quality of mediation service, and the fact-finders' 
own philosophies. However, few would take the position that 
mediation is always inappropriate. Therefore, the general 
view is within a range of degree with respect to the encour-
agement of mediation occurring during fact-finding. 
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Recommendations: Just or Acceptable. This issue re-
fers to the nature of the fact-finders' recommendations. 
Some ~rgue that the recommendations should stress justice; 
that is, reflect what is fair and equitable rather than what 
. t . I 59 lS accep aD e. 
James C. Hill questions the three basic assumptions 
behind the theory of judicial fact-finding. First, he is 
unsure whether public pressure is significant once the facts 
are known; second, he questions whether there are standard 
criteria that can be used to determine wages and other con-
ditions of employment; and third, in new contract condi-
tions, a fact-finder (like an arbitrator), for pragmatic 
60 
reasons, must seek a solution which is acceptable. 
Arnold Zack avoids the argument by equating acceptabil-
ity and public interest, and by placing community responsi-
bility on the parties, not the fact-finder. He sums up his 
view when he states "If both agree to a settlement, it must 
be concluded that community responsibility has, been met.,,61 
Because t~e fact-finders' role is to bring the parties 
together voluntarily in order to avoid strike, others put 
great emphasis on the fact-finders' report reflecting ac-
ceptability. Donald H. Wollett bluntly states that "The 
fact-finders are not expected to dispense justice; they are 
expected to arrange peace.,,62 
Practically speaking, a fact-finder in this position 
must consider the relative bargaining power of each party 
and make recommendations accordingly. Because of this, 
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some experts, such as Robert E. Doherty, fear that "a fair 
settlement has corne to mean that sort of bargain one has the 
power to secure, ,,63 rather than one reflecting a sta.ndard 0':: 
fairness and the public interest. 
The moderate view, as expressed by Harold Seamon, 
recognizes a need for balance between what is just and 
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acceptable. This view is supported and summarized by Tim 
Bornstein when he says "This is not to say that the fact-
finder should make recommendations based solely on what he 
senses the parties will take, but it is to say that he must 
be conscious of his role."65 
It becomes apparent that the acceptability vs. justice 
issue also reflects a wide range of opinion; and perhaps one 
might conclude, as Gould did in a previous quote, that it 
would be audacious to draw hard and fast lines. There is, 
however, an issue that is not surrounded by as much vague-
ness, and which is at the core of the usefulness of fact-
finding. That issue is the impact which fact-finding has 
on negotiation and mediation. 
Undermining Negotiations and Mediation. This issue 
refers to the possibility that the parties may assume and 
maintain extreme positions during negotiations and mediation 
in anticipation that the fact-finders' recommendations will 
bring them to a compromise near their perceived last offer. 
The results of such action is an erosion of the collective 
bargaining process and an undermining of mediation efforts. 
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William Simkin likens fact-finding to a "one-play ball 
game," where "with adequate tenacity and ability, some play 
will succeed.,,66 Jean McKelvey's concern, in reference to 
the Railway Labor Act, is that "fact-finding may become an 
addictive habit, [that is], the first and not the final 
step in collective negotiations.,,67 Arnold Zack concurs 
with this concern when he states "Fact-finding has, in fact, 
come to be accepted as yet another appeal beyond media-
t ' ,,68 1.on. 
However, others claim it may not harm negotiations or 
mediation because parties are aware fact-finding can yield 
inexact and unpredictable recommendations, and that they are 
therefore encouraged to settle themselves. 69 It is known 
that some mediators use this argument as a threat to par-
ties in order to pressure a settlement in mediation. 
Krinsky found in a Wisconsin study that inti tal use of fact-
finding improved the bargaining relationship by contribut-
ing to the education of the parties. This is because the 
report provided them with a neutral perspective of what was 
a reasonable solution, and the experience made them under-
stand that they should be able to reach the same point as 
the fact-finders' recommendation through negotiations, thus 
avoiding the time and monetary costs involved in the fact-
f ' d' 70 1.n 1.ng process. 
Other studies show conflicting conclusions. For ex-
ample, Wolkinson and Stieber concluded in their Michigan 
study that "Evidence suggests that the bargaining posture 
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[hold-back] is not widely maintained, "71 while Yaffe and 
Goldblatt reported in their New York study that "Parties 
'wait' for fact-finding ann 'hold-back.,"72 Tim Bornstein 
supports this view and further suggests that unions are per-
haps more prone to rely too heavily on fact-finding than 
employers; he states "because unions normally cannot strike, 
they sometimes reason that they have everything to gain and 
nothing to lose by going to fact-finding."73 
In an effort to encourage negotiations and make media-
tion more attractive, Arnold Zack proposes several sugges-
tions that are intended to make fact-finding less access-
ible and more final. These suggestions are: (1) that 
parties pay for the cost of fact-finding, (2) that fact-
finders not have access to mediation information in order 
to make their findings less predictable and not to under-
mine the confidentiality of the mediator, (3) that unfair 
labor practice penalties be imposed on those who do not 
negotiate in good faith, and (4) that the fact-finder assume 
an adjudicatory role so parties cannot expect a "split of 
the differences." Zack further emphasizes that improvement 
of the fact-finding step, rather than extensions of the pro-
cess such as super-mediation, is desirable in order to make 
fact-finding the final step in the process and short of a 
legal or illegal strike. 74 However, even with these re-
forms, there are questions as to whether fact-finding can 
work well, given the lack of public pressure. 
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Public Pressure. This issue reflects concern over 
whether the publication of fact-finding recommendations does 
in fact marshall public opinion to the extent that the par-
ties feel pressured into accepting the fact-finders' report. 
William Word reports that in the case of New York and 
Wisconsin, public opinion did not seem to be very influen-
tial,75 and Donald W. Wollett bluntly says that it is "a 
romantic delusion" to think the public will comprehend and 
respond constructively to a fact-finders' recommendation. 76 
The lack of public interest and pressure may be due in part 
to the fact that the reports are not readily available, nor, 
at times, understandable to the general public. 77 Allan W. 
Drachman further suggests that even if the public is in-
terested, "public opinion has very little impact if either 
the municipal employer or the union is in a weak bargaining 
position relative to the opposing party.,,78 
Other Issues. Several other issues arise with respect 
to fact-finding. Time is another doubled edged sword. On 
the one side, if too much time lapses between the request 
for the hearing and when it actually takes place, the union 
may become more prone to strike, or the budget submission 
d - f h ' fl ' b ' l' t 79 0 h th ate may pass, causlng urt er 1n eXl 1 1 y. n teo er 
side, this time-lapse gives both parties the opportunity to 
reassess their positions and to let their emotions calm. 
Even the question of whether fact-finding should be 
conducted by a tripartite panel or a single individual stirs 
debate. Jerry Wurf states thcLt a tripartite panel consisting 
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of one labor, one management, and one public representative, 
"provides for true neutrality.II BC On the other hand, it 
may encourage a mediation approach rather than adjudication 
approach, which might be less likely where there is only one 
neutral. 
The effectiveness of fact-finding is also questioned 
even though there are studies which, utilizing systematic 
investigation, indicate the effectiveness of fact-finding. 
For example, Yaffe and Goldblat concluded that although im-
perfect as a strike substitute, fact-finding in New York 
State offered "more promise than illusion as a mechanism to 
facilitate the resolution of interest disputes in public 
sector negotiations. IIBI In their Michigan study Wolkinson 
and Stieber stated that the process is a "viable mechanism 
for dispute resolution that should be continued and 
strengthened. ,,82 
However, this evidence has not quelled the controversy 
because of its impact on negotiation strategy and mediation 
efforts. Krinsky, in his Wisconsin study, does concur that 
fact-finding was very effective in settling disputes and 
avoiding strikes, but he seriously questions its ability to 
accomplish "just" gains from the employee's standpoint. B3 
Again there exists a diversity of opinion as to the effec-
tiveness of fact-finding, just as there is on most issues 
surrounding fact-finding. 
One reason for this diversity of opinion is the diffi-
culity in comparing fact-finding among states because of 
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differences in state laws, impasse procedures, socio-
economic structures, and administrative philosophies. 
Another reason is the shortage of systematic investigation 
and analysis of the process. Thus, more research and ex-
perience is needed before most experts would be willillg to 
fully endorse the fact-finding process. 
In fact, there are other alternatives that are thought 
to be a superior last step in public employee impasse reso-
lution. One of these, of course, is the strike, (which 
only a few states allow), the other processes are various 
forms of interest arbitration. 
Interest Arbitration 
Interest arbitration has become quite widespread as the 
last step in impasse resolution. Although it may take two 
forms, voluntary and compulsory, it is the compulsory form 
that is utilized most often in the public sector. This is 
especially true for the essential services, such as police 
and fire, where the public health and safety is paramount. 
Arbitration usually occurs after efforts at mediation 
and perhaps fact-finding have been exhausted. Unlike fact-
finding, arbitration is clearly a process of adjudication, 
not compromise. 84 In the case of compulsory binding arbi-
tration, the parties, after exhausting other impasse proced-
ures, are required by law to submit their case to a neutral 
for a binding decision. 
lOS 
Frank and Edna Elkouri cite three basic arguments in 
favor of compulsory arbitration. First, it protects citi-
zens from a strike which may endanger the health and safety 
of the general public. Second, it substitutes judicial pro-
cedures that consider the merits of a case in place of the 
IIjungle warfare ll of power politics and the strike. Third, 
at times it is necessary to balance power between employer 
and employee where strike is prohibited. 8S 
The arguments against compulsory arbitration are four-
fold. First, it undermines good-faith bargaining because a 
weaker party may have little to gain from bargaining; 
furthermore, as Merton Berstein suggests, IIsince arbitrators 
may treat the best disclosed offers as the permissible lim-
its of the award, it pays for each side not to disclose how 
far it is really willing to go on each issue. 1I86 However, 
a counter argument is that some parties are finding that 
the arbitrator's decision may not result in as positive re-
suIts as collective bargaining, and the possibility exists 
that on non-economic issues, the arbitrator may present a 
solution that is administratively unpalatable; thus the 
parties are encouraged to bargain in good faith. It is 
Howlett's opinion that the U. S. experience (although not 
extensive) does not reflect the pessimistic view about ar-
b , , k' ,,87 1trat1on wea en1ng negot1at1ons. 
Second, compulsory arbitration may involve an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislated power, as wage decisions 
and resource allocations involve public policy. Put more 
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simply: "elected officials should not delegate the duty 
they owe the electorate to settle these questions."aa This 
view centers on the sovereignty of the state argument that 
has been discussed in detail in the chapter regarding col-
lective bargaining in the public sector. 
Third, it is argued that arbitration decisions may have 
enforcement problems, thus "divulging the impotence of gov-
ernment."a9 Because most arbitration decisions are accept-
able, this is not generally a problem; but "illegal strikes 
have been known to occur in the event of unfavorable arbi-
tration awards.,,90 
Fourth, some are concerned that it may lead to an 
economy with administered prices which would threaten the 
voluntary collective bargaining process, the free market, 
d · k . 91 an enterprlse system as we now It. This argument is 
akin to that in economics where the use of wage and price 
controls involve a trade off between "economic freedom" and 
macro-economic stability. In that case the pill is bitter, 
but the disease worse. 
Problems such as these lead Wellington and Winter to 
conclude that "compulsory and binding arbitration is no 
panacea either.,,92 George W. Taylor states "Neither com-
pulsory arbitration nor strikes are appropriate in public 
employment relations" and stresses that we need to develop 
new procedures to deal with the dilemma. 93 Many are in 
agreement with Taylor, and innovative suggestions have 
resulted. 
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Innovations in Arbitration 
Final-offer arbitration such as instituted in Michigan 
and Eugene, Oregon, is one such innovation. In this case, 
the last best offer of each party is submitted to an arbi-
trator who chooses one or the other. The thought is that 
the parties will be encouraged to bargain in good faith; and 
in the event of impasse, if they do not move closer to-
gether, the neutral's decision may go against the less 
reasonalbe of the two. 94 Charles M. Rehmus reports that in 
Michigan, final-offer arbitration for protective services is 
actually an extention of mediation, because the law does not 
require parties to submit their final offer until the con-
lcusion of the hearing. However, he does not belittle the 
process, because mediation during arbitration 
. is a constructive alternative to the strike 
or conventional arbitration .•.. it helps the 
public interest by promoting the peaceful settle-
ment of impasse in crucial negotiations in the pub-
lic sector by the parties themselves. 95 
But this much flexibility may cause other problems. 
Paul Sommers, in analyzing the Massachusetts system, states 
that their form of final offer is too flexible, as it in-
cludes fact-finding and allows parties to change positions 
before conclusions of the final offer hearing; thus, the 
parties have a tendency to "hold back" until the bitter end, 
which undermines the negotiations process. He further 
states that arbitration hearings have turned into a show 
cause hearing for not accepting the fact-finders' recommen-
dations. In order to make final offer more' effective he 
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advocates dropping the fact-finding step, having only one 
neutral, and prohibiting the arbitrator from mediating dur-
o h h 0 96 ~ng t e ear~ng. 
Peter Fenille in another recent study compares Wiscon-
sin, Michigan, Massachusetts, and Eugene, Oregon, data. He 
concludes that with final offer: (1) parties increase their 
use of them as they gain familiarity (as in other impasse 
procedures), (2) parties use the hearings as forums for con-
tinued negotiations, and (3) mediatory efforts by arbitra-
tors resolve many cases. To further encourage good faith 
bargaining he suggests another form of final-offer arbitra-
tion. This has often been referred to as mediation-
arbitration (med-arb) .97 
Med-arb is a situation in which the neutral has a dual 
role. He is more than a "go between" because he has in re-
serve the authority of an arbitrator. Sam and John Kagel 
explain: 
He, in effect becomes a party to the negotiations 
in the sense that, while negotiating, each of the 
contending parties must necessarily seek to con-
vince him that their position is reasonable and 
acceptable . . . . Each party must face up to the 
merits of the particular issue under disucssion, 
because if either or both do not, the med-arbiter 
will make the decision. The incentive is for both 
parties to settle through negotiations g~ther than 
have the med-arbiter make the decision. 
Med-arb is being considered seriously because it places 
emphasis on negotiations, utilizes proven mediation tech-
niques, and avoids the unpopularity of compulsory arbitra-
tion or the economic disruption and illegality of strike. 
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other Innovative Proposals 
Another proposed alternative to the strike is the com-
bination of a "nonstoppage strike" and a "graduated strike." 
Briefly, in the case of the nonstoppage strike, workers 
would continue to work full-time but forego a portion of 
their take home pay, which the employer matches (say 10 per-
cent) and which is put into a fund (to be used later for 
publicly desirable projects). Periodically, the union may 
choose to increase the percent involved, or the employer 
may decide to switch to a graduated strike. This is theor-
ized to have the following benefits: (1) it would attract 
attention without a ruinous strike, (2) it imposes less 
hardship on workers since their fringe benefits would not 
be hampered as in a strike, and also there would be no loss 
of jobs for an illegal strike, and (3) both parties would be 
under "strike" pressure but not to their complete detri-
ment. 99 
If the non-stoppage strike is not sufficient to induce 
settlement, a graduated strike could. Graduated strike is 
work stoppage in which services are successively reduced in 
stages, thereby steadily increasing pressure to force set-
tlement. In Bernstein's opinion, both the non-stoppage and 
d d ok 1 k bOd 100 gra uate str1 e wou d wor est 1n tan urn. 
Another proposal, made by Sam Zagoria, is the public 
referendum. In this case if either party rejects the fact-
finders' recommendation, the issue is put on the next 
election ballot. This would provide a terminal point 
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without strike; however, it may delay new terms and condi-
tions, and it requires educational campaigns and thus ex-
pense to both parties. lOl Given the recent "tax revolt," 
one can almost predict the outcome of such an election, in 
spite of the needs of public employees. 
Summary 
Presently in the United States there is a search for 
impasse resolution procedures that fulfill the two goals of 
(1) preventing strikes in the public sector (legal or il-
legal) and (2) encouraging good-faith bargaining within 
the the voluntary collective bargaining process as we know 
it in this country. 
The impasse resolution procedures most often used are 
various combinations and forms of mediation, fact-finding, 
and interest arbitration. Exactly which procedure and which 
combination is most effective is a matter of considerable 
debate. In order to improve impasse resolution processes, 
various studies in various states have been, and are being, 
generated to analyze these various procedures and their ef-
fectiveness. This dissertation's particular contribution to 
the research lies in analysis of the fact-finding phase of 
Oregon's impasse resolution process. To accomplish this, 
the major controversial issues surrounding the fact-finding 
process which were discussed in this chapter will be con-
sidered. The issues are: recommendations or facts, adjudi-
cation or mediation, undermining negotiations and mediation, 
III 
public pressure, time, and effectiveness. The next chapter 
deals with Oregon's impasse procedure and an analysis of it. 
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CHAPTER V 
OREGON'S IMPASSE PROCEDURE AND 
AGGREGATE DATA ANALYSIS 
Oregon's impasse resolution process (as summarized in 
Figure 2 may be viewed as a filtering process where each 
step in the process contributes significantly to the orderly , 
resolution of impasses, reduces the possibility of strike, 
and encourages the parties to settle voluntarily. Each step 
introduces a higher level of intervention by the neutral 
third party -- from suggestion to recommendation to public 
pressure to final determination by a third party. 
The procedure follows the sequence of mediation, fact-
finding, and a cooling-off period. If these steps are un-
successful they may be followed by strike for public employ-
ees other than those in the protective services (police, 
fire, and institutional guards) which go to compulsory arbi-
tration. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain and analyze 
Oregon's impasse resolution procedure, with particular em-
phasis being placed on the fact-finding phase. An analysis 
of aggregate data is presented in order to describe the char-
acteristics and ascertain the effectiveness of the fact-
finding process in Oregon. The impasse procedure is 
explained phase by phase as follows. 
Settlement 
/ 
If either 
Party rejects, 
Negotiations report is 
I \ mad~ public 
Parties have 
I Impasse) Mediation ~Fact-finding > 5 days to 15 days 30 days study fact-
1 1 finding report t 
I 
J, 
settlement settlement 
If parties jointly and voluntarily agree in advance to submit 
any and all unresolved issues to final and binding arbitration 
immediately upon declaring impasse, then the mediation and fact-
finding steps above may be skipped. 
See HB2263, Sections· 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 
Mutual 
acceptance 
t 
settlement 
~ Strike 
~ 
Except for: 
1) police, fire 
& guards--their 
cases go to 
final and bind-
ing arbitration 
2) those cases 
where the court 
finds a strike 
would create a 
clear and present 
danger or threat 
to the health, 
safety o~ welfare 
of the public--
final and binding 
arbitration is 
ordered in these 
cases 
Figure 2. IMPASSE PROCEDURES UNDER OREGON'S PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW 
Source: Prisim III, Inc., Training Bulletin. (1974), p. 12. 
f-' 
N 
o 
121 
Mediation 
Mediation services are provided at no cost to the par-
ties by the State Conciliation Service upon notification of 
an impasse by one or both of the parties, or when the Employ-
ment Relations Board (ERB) deems it appropriate. l The State 
Conciliation Service is a division of ERB, and is staffed by 
full-time mediators. 2 
If ERB mediation efforts are not successful after fif-
teen days of mediation, fact-finding may be initiated by 
either of the parties or by the mediator if it is deemed 
appropriate, and in the public interest. 3 
The law specifically states that if the parties wish 
they may at anytime voluntarily agree to submit any or all 
issues, to final and binding arbitration. In this case the 
arbitration decision will supersede any mediation and/or 
4 fact-finding procedures. 
Fact-Finding 
The fact-finding procedure may be viewed in terms of 
the follwoing phases: selection and scheduling, the hear-
ing, the report, and the parties' actions. 
The Selection Phase. The law allows parties to mutu-
ally agree upon a fact-finder within five days of the ERB 
notification that fact-finding is to be initiated; otherwise 
ERB submits a list of five qualified neutrals to the parties. 
Each party then alternately strikes two names from the list, 
with the remaining individual designated the fact-finder. 
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In the cases where parties wish to have a panel of three 
fact-finders the ERB submits a list of seven qualified neu-
trals, the parties alternately strike two names, with the 
remaining individuals designated the fact-finders. 5 
If in either case the parties do not notify the board 
of their choice within five days of receipt of the list, the 
ERB appoints a fact-finder(s}. If only one party fails to 
notify, the ERB appoints a fact-finder from the remaining 
names on the list. 6 
The State Conciliation Service regulations state that 
a person may not serve as a fact-finder in a case where he 
has any personal interest, however, the parties may waive 
this disqualification in writing. Also the neutral is re-
quired to "disclose any circumstances likely to create a 
presumption of bias," and either party may disqualify him 
or waive the presumptive disqualification. 7 
Scheduling. After the appointment, the fact-finder es-
tablishes the date, time, and location of the hearing. The 
parties must submit a written list of the issues to be sub-
mitted to fact-finding to the fact-finder at least seven 
days prior to the hearing. 
The Hearing. The hearing is public, and like an arbi-
tration hearing, structured. The role of the fact-finder is 
expected to be quasi-judicial by both parties and the State 
Conciliation Service, which discourages mediation efforts on 
the part of the fact-finder. 8 
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During the hearing the fact-finder may administer oaths 
and provide all parties the opportunity to examine and cross 
examine all witnesses and to present any evidence pertaining 
h d ' 9 to t e lspute. Any exhibits introduced by a party are 
filed with the fact-finder and a copy provided to the other 
party. 
The Fact-Finders' Report. The report consists of writ-
ten findings of fact and recommendations on all issues sub-
mitted. It is to be served within thirty days from the con-
clusion of the hearings. The report is delivered personally 
or by registered mail to the parties and the ERB. IO 
The criteria of judgment used by fact-finders, although 
not specified in the law, are set forth in the rules of the 
State Conciliation Service to be the same as those required 
by arbitrators by the law. These criteria include: the 
ability to pay of the governmental unit; wages, hours and 
conditions of employment in comparative units; the consumer 
price index; and fringe benefits. ll 
The Parties' Actions. Acceptance of the report by the 
parties terminates the dispute. Acceptance is interpreted 
to mean acceptance of the recommendations on all issues 
submitted. 
If the fact-finders' report has not been accepted by 
both parties within five working days after the parties re-
ceive the report and one or both reject the report, the ERB 
publicizes the report. However, if the parties agree to 
submit the impasse to final binding arbitration, or agree 
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on settlement within those five days, the ERB will not pub-
12 licize the report. Publication consists of releasing the 
report to the wire services rather than the home town 
newspaper. 
In summary, fact-finding in Oregon is a mandatory pro-
cess with the parties equally bearing the cost of the fact-
finder. The parties may select or be involved in the selec-
tion of the fact-finder. The process is quasi-judicial, and 
requires specific criteria of judgment to be utilized in the 
findings and report. However, fact-finding is not the final 
step in Oregon's impasse resolution process. 
Cooling-Off Period. When a fact-finding report is re-
jected the cooling-off period begins. This is the 30 day 
interim after fact-finding and before strike can be initi-
ated. During this time it is not unusual for the Concilia-
tion Service to engage in super-mediation efforts to help 
avoid a strike. Usually the mediator is the same one in-
volved at the first step of mediation. 
Strike 
The strike is the final stage in Oregon's impasse reso-
lution process (except for the protective services). In 
order to strike the mediation and fact-finding processes 
must have been exhausted; the thirty day cooling-off period 
must have passed; and an intent to strike notice submitted 
b th ' t d 't th t 'k 13 y e un10n en ays pr10r 0 e s r1 e. 
12S 
Injunctive relief may be granted by the local circuit 
court upon petition by the employer, if the potential strike 
"creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, 
safety, or welfare of the public. ,,14 In this circumstance 
the dispute is submitted to final binding arbitration. 
Binding Interest Arbitration 
Binding interest arbitration is the final step for the 
protective services and in the case of a court injunction 
against a strike. This phase may be utilized only after 
mediation and fact-finding efforts have been exhausted. 
Selection of the arbitrator is similar to that in fact-
finding, where the parties may select their own or strike 
names from a list provided by ERB. IS 
The arbitrator, upon selection, establishes dates, 
times and location of the hearing. The parties must have 
specified the issues prior to the hearing. The hearing is 
formal and the criteria of judgment set forth in the law. 16 
Within thirty days the arbitrator will issue his deci-
sion that is binding to both parties. Enforcement of the 
decision occurs through the circuit court by the insistance 
of either party or the ERB. 
The law also allows parties to enter "into a collective 
bargaining agreement which provides for a compulsory arbi-
tration procedure which is substantially equivalent" to the 
state statute. 17 
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Summary 
In summary, Oregon's impasse resolution process follows 
an elaborate sequence involving mediation, fact-finding, a 
cooling-off period, interest arbitration for protective ser-
vices, and strike for other public employees. This sequence 
may be viewed as a filtering process where each step reduces 
the possibility of strike and encourages the parties to set-
tle voluntarily. 
Now with over four years experience, the fact-finding 
phase of this process has become controversial, and there 
are bills being prepared for presentation to the next legis-
lature that would abolish fact-finding. 18 The purpose of 
this study is to provide systematic investigation into the 
process. In particular, the intent of this study is to 
describe the nature and characteristics of Oregon's fact-
finding process and evaluate its effectiveness. In the re-
mainder of this chapter aggregate data is considered and 
analyzed. 
METHODOLOGY FOR THE AGGREGATE DATA 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, data was col-
lected from the fact-finding records of Oregon's State Con-
ciliation Service. The years cover 1974 through 1977 and 
involved two hundred and thirty nine cases (n = 239). Anal-
ysis of the aggregate data was conducted by utilizing fre-
quency distributions and contingency tables (cross-tabula-
tions) through the use of the SPSS Computer Program. The 
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frequency tables provided absolute and percentage distribu-
tions indicating what has transpired over the four years. 
The contingency tables provide further understanding of 
relationships between variables. To aid in the judgment of 
whether an association exists, lambda (asymmetric) and 
Goodman-Kruskal's Tau have been utilized. 19 
Because of the home rule issue, the data related to 
cities and home rule counties is incomplete. In order to 
avoid a skewing of the aggregate data, home rule cases were 
dropped from much of the analysis. As a result no specific 
descriptions or analysis will be able to be made about 
cities; however, this should not detract from the descrip-
tion and analysis of the fact-finding process, which is the 
f th ' study. 20 purpose 0 lS 
Because this data represents the total population of 
fact-finding cases between 1974-1977, observed differences 
are real and therefore merit discussion. 
One final note, comparative data from other states will 
be introduced where it is possible and appropriate. 
ANALYSIS OF THE AGGREGATE DATA 
Table XVI shows the use of each phase of Oregon's fact-
finding process within the context of the entire impasse 
resolution procedure. The table reflects the total fact-
finding cases from 1974-1977 and categorizes that into home 
rule and all cases without home rule. This last category 
is divided into education and all other government cases. 
TABLE XVI 
DISPOSITION OF CASES GOING TO IMPASSE IN OREGON, 1974-1977 
Fact Settled Settled W/O Settled W/ 
Media- Finding Before Hearing Report Mediation Mediation Arbitra-
tion· Initiated Hearing Held AcceEted After FF After FF tion Strike 
Total Cases 874 239 75 153 25 12. 82 7 7 
Home Rule 38 5 22 3 0 1 3 0 
All Cases W/O 
Home Rule 201 70 131 22 12 81 4 7 
Education 526 139 46 93 16 6 64 NA 5 
All Other 
Government 62 24 38 6 6 17 4 2 
Source: Data collected and tabulated from the file of the Oregon State Conciliation Service Division 
*Cases where disposition beyond initiation of fact-finding is unknown 
-Data not available 
NA Not applicable 
Missin2* 
31 
26 
5 
2 
3 
..... 
IV 
00 
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Due to the home rule issue only brief comments will be made 
about the total cases category, and most of the analysis 
will center on all the cases without home rule category. 
Total Cases 
Between 1974 and 1977, 239 of the 874 cases going to 
mediation went unresolved and resulted in a request for 
fact-finding. These 239 cases represented 27.3 percent of 
the disputes going to mediation. That is, almost 73 per-
cent of the cases going to mediation were resolved at that 
stage of impasse resolution. This is 21 percent higher ,than 
Drothing and Lipsky reported in their study of New York 
State's impasse procedure, where about 52 percent of the 
cases going to impasse were settled in mediation. 21 
This in and of itself testifies to the success of the 
State Conciliation Service's mediation efforts and to the 
concept that the impasse procedure acts as a filtering pro-
cess. This success is further demonstrated when one con-
siders the service's role in post-fact-finding mediation 
(super-mediation) during the cooling-off period, which will 
be discussed later. 
Of the 239 requests for fact-finding, 75 (or 31.4 per-
cent) had been resolved before the hearing. This is 11 per-
cent higher than that reported by Steiber and Wolkinson in 
their Michigan study, where about 20 percent of the cases 
ttl d b f h h . 22 were se e e ore t e ear1ng. In Oregon this is pro-
bably due to continuing mediation efforts, the cost of fact-
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finding, and the effort required to prepare for fact-finding. 
Further analysis regarding this will be presented later in 
this chapter. 
In contrast, almost two-thirds of the 239 requests for 
fact-finding resulted in a hearing; and 11 (4.6 percent) are 
unaccounted for. The disposition of those cases going to 
hearing follows. This data is based upon the relative fre-
quency since it is not adjusted for the missing cases. 
Of the 153 cases going to hearing, 25 (or 16.3 percent) 
resulted in both parties accepting the fact-finder's report. 
By way of comparison, the Drothing and Lipsky study showed 
about 36 percent of the fact-finder's reports in New York 
d . h d· f· . 23 State were accepte Wlt out mo 1 lcatlon. Detailed analy-
sis will be presented later in this chapter as to the cause 
of such a low percentage of fact-finding reports being ac-
cepted in Oregon. 
Twelve of the 153 cases (or 7.8 percent) were settled 
after the hearing without further mediation assistance. 
Another 7 (or 4.5 percent) went to binding arbitration and 
7 (or 4.5 percent) went on to strike. Of the 31 cases where 
data is missing, 26 involve home rule cases, thus the ra-
tionale for leaving them out of the rest of the analysis. 
Although this dissertation concentrates on the cases 
excluding home rule, the data for the total cases suggests 
that Oregon's impasse resolution procedure does significant-
ly reduce the number of impasses at each step, and that the 
process does result in very few strikes, as less than 1 
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percent of the total cases going to impasse (mediation being 
the first step) go on to strike. Indications are that fact-
finding does contribute toward the reduction of strikes, as 
less than 3 percent of the cases where fact-finding has been 
initiated result in strike. Further analysis cannot be ac-
complished because the home rule cities which begin the pro-
cess have a strong tendency to opt out at their convenience, 
as demonstrated by the missing data. 
All Cases Excluding Home Rule Cases 
Dropping home rule cases from Table XVI provides a 
clearer basis for analysis of the impasse process. The re-
mainder of this study will be based upon this data base. 
Mediation. Of the total non home rule cases going to 
impasse, about 77 percent are solved in the first step, med-
iation, which again testifies to the effectiveness of the 
State Conciliation Service's mediation efforts. 
Fact-Finding. Fact-Finding was initiated (requested) 
201 times. Of these 201 cases, 70 were settled before a 
hearing. As mentioned before this suggests that the threat 
of fact-finding encourages a1most 35 percent of parties to 
resolve their differences rather than go to the expense, 
time, and uncertainty involved in the fact-finding hearing. 
Table XVI shows that during the years 1974-1977, about 
two-thirds of the request for fact-finding resulted in hear-
ings and reports issued. The disposition of those 131 cases 
was as follows: 
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(1) Reports accepted: 16.8 percent of the reports 
issued were accepted by both parties. This is not as high 
of a percent as theorists may like, however this is not 
necessarily an indication that the process does not work. 
Further analysis, including the numbers of issues involved 
and the views of the parties are needed in order to ascer-
tain the effectiveness of the process. This will be accom-
plished in this and the following chapters. 
(2) Settled without post-fact-finding mediation: 
9.2 percent of the cases going to hearing were resolved by 
the parties themselves after one or both parties rejected 
the report. 
(3) Settled with post-fact-finding mediation: 81 (or 
62 percent) of the cases going to hearing were resolved by 
post-fact-finding mediation by the State Conciliation Ser-
vice. This phase, often called "super-mediation," generates 
much interest and concern for two reasons. First, although 
the cooling-off period is required by Oregon law, super-
mediation is not. It has evolved of necessity as the State 
Conciliation Service has interposed to protect the public 
interest. Second, over 62 percent of the cases going to a 
fact-finding hearing are not resolved without super-
mediation by the State Conciliation Service. 
The intent of the fact-finding process is for the 
parties themselves, after objectively considering one 
anothers case, to agree on the fact-finder's report, or at 
the very least to use it as a basis for unassisted and 
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voluntary resolution. However, this is not occurring in the 
majority of the cases. Later this study will consider why 
more reports are not accepted, whE:ther something can be done 
to improve the acceptance ratio, and whether the heavy re-
liance on super-mediation means the fact-finding process is 
not useful. 
Arbitration. Less than 4 percent of the cases going to 
a fact-finding hearing went on to binding arbitration after 
failing to resolve differences in the fact-finding stage. 
These four cases involved the public safety services of 
police and fire. 
Strike. Of the 131 cases that went to a fact-finding 
hearing, 7 resulted in strike. The vast majority of the 
strikes (5 of 7, or 71 percent) involved the education sec-
tor. When comparing the number of strikes to the number of 
cases where fact-finding was initiated it is found that only 
3.5 percent of the 201 cases where fact-finding was ini-
tiated resulted in strike. 
Before engaging in further analysis of the aggregate 
data, a discussion regarding the numbers and types of issues 
submitted to fact-finding is warranted. 
NUMBERS AND TYPES OF ISSUES 
The numbers and types of issues submitted to fact-
finding ranged from 1 to 92. In order to identify the aver-
age number of issues, and the issues more frequently sub-
mitted, actual fact-finding reports were analyzed. The 
134 
sample analyzed was based upon availability, and consisted 
of 18 of 38 non teaching reports and 81 of 93 teaching re-
ports. 
Numbers of Issues 
Table XVII shows that the average number of issues in 
teaching cases is over twice as high as in non teaching 
cases. supporting data may be found in Appendix C. 
TABLE XVII 
NUMBER OF ISSUES SUBMITTED TO FACT-FINDING, 1974-1977* 
Teaching 
Mean 17 
Median 11 
Mode 2 
Non 
Teaching 
7 
4 
4 
*Based upon a sample of 99 of 139 reports issued. 
Total 
15 
9 
2 
These averages, especially in the teaching cases, are 
conservative numbers because one issue may involve several 
sub-issues. For example, the issue of salary might involve 
the sub-issues of 1) the base, 2) the form of the schedule 
(steps and columns), and 3) the increment between columns 
and steps. In addition, the following sub-issues may also 
arise from the salary issue: 1) automatic vs merit pay in-
creases, 2) method to prove employees are to move to another 
step, 3) extra pay for M.A. and Ph.D. degrees, 4) ratio from 
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top to bottom of scale, and 5) teachers not on the schedule. 
Thus, although salary is counted here as one issue for con-
sistency, there are as many as eight sub-issues that might 
be involved, and therefore the averages in Table XVII are 
seen as conservative. 
By way of comparison, Yaffe and Goldblatt found that in 
New York State the average number of issues in teaching and 
h · 24 d 9 . 1 24 non teac lng cases was an respectlve y. 
The total average number of issues in Oregon is 15, 
which is high considering that acceptance of a fact-finding 
report requires both parties to agree to the recommendations 
on all issues submitted. This may have much to do with the 
high rejection rate in Oregon as compared to New York State 
where parties could reject only part of the report rather 
than the total report. 
Frequency of Issues 
Table XVIII and XIX show the issues most frequently 
submitted to fact-finding for teaching and non teaching 
cases. Both tables show that salary and insurance are by 
far the most often submitted issues. After salary and in-
surance there are differences in the main issues between 
teaching and non teaching cases. This is to be expected 
given the unique nature of the teaching field and the fact 
that it is regarded as a profession, not a vocation. It is 
interesting to note that grievance procedures are an issue 
in 41 percent of the teaching cases and in less than 20 
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TABLE XVIII 
FREQUENT ISSUES SUBMITTED IN TEACHING CASES, 1974-1977* 
Rank 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
7. 
8. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
10. 
II. 
12. 
12. 
13. 
13. 
13. 
14. 
14. 
14. 
15. 
Issue 
Salary 
Insurance 
Grievance 
Duration of Contract 
Teaching Calendar 
Extra Duty Pay 
Teacher Evaluation 
Fair Share 
Personal/Academic Freedom 
Non Teaching Schedule 
Lockout/Strike Clause 
Sick Pay 
Just Cause 
Reduction in Staff 
Professional Leave 
Teaching Day 
Teaching Load 
Union Rights 
Vacancies/Transfers 
Management Rights 
Personal Leave 
Maintenance of Standards 
Tuition Reimbursement 
Classroom Control/Discipline 
Percent of Cases 
95 
86 
41 
35 
34 
34 
33 
31 
31 
30 
30 
29 
28 
28 
26 
25 
25 
24 
24 
24 
23 
23 
23 
18 
*Based upon a sample of 81 of 93 reports issued 
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TABLE XIX 
MOST FREQUENT ISSUES SUBMITTED IN NON TEACHING CASES* 
Rank Issue Percent of Cases 
l. Salary 88 
2. Insurance 61 
3. Vacation 44 
3. Status of Agreement 44 
4. Sick Leave 28 
4. Holiday 28 
5. Paid Negotiating Time 22 
*Based upon a sample of 18 of 38 reports issued. 
percent of the non teaching cases. It seems teachers are 
having to fight hard to gain many rights that are accepted 
as normal in other occupations. 
In summary, the number of issues involved in Oregon's 
fact-finding cases range from 1 to 92, with an average of 
15 issues per case. The impact such a high number of issues 
has on the process will be discussed on occasion in the next 
portion of this chapter that deals with the characteristics 
of the fact-finding phase. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FACT-FINDING PHASES 
Given this overview of the fact-finding process more 
detailed information was obtained from frequency distribu-
tions and cross tabulations of the variables. Although 
several appr0aches are possible, this study will consider 
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in sequence each phase of the fact-finding process in terms 
of the parties involved and their actions. 
The Initiation or Request Phase 
Table XVI shows over 69 percent of the requests for 
fact-finding carne from the education sector, while the re--
maining 30.8 percent of the requests were made by all other 
governments (special districts, county and state). By way 
of comparison Yaffe and Goldblatt found in their New York 
study that about 83 percent of the fact-finding cases oc-
curred in the education sector; also Steiber and Wolkinson 
f d h .. . b 74 . d . 25 oun t at ln WlsconSln a out percent were ln e ucatlon. 
Analysis of requests for fact-finding by employee or-
ganization and type of government follows. 
Requests by Employee Organization. Table XX shows the 
employee organization that accounted for the majority (57.2 
percent) of fact-finding cases was the Oregon Education As-
sociation (OEA) , which represents all but a few public school 
teacher bargaining units (K-12), some Intermediate Education 
Districts, and a few community colleges. This high usage is 
not surprising as public school teachers have the highest 
incidence of organization and number of contacts in Oregon's 
public sector (see the penetration study in Chapter III). 
The Oregon School Employees Association (School Employees) , 
which represents non teaching staff in many public schools 
(such as secretaries, aids, cooks, bus drivers and custodi-
ans) accounts for 5.5 percent of the total cases. 
TABLE XX 
OREGON FACT-FINDING REQUESTS BY EMPLOYEE 
ORGANIZATIONS, 1974-1977 
Employee Organization Frequency 
OEA 115 
AFSCME 23 
OSEA (Education) 11 
Other Teachers 6 
Fire ( IAFF) 4 
Police 1 
Sheriff 5 
ILWU 6 
Labor 1 
ONA 3 
Other (Misc. ) 19 
OSEA (state) 8 
Total 201 
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Percent 
57.2 
11. 4 
5.5 
3.0 
2.0 
0.5 
2.5 
3.0 
0.5 
1.5 
9.5 
4.0 
100.6 
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The organization involving the second highest number of 
requests is the American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME), with 11.4 percent of the re-
quests. The Oregon State Employee Association (State Em-
ployees) accounted for 4.0 percent of the requests, the ILWU 
(Long Shoremens' union for the Port of Portland special dis-
trict) for 3.0 percent, and various others for the remain-
ing. Of special interest is the reduction in the percent 
of police and fire cases once the home rule cases were 
dropped from the study. Police decreased from 8 to 1 cases 
and fire from 17 to 4 cases; this reflects the cities' dis-
like for compulsory arbitration, which is their professed 
reason for using their home rule status to avoid the state 
collective bargaining law. 
Requests by Type of Government. Table XXI shows the 
type of government employer most involved in fact-finding 
was public schools. Public schools account for 58.7 percent 
of the requests for fact-finding. Counties account for 14.4 
percent, special districts for 8.0 percent, state government 
for 8.5 percent, community colleges for 7.0 percent, higher 
education for 2.9 percent, and lED's for 1.5 percent of the 
requests for fact-finding. 
It is interesting to note that special districts have 
about the same frequency of requests for fact-finding as the 
state and community colleges, yet the penetration rate (see 
Table XV) in special districts was very low compared to the 
other two areas. This might be a topic for further research. 
TABLE XXI 
OREGON FACT-FINDING REQUESTS BY TYPE OF 
GOVERNMENT (EMPLOYER), 1974-1977 
Type of 
Government Employer Frequency 
Public School 118 
lED 2 
Community College 14 
Higher Education 4 
Special District 16 
City 0 
County 29 
State 17 
Total 201 
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Percent 
58.7 
1.5 
7.0 
2.9 
8.0 
0.0 
14.4 
8.5 
101. 0 
Requests by Year. Table XXII shows the incidence of 
requests by year. The change from 1974 to 1975 is 55 per-
cent, from 1975 to 1976 no change, and from 1976 to 1977 an 
increase in the number of fact-finding requests of almost 
65 percent. This increasing usage reflects the newness of 
the process, growing unionism and familiarity. That is, as 
more unions became certified and engaged in collective bar-
gaining (and thus impasses) they have become more familiar 
with the process and less shy of using fact-finding. 
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TABLE XXII 
OREGON FACT-·FINDING REQUESTS BY YEAR 
Year Frequency Percent 
1974 27 13.4 
1975 49 24.4 
1976 49 24.4 
1977 76 37.8 
Total 201 100.0 
Summary of the Initiation or Request Phase. In summar-
izing the data relating to the initiation or request phase 
it has been shown that almost 70 percent of all fact-finding 
requests came from the education sector. The employee or-
ganization that accounted for the greatest share of requests 
was the OEA, followed by AFSCME, with many others accounting 
for less than 5 percent each. The type of government most 
involved was the public schools, followed by counties, spe-
cial districts, and state government. Furthermore, there 
has been yearly percentage increases in fact-finding re-
quests from 1974 through 1977. All requests for fact-
finding do not result in a hearing, rather many are settled 
before the hearing. This phase is discussed next. 
The Settled Before Hearing Phase 
As Table XVI showed, about 35 percent of the cases were 
resolved before a hearing. The question was posed as to 
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whether the organization or the type of government involved 
was associated with a case being settled before the hearing; 
the thought being that this might be an indication of good 
faith bargaining and general belief in the collective bar-
gaining process. 
Table XXIII shows a cross tabulation of cases settled 
before hearing by sector. In this table education was col-
lapsed into one group and all other government into another. 
Although education accounted for about 66 percent of the 
total cases settled before hearing, the propensity to settle 
before hearing was almost identical for both sectors. It is 
concluded, then, that the propensity for a case to be set-
tled before the hearing is not a function of its mission 
(e.g. education vs. other government). Other cross tabula-
tions were run to observe any relation between particular 
employee organizations and governmental types, and cases 
settled before hearing. 
Settled Before Hearing by Employee Organizations. 
Table XXIV shows a cross tabulation between the employee or-
ganizations and the cases settled before hearing. The table 
reveals some real differences since OEA settled before hear-
ing in about 30 percent of their cases, AFSCME in about 48 
percent of their cases, the School Employees (OSEA-Ed) in 
about 64 percent of their cases, and the nurses (ONA) in 
67 percent of their cases (there were only 3). Some organi-
zations had a very low settled before hearing record, for 
example the IU\TU was not involved in any cases settled 
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before hearing, and the State Employees (OSEA-State) settled 
before hearing in only 14 percent of their cases. 
When statistical association was measured, lambda was 
0.7 indicating that the employee organization and settled 
before hearing actions are associated, but that the associa-
tion is mild. Whether this association is due to the leader-
ship of the employee organization, tradition, or other fac-
tors are questions that remain for further research. 
Sector 
Education 
Other 
Government 
TotaJ 
TABLE XXIII 
OREGON FACT-FINDING CASES SETTLED BEFORE 
HEARING BY SECTOR, 1974-1977 
Not Settled Settled 
Before Hearing Before Hearing Total 
46 (33.1) 93 (66.9) 139 (100) 
24 (38.7) 38 (61.3) 62 (l00) 
70 (34.8) 131 (6S.2) 101 (l00) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.00 with settled before hearing 
dependent 
Goodman-Kruskai Tau = .003 with settled before hearing 
dependent 
TABLE XXIV 
OREGON FACT-FINDING CASES SETTLED BEFORE HEARING 
BY EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION, 1974-1977 
Employee Settled Not Settled 
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Organization Before Hearing Before Hearing Total 
OEA 35 (30.4) 80 (69.6) 115 
AFSCME 11 (47.8) 12 (52.2) 23 
OSEA (Education) 7 (63.6) 4 (36.4) 11 
Other Teachers 3 (50.0) 3 (50.0) 6 
Fire (lAFF) 1 (25.0) 3 (75.0) 4 
Police 0 (0.0) 1 (100.0) 1 
Sheriff 2 (40.0) 3 (60.0) 5 
I.L.W.D. 0 ( 0 . 0 ) 6.(100.0) 6 
Labor 1 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 1 
ONA 2 (66.7) 1 (33.3) 3 
Other (Misc. ) 
Independent 7 (36.8) 12 (63.2) 19 
OSEA (State) 1 (14.3) 6 (85.7) 7 
Total 70 (34.8) 131 (65.2) 201 
Lambda (asymmetric) = .071 with settled before hearing 
dependent 
(100) 
(100) 
(100) 
(100 ) 
(100) 
(100 ) 
(100 ) 
(100) 
(100) 
(100) 
(100 ) 
(100) 
(100 ) 
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Settled Before Hearing by Type of Government. Table XXV 
provides a cross tabulation between the type of government, 
and the cases settled before hearing. Again real differences 
are shown as public schools settled before hearing in 38 
percent of their cases, community colleges in 36 percent, 
higher education 50 percent, counties in 48 percent, and the 
state in 41 percent; while special districts settled before 
hearing in ab0ut 19 percent of their cases. In spite of 
these differences little statistical association was found 
since lambda = 0 and Goodman-Kruskai tau = .026. 
Settled Before Hearing by Population and Census Type. 
The question was posed as to whether the population or cen-
sus type (rural, suburban, urban) had any relation to cases 
being settled before hearing. Table XXVI shows a fairly 
even distribution (29-40 percent) between cases settled be-
fore hearing and population categories. There is no appar-
ent association between population and settled before hear-
ing as lambda = O. Table XXVII is a cross tabulation 
between settled before hearing and census type. It shows a 
similar distribution (27-34 percent) and that no significant 
difference between urban, suburban and rural areas exists 
with respect to their propensity to settle before hearing. 
Summary of the Settled Before Hearing Phase 
In summary, 35 percent of the cases were settled before 
the fact-finding hearing. There is a mild association be-
tween employee organizations and settled before hearing 
TABLE XXV 
OREGON FACT-FINDING CASES SETTLED BEFORE HEARING BY 
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER, 1974-1977 
Type of 
Government Settled Not Settled 
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Employer Before Hearing Before Hearing Total 
Public School 38 (32.2) 80 (67.8) 118 
lED 1 (33.3) 2 (66.7) 3 
Community College 5 (35.7) 9 (64.3) 14 
Higher Education 2 (50.0) 2 (50.0) 4 
Special Districts 3 (18. 8) 13 (81.3) 16 
County 14 (48.3) 15 (51. 7) 29 
State 7 (41.2) 10 (58.8) 17 
Total 70 (34.8) 131 (65.2) 201 
Lambda (asymmetric) = .000 with settled before hearing 
dependent 
Goodman-Kruskal tau = .026 with settled before hearing 
dependent 
(100 ) 
(100) 
(100) 
(100) 
(100 ) 
(100 ) 
(100 ) 
(100) 
TABLE XXVI 
OREGON FACT-FINDING CASES SETTLED BEFORE HEARING 
BY POPULATION CATEGORY, 1974-1977 
Population Settled Not Settled 
14S 
Category Before Hearing Before Hearing Total 
Under 2,500 6 (28.6) 15 (71.4) 21 
2,500-10,000 16 (40.0) 24 (60.0) 40 
10,000-50,000 21 (32.8) 43 (67.2) 64 
Over 50,000 15 (30.0) 35 (70.0) 50 
Total 58 (33.1) 117 (66.9) 175 
Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.000 with settled before hearing 
dependent 
Goodman-Kruska1 tau = 0.007 with settled before hearing 
dependent 
Missing observations = 26 
(100) 
(100) 
(100) 
(100) 
(100) 
TABLE XXVII 
OREGON FACT-FINDING CASES SETTLED BEFORE HEARING 
BY CENSUS TYPE, 1974-1977 
Settled Not Settled 
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Census Type Before Hearing Before Hearing Total 
Rural 6 (27.3) 16 (22.7) 22 
Suburban 7 (33.3) 14 (66.7) 21 
Urban 45 (34.1) 87 (65.9) 132 
Total 58 (33.1) 117 (66.9) 175 
Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.000 with settled before hearing 
dependent 
Goodman-Kruskal tau = 0.002 with settled before hearing 
dependent 
Missing observations = 26 
(100) 
(100) 
(100 ) 
(100) 
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actions; of the heavy users, the School Employees and AFSCME 
are more prone to settle before the hearing than the OEA or 
State Employees. Among governmental types there is little 
statistical association measured, although special districts 
are not as prone to settle before hearing as other govern-
ment types. 
The Parties' Action Phase 
Given that the intent of issuance of a fact-finder's 
report is its potential acceptability, much consideration is 
given as to which parties accept reports and the possible 
factors that may influence such actions. Table XVI showed 
that of the 131 cases going to hearing only 22 (about 17 
percent) were accepted by both of the parties. The question 
then was posed, are there significant differences between 
the parties' action and the parties themselves; and further-
more what effect, if any, does population, census type, 
time, and the fact-finder have on the parties' actions. 
Employee and Employer Action. Table XXVIII shows em-
ployee and employer action on fact-finding reports from 
1974-1977. It shows employees have a higher acceptance rate 
and a lower rejection rate than employers. Employees ac-
cepted reports in 48 percent of the cases, while employers 
accepted in 34 percent of the cases. Employees rejected in 
24 percent of the cases while employers rejected in almost 
53 percent of the cases. These differences are partially 
explained by the interviews in later chapters of this 
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dissertation, which indicate that some major users of fact-
finding may have had particular strategies in mind before 
the reports were issued. Another explanation of such high 
rejection rates lies in the large amount of issues involved 
in many cases. With a conservative average of 15 issues per 
case the odds are against both parties agreeing on the recom-
mendations on every issue, which is required for the report 
to be accepted. Further analysis will be presented with re-
spect to particular employer and employees' propensity to 
accept or reject fact-finding reports. Of immediate interest 
is the No Action category. 
Employee 
Employer 
TABLE XXVIII 
EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER ACTION ON OREGON 
FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977 
Accept 
Report 
62 (48.1) 
44 (34.1) 
Action 
Reject 
Report 
31 (24.0) 
68 (52.7) 
No 
Action 
36 (27.9) 
17 (13.2) 
Total 
131 (100) 
131 (100) 
No Action refers to a party not notifying ERB of their 
acceptance or rejection of a fact-finders' report, or word-
ing it in such a way as to neither accept nor reject. Em-
ployees were involved in no action in almost 28 percent of 
the cases while employers were in 13 percent of the cases. 
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This category is not technically possible because the law 
requires the parties to notify ERB within five working days 
after receipt of the report of their acceptance or rejection. 
What appears to have happened is that the parties (in 
particular the employee groups) desire to bide their time, 
hoping circumstances change so they might secure a more ac-
ceptable solution. Because the ERB cannot publish a report 
unless one party rejects, the parties prevent publication by 
taking no action (it is not a reject and therefore the re-
port is not made public). 
ERB in the meantime has no power to punish the parties 
for not meeting the requirement of the law in terms of their 
notification of action. It may be questionable whether ERB 
would help the process by insisting on parties meeting this 
requirement; however in this author's view such time lines 
and requirements should be met as the intent of the law is 
clear. The parties have a responsibility to play by the 
rules and not blatantly use the process for strategic rea-
sons and bypass the intent of the law through a loophole, or 
through lack of enforcement powers by ERB, and/or follow-
up procedures by the State Conciliation Service Division. 
Employee Action. Table XXIX shows a cross tabulation 
between education cases and all other government cases with 
employee action. This shows that employee groups in educa-
tion, compared to those in other government units, have a 
higher propensity to accept fact-finders' reports (51.1 vs. 
40.5 percent), about the same tendency to reject, and a 
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lower propensity for no action (26.1 vs. 32.4 percent). Al-
though these differences are present, lambda = 0 and there-
fore there is no apparent statistical relationship between 
the sector and employee action. 
Sector 
Education 
Other 
Government 
TABLE XXIX 
SECTOR BY EMPLOYEE ACTION ON OREGON 
FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977 
Employee Action 
Accept Reject No 
Report Report Action 
47 (51.1) 21 (22.8) 24 (26.1) 
15 (40.5) 10 (27.0) 12 (32.4) 
Total 
92 (100) 
37 (100) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = .000 with employee action dependent 
Goodman-Kruskal tau = .0054 with employee action dependent 
Missing observations = 2 
In order to analyze particular employee groups' actions, 
a cross tabulation between employee organizations and em-
ployee actions is provided in Table xxx. This table shows 
that the education sector unions (OEA, School Employees, 
and other teachers) have an acceptance rate of over 50 per-
cent, which is much higher than the ILWU with a 33 percent 
acceptance, but less than State Employees with a 60 percent 
acceptance rate. An interesting observation is the state 
employees no action rate which is 40 percent, and their ro-
jection rate of zero. OEA also demonstrated a high no action 
TABLE XXX 
EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION BY EMPLOYEE ACTION ON 
OREGON FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977 
EmEloyee Action 
Employee Accept Reject No 
Organization Report Report Action 
OEA 41 (51.3) 16 (20.0) 23 (28.8) 
AFSCME 5 (41.7) 6 (50.0) 1 (8.3) 
OSEA 
(Education) 2 (50.0) 2 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 
Other 
Teachers 2 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Fire ( IAFF) 0 (0.0) 1 (33.3) 2 (66.7) 
Police 0 (0.0) 1 (l00.0) 0 (0.0) 
Sheriff 0 (0.0) 1 (33.3) 2 (66.7) 
ILWU 2 (33.3) 3 (50.0) 1 (16.7) 
ONA 1 (l00.0) 0 (0. 0) 0 (0.0) 
Other 6 (50.0) 1 (8. 3) 5 (41. 7) 
OSEA (State) 3 (60.0) 0 (0. 0 ) 2 (40.0) 
Total 62 (48.1) 31 (24.0) 36 (27.9) 
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Total 
80 ( 100) 
12 (100) 
4 (100) 
2 (100) 
3 (100) 
1 (100) 
3 (100) 
6 (100) 
1 (100) 
12 (100) 
5 (100) 
129 (100) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.104 with employee action dependent 
Missing observations = 2 
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rate of 28.8 percent, but not nearly as high as the no ac-
tion rate of the fire and sheriff groups with 67 percent. 
Although Table XXVIII shows that employees overall 
accept fact-finders' reports 48 percent of the time, Table 
XXX shows the protective service employee groups (police, 
fire and sheriff) did not accept one report. An explanation 
of this is that with binding arbitration as a final step 
these organizations may view the fact-finders' report as 
just another step, and may reason that they have everything 
to gain and nothing to lose by going on to arbitration. 
This is because they hope that the fact-finders' report will 
be the minimum and not the maxirrum recommended by the arbi-
trator. The following chapters of this dissertation will 
deal more with this observation. 
When testing for association lambda was .10 which indi-
cates there is a mild association between employee organi-
zation and action. 
Table XXXI relates employee action and employer in 
order to attempt to observe whether employee action depends 
on the type of government they are dealing with. In this 
case there is a relationship, however it is mild as lambda = 
.06. Table XXXI also shows that in public school cases em-
ployees accept 52 percent of the reports, in community col-
leges 33 percent, in county 53 percent, in state 44 percent 
and in special districts 23 percent of the reports. Of in-
terest is the higher rate of no action among the state, 
county and community college cases as compared to public 
Type of 
Government 
TABLE XXXI 
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT BY EMPLOYEE ACTION ON 
OREGON FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977 
EmEloyee Action 
Accept Reject No 
Report Report Action 
Public School 41 (51. 9) 17 (21.5) 21 (26.6) 
lED 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 
Community 
College 3 (33.3) 3 (33.3) 3 (33.3) 
Higher 
Education 2 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
Special 
District 3 (23.1) 7 (53.8) 3 (23.1) 
County 8 (53.3) 2 (13.3) 5 (33.3) 
State 4 (44.4) 1 (11. 1) 4 (44.4) 
Total 62 (48.1) 31 (24.0) 36 (27.9) 
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Total 
79 (100) 
2 (100) 
9 (100) 
2 (100) 
13 (100) 
15 (100) 
9 (100 ) 
129 (100) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.059 with employee action dependent 
Missing observations = 2 
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schools and special districts. 
Employer Action. Table XXXII is a cross tabulation of 
employer action and government sector. Employers in the 
education sector had an acceptance rate of 31.5 percent and 
a rejection rate of 57.6 percent compared to other govern-
ments' identical acceptance and rejection rate of 40.5 per-
cent. This means the propensity for employers in the educa-
tion sector to accept fact-finding reports is 9 points lower 
than other government, and their propensity to reject 17.1 
points higher. An interesting observation is that the no 
action rate of other governments is 8 points higher than 
that of education, which means those in the other government 
category prefer no action to reject in many cases. Neither 
group used no action as much as their employee adversaries. 
Although these differences exist there is no apparent asso-
ciation between employer action and the sector since 
lambda = O. 
To analyze particular employer actions a cross tabula-
tion between type of government and employer actions is 
provided in Table XXXIII. Of particular interest is the re-
latively low percent of acceptances by community college 
employers as compared to public school, special district, 
county, and state governments. Whether this is coinciden-
tal or a result of a strategy by the OCCA (an affiliation 
of community college boards and presidents) is a matter of 
speculation. Lambda was .03 which indicates association, 
but very mild. 
Sector 
Education 
Other 
Government 
Total 
TABLE XXXII 
SECTOR BY EMPLOYER ACTION ON OREGON 
FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977 
EmEloyer Action 
Accept Reject No 
Report Report Action 
29 (31.5) 53 (57.6) 10 (10.9) 
15 (40.5) 15 (40.5) 7 (18.9) 
44 (34.1) 68 (52.7) 17 (13.2) 
158 
Total 
92 (100) 
37 (100 ) 
129 (100) 
Lambda (asymnletric) = 0.000 with employer action dependent 
Goodman-Kruskal tau = 0.015 with employer action dependent 
Missing observations = 2 
Table XXXIV is a cross tabulation of employer action 
and the employee group they are dealing with. It shows that 
the relationship between employer action and the adversary 
employee organization is among the strongest in this study. 
Lambda is .21 which indicates a moderate association, thus 
some particular observations warrant discussion. 
First within education, public school employers re-
jected reports involving the OEA 58 percent of the time, 
while they rejected those involving non-teaching staff 
(OSEA-Ed) in 75 percent of the cases. This may be an indi-
cation that public school boards find it even more difficult 
to accept collective bargaining among non-teaching employees 
than they do teachE:rs. Thi s may be due to the previous (and 
Type of 
Government 
Public 
School 
lED 
Community 
College 
Higher 
Education 
Special 
District 
County 
State 
Total 
TABLE XXXIII 
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT BY EMPLOYER ACTION ON 
OREGON FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977 
Employer Action 
Accept Reject No 
Report Report Action 
26 (32.9) 45 (57.0) 8 (10.1) 
2 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0. 0) 
1 (11.1) 6 (66.7) 2 (22.2) 
0 (0.0) 2 (100.0) 0 (0. 0) 
5 (38.5) 5 (38.5) 3 (23.1) 
6 (40.0) 6 (40.0) 3 (20.0) 
4 (44.4) 4 (44.4) 1 (11.1) 
44 (34.1) 68 (52.7) 17 (13.2) 
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Total 
79 (100) 
2 (100) 
9 (100) 
2 (100) 
13 (100) 
15 (100) 
9 (100) 
129 (100) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = .032 with employer action dependent 
Missing observations = 2 
TABLE XXXIV 
EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION BY EMPLOYER ACTION ON OREGON 
FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977 
Employer Action 
Employee Accept Reject No 
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Organization Report Report Action Total 
OEA 25 (31.3) 46 (57.5) 9 (11. 3) 80 (100 ) 
AFSCME 10 (83.3) 2 (16.7) 0 (0.0) 12 (100) 
OSEA 
(Education) a (0. 0) 3 (75.0) 1 (25. 0) 4 (loa) 
Other 
Teachers a (0. 0) 2 (100.0) a (0.0) 2 (laO) 
Fire (IAFF) a (0.0) 1 (33.3) 2 (66.7) 3 (100) 
Police a (0.0) 1 (100.0) a (0.0) 1 (10 0) 
Sheriff a (0.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (100.0) 3 (100) 
I.L.W.U. 3 (50.0) 2 (33.3) 1 (16.7) 6 (100) 
aNA a (0.0) 1 (100.0) a (0. 0) 1 (100 ) 
Other 4 (33.3) 8 (66.7) a (0.0) 12 (100) 
OSEA (State) 2 (40.0) 2 (40.0) 1 (20.0) 5 (100) 
Total 44 (34.1) 68 (52.7) 17 (13.2) 129 (lOO) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.21 with employer action dependent 
Missinq observations = 2 
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traditionally unquestioned) power employers have had over 
non-teaching staff, and their staffs' relatively low socio-
economic status. 
Second, employer action in the protective services 
resembles that of the employees. Employers did not accept 
any reports, which indicates that fact-finding (when the 
final step is compulsory arbitration) may be viewed as just 
another step in the process. In this case employers have, 
like employee organizations, everything to gain and nothing 
to lose by going to arbitration. 
Third, employers dealing with cases involving AFSCME 
had a very high propensity to accept reports (83 percent) 
as did the special districts, dealing with the ILWU, with 
acceptance of 50 percent of the reports. 
Fourth, the state has a 20 percent no action rate when 
dealing with the State Employees (OSEA-State), which is only 
exceeded by the no action rate among the protective services 
and public schools with respect to non-teaching staff. 
It is concluded then that employers' actions on fact-
finder's reports are associated with the employee organiza-
tion they are dealing with. Whether this is a result of 
tradition, personalities of the actors, or other variables 
is unknown and further research in this area might prove 
very useful in understanding Oregon public employee labor 
relations. 
Summary of Employee and Employer Actions. Employee 
groups accept fact-finding reports more often than employers 
16 4 
(48 percent vs. 34 percent respectively). Employees reject 
less often than employers (24 vs. 53 percent), but have a 
higher no action record (28 percent vs. 13 percent respec-
tively) . 
There is no apparent association between the parties' 
actions and the sector. There is an apparent association 
between the employee organization and employee action, with 
education and state employees having a higher acceptance 
rate than the IL{~ and the protective services' unions. 
There is no apparent association between employer action and 
the type of government, however there isan association be-
tween employer action and the union which they deal with. 
In this case employers dealing with AFSCME and the ILWU have 
a higher propensity to accept than those dealing with other 
unions. Of particular concern is the high no action and re-
jection rate by both employees and employers in the protec-
tive service area, which indicate fact-finding may not be 
useful in these cases. 
Other factors that may affect the parties' actions will 
be discussed in the next section. 
OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE PARTIES' ACTIONS 
Other factors were considered that may affect the em-
ployee and employer actions on fact-finders' reports. The 
variables considered are time, population and census type, 
and the fact-finder. 
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Time 
In Oregon law, specific time lines have been estab-
lished in order to insure that the fact-finding process pro-
ceeds in an uninterrupted manner and that proposed solutions 
are made without undue time lapses. Excessive time lapses 
are seen to cause frustration among parties which adds to 
the problems involved, and perhaps adversely affects the 
parties' decisions to accept or reject fact-finders' reports. 
In this study two time phases were cross tabulated with 
the parties' actions. The two phases are: (1) the time 
lapse from the request for fact-finding to the hearing, and 
(2) the time lapse from the hearing to the issuance of the 
report. These two phases are viewed as one measurement of 
the efficiency of the fact-findj.ng process. 
Request to Hearing. This time lapse is viewed as a 
measurement of the responsiveness and efficiency of the 
selection/scheduling process that is administered by the 
State Conciliation Service. Because the selection of a 
fact-finder involves the parties, it is expected that this 
lapse will take longer than if the ERB selected the fact-
finder without the parties' involvement. 
The selection/scheduling phase was broken down into 
four categories. Table XXXV shows that this process has an 
almost even distribution, with 21 percent of the cases in 
the less than 4 week category, 32 percent in the 4 to 6 week 
category, 25 percent in the 6 to 8 week category, and 22 
percent: in the over 8 week category. 
TABLE XXXV 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF TIME PHASE 1 REQUEST TO HEARING 
AND TIME PHASE 2 HEARING TO REPORT 
Time Categories 
Less than Over 
4 weeks 4-6 weeks 6-8 weeks 8 weeks Missing 
Time Phase 1 
Request to Hearing 24 (21.1) 36 (31. 6) 29 (25.4) 25 (21. 9) 17 
Time Phase 2 
Hearing to Report 44 (38.6) 46 (40.4) 14 (12. 3) 10 (8.8) 17 
Missing observations = 17, all percents adjusted for missing data 
Total 
131 
131 
I-' 
C'\ 
~ 
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Considering the amount of time involved in mailing, it 
seems reasonable that this phase might take as long as one 
month to accomplish, and 21 percent of the cases did take 
that long. However 79 percent of the cases took over one 
month, and of those, 22 percent took over two months from 
the request for fact-finding and a hearing. In comparison, 
Michigan's average number of days between the fact-finders' 
appointment and the hearing was 39 days (up from 17 days in 
the 60's when parties did not select the fact-finder) .26 
There are reasons for Oregon's performance. First, 
because fact-finders in Oregon do not work for the State 
Conciliation Service, they are not always as flexible in 
scheduling their time to respond immediately to parties 
requesting their services; second, good fact-finders (in 
the parties' views) are scarce, and many of the fact-
finders cannot respond quickly due to other con~itments 
involving their fact-finding expertise. It is concluded 
then, that because Oregon is faced with a shortaye of com-
petent fact-finders, the selection/scheduling process take~ 
longer than is desirable. 
Hearing to Report. This time phase refers to the time 
lapse between the hearing and issuance of the fact-finders' 
report. This measures the efficiency of the fact-finders, 
that is, how responsive the fact-finders are to the require-
ments that a report be issued within one month of the 
hearing. 
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Table XXXV shows that in 39 percent of the cases, re-
ports were issued in less than four weeks of the hearing, 
and thus within the proscribed period by the legislature. 
This table also shows that in 40 percent of the cases 4-6 
weeks lapsed, in 12 percent of the cases 6-8 weeks, and in 
9 percent over two months lapsed between the hearing and 
the issuance of the fact-finder's report. 
This means that over 61 percent of the fact-finder's 
reports took longer than the proscribed one month for a re-
b · d 27 port to e lssue ,. Reasons for this include several 
factors: (1) in some cases post-hearing briefs are filed 
that extend the process as much as two weeks, (2) the 
aforementioned shortage of fact-finders which causes an 
overload on some fact-finders, and (3) some fact-finders 
are inordinately slow and unresponsive to the intent of the 
law and the parties' needs. This study will make recommen-
dations as how to reduce this time lapse in the concluding 
chapter. 
Time and Parties' Actions. The relationship or associ-
ation between time and the parties' actions (that is, their 
propensity to accept or reject fact-finders' reports) was 
considered. Tables XXXVI and XXXVII show there appears to 
be no association between the time and parties' action as 
lambda was zero in both cases. However, this does not mean 
that time has no impact on parties' actions. There is rea-
son to suspect that abnormally high time lapses may affect 
parties' attitudes, which in turn may affect the parties' 
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TABLE XXXVI 
TIME LAPSE REQUEST TO HEARING AND HEARING TO 
REPORT BY EMPLOYEE ACTION ON OREGON 
FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977 
Time Phase 1 - Reguest to Hearing 
Time Accept Reject No 
Category Report Report Action Total 
Less than 
4 weeks 9 (37.5) 8 (33.3) 7 (29.2) 24 (100 ) 
4 to 6 weeks 15 (41.7) 10 (27.8) 11 (30.6) 36 (100) 
6 to 8 weeks 18 (62.1) 6 (20.7) 5 (17.2) 29 (100) 
Over 8 weeks 10 (40.0) 7 (28.0) 8 (32.0) 25 (100) 
Total 52 (45.6) 31 (27.2) 31 (27.2) 114 (100) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.00 with employee action dependent 
Goodman-Kruska1 tau = .023 with employee action dependent 
Time Phase 2 - Hearin9: to ReEort 
Time Accept Reject No 
Category Report Report Action Total 
Less than 
4 weeks 20 (45.5) 11 (25.0) 13 (29.5) 44 (100) 
4 to 6 weeks 22 (47.8) 12 (26.1) 12 (26.1) 46 (100 ) 
6 to 8 weeks 5 ( 35. 7) 5 (35.7) 4 (28.6) 14 (100) 
Over 8 weeks 6 (60.0) 2 (20.0) 2 (20.0) 10 (100) 
Total 53 (46.5) 30 (26.3) 31 (27.2) 114 (100 ) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.00 with employee action dependent 
Goodman-Kruska1 tau = .008 with employee action dependent 
Missing observations = 17 
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TABLE XXXVII 
TIME LAPSE REQUEST TO HEARING AND HEARING TO 
REPORT BY EMPLOYER ACTION ON OREGON 
FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977 
Time Phase 1 - Request to Hearing 
Time Accept Reject No 
Category Report Report Action Total 
Less than 
4 weeks 7 (29.2) 12 (50.0) 5 (20.8) 24 (100) 
4 to 6 weeks 15 (41.7) 17 (47.2) 4 (11.1) 36 (100) 
6 to 8 weeks 7 (24.1) 19 (65.5) 3 (10.3) 29 (100) 
Over 8 weeks 9 (36.0) 14 (56.0) 2 (8.0) 25 (100) 
Total 38 (33.3) 62 (54.4) 14 (12. 3) 114 (100) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.00 with employer action dependent 
Goodman-Kruskal tau = .021 with employer action dependent 
Time Phase 2 - Hearing to Report 
Time Accept Reject No 
Category Report Report Action Total 
Less than 
4 weeks 14 (31. 8) 21 (47.7) 9 (20.5) 44 (100 ) 
4 to 6 weeks 16 (34.8) 28 (60.9) 2 ( 4 . 3) 46 (40.4) 
6 to 8 weeks 4 (28.6) 9 (64.3) 1 (7. 1 ) 14 (12.3) 
Over 8 weeks 4 (40.0) 5 (50.0) 1 (10.0) 10 ( 8 . 8) 
Total 38 (33.3) 63 (55.3) 13 (11. 4) 114 (l00) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.00 with employer action dependent 
Goodman-Kruskal tau = .018 with employer action dependent 
Missing observations = 17 
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actions. Although this study did not include attitudes as 
a variable, it is an area which future research could be 
directed. In the meantime the rationale for making recom-
mendations that would reduce the time involved in the fact-
finding process is two-fold: (1) compliance of the law 
(and its intent) and (2) the possible adverse effects time 
has on parties' attitudes toward the process. 
Population and Census Type 
Table XXXVIII shows data relating fact-finding to pop-
ulation and census type. It reveals that requests for 
fact-finding were fairly evenly distributed between small, 
medium, and large cities; however, in low populated areas 
the percent of requests was about half that of the cities 
of all sizes. This is not surprising as most public ser-
vices are in cities, and therefore most unions' bargaining 
units and the need for fact-finding. 
Table XXXVIII also shows the vast majority (74.4 per-
cent) of the requests for fact-finding were from urban 
areas (which includes all cities over 2,500 not classified 
as suburban). The percent of cases in the rural and subur-
ban areas are essentially the same with 13.7 percent and 
12.0 percent respectively. Again this makes sense when one 
considers where public services are demanded and therefore 
located. 
Population, Census Type and Parties' Actions. Cross 
tabulation tables are provided that relate employee and 
TABLE XXXVIII 
OREGON FACT-FINDING REQUESTS BY POPULATION 
CATEGORY AND CENSUS TYPE, 1974-1977 
Population Category 
Under 2,500 
2,500 - 10,000 
10,000 - 50,000 
Over 50,000 
Total 
Census Type 
Rural 
Suburban 
Urban 
Total 
Missing observations = 14 
Adjusted Frequency 
(percent) 
12.8 
20.5 
36.8 
29.9 
100.00 
Adjusted Frequency 
(percent) 
13.7 
12.0 
74.4 
100.0 
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action with population categories and census type. These 
tables are used to determine the effect, if any, the popu-
lation and type of area may have on parties' actions. 
Table XXXIX shows there appears to be a mild statisti-
cal association between population and employee action 
(lambda = .07). The high acceptance rate by employees in 
less populated areas may be an indication of their lack of 
strength and bargaining power, and thus their willingness to 
accept the fact-finders' report, rather than go on to strike. 
Furthermore, the under 2,500 category has a no action rate 
of 33 percent which (like the 2,500 to 10,000 category) is 
an indication of the lower populated areas reluctance to re-
ject reports. Of interest is the high (60.5 percent) employ-
ees acceptance rate in the 10,000 to 50,000 category. 
Table XXXIX also shows there is no significant statis-
tical relationship between employee action and census type, 
although differences exist. For example, suburban employee 
groups accepted fact-finding reports in 64 percent of their 
cases, where urban employee groups accepted in 44 percent of 
their cases. 
Employer data is reflected in Table XXXX. This table 
shows that although there is no statistical association be-
tween employer action and population and census type, some 
interesting patterns exist. There is a higher propensity 
for highly population areas (lO,OOO and over) to accept re-
ports than in the rural areas (under 2,500) and small towns 
(2,500 - 10,000). When comparing the census types, mild 
TABLE XXXIX 
POPULATION AND CENSUS TYPE BY EMPLOYEE ACTION ON 
OREGON FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977 
Employee Action 
population Accept Reject No 
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Category Report Report Action Total 
Under 2,500 8 (53.3) 2 (13.3) 5 (33.3) 15 (100) 
2,500-10,000 7 (29.2) 7 (29.2) 10 (41. 7) 24 (100) 
10,000-50.000 26 (60.5) 6 (14.0) 11 (25.6) 43 (100) 
Over 50,000 14 (41.2) 15 (44.1) 5 (14.7) 34 (100) 
Total 55 (47.4) 30 (25.9) 31 (26.7) 116 (100) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = .065 with employee action dependent 
Census Type 
Rural 8 (50.0) 2 (12. 5) 6 (37.5) 16 (100 ) 
Suburban 9 (64.3) 3 (21.4) 2 (14. 3) 14 (100) 
Urban 38 (44.2) 25 (29.1) 23 (26.7) 86 (100 ) 
Total 55 (47.4) 30 (25.9) 31 (26.7) 116 (100 ) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = .00 with employee action dependent 
Goodman-Kruskal tau = .018 with employee action dependent 
Missing observations = 15 
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TABLE XXX X 
POPULATION AND CENSUS TYPE BY EMPLOYER ACTION ON 
OREGON FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977 
EmEloyer Action 
Population Accept 
Category Report 
Under 2,500 4 (26.7) 
2,500-10,000 4 (16. 7) 
10,000-50,000 17 (39.5) 
Over 50,000 14 (41.2) 
Total 39 (33.6) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.00 
Goodman-Kruskal tau = .034 
Census Type 
Rural 
Suburban 
Urban 
Total 
4 (25.0) 
8 (57.1) 
27 (31.4) 
39 (33.6) 
Reject No 
Report Action 
9 (60.0) 2 (13.3) 
16 (66.7) 4 (16.7) 
22 (51.2) 4 (9.3) 
14 (41. 2) 6 (17.6) 
61 (52.6) 16 (13.8) 
with employer action 
with employer action 
9 (56.3) 
4 (28.6) 
48 (55.8) 
61 (52.6) 
3 (18.8) 
2 (14.3) 
11 (12.8) 
16 (13.8) 
Total 
15 (100) 
24 (100) 
43 (l00) 
34 (100 ) 
116 (100) 
dependent 
dependent 
16 (100) 
14 (100) 
86 (100) 
116 (100) 
Lambda (asymmetric) = .073 with employer action dependent 
Missing observations = 15 
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association exists (lambda = .07) and it is observed that 
suburban areas have an acceptance rate 32 points higher than 
rural areas, and 26 points higher than urban areas. This 
may be due to the fact that rural and urban areas (core 
city) do not have the population and business influx that 
give the suburban areas a better financial base from which 
to work. 
In summary, 74 percent of the requests for fact-finding 
originate from urban areas. Although mild association ex-
ists between employee action and population, and employer 
action and census type, this author is reluctant to make 
much of these differences as they are somewhat inconsistent 
and may be due to other factors. 
The Fact-Finders 
In order to ascertain the impact individual fact-
finders have on the parties' action a cross tabulation was 
made between the two variables. The results showed the 
highest statistical association in this study. Because of 
confidentiality considerations the fact-finder names and 
employee/employer actions will not be presented. However, 
the following general comments are appropriate. 
First, there is an association between the employee 
actions and the fact-finder as the cross tabulation resulted 
in a lambda = .22 (a moderate association). 
Second, there is an equally strong association (lambda 
= .22) between employer action and the fact-finder involved. 
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These associations are not surprising given the com-
ments of the parties during the interviews. Many parties 
indicated they had more faith and respect in and for some 
fact-finders than others (although names were never soli-
cited or volunteered). Further discussion about fact-
finders will occur in the next chapter, and recommendation 
on how to improve their effectiveness made in the conclud-
ing chapter. In the meantime there is evidence that the 
parties' action are associated with the individual fact-
finder's personality and perceived competency. 
SUMMARY OF AGGREGATE DATA 
The aggregate data in Table XVI supports one intent of 
Oregon's impasse resolution procedure; that each step sig-
nificantly reduces the number of impasses and therefore the 
number of potential strikes. The fact-finding phase accom-
plishes this also. Over 31 percent of the cases were re-
solved prior to hearing, which support.s the concept that the 
cost and inconvenience of fact-finding discourages its use. 
Of the cases going to hearing, few reports were accepted; 
and most of the cases were settled in super-mediation, but 
prior to strike. 
Table XXXXI shows a summary of the fact-finding data 
generated in this dissertation. It shows that the greatest 
use of the fact-finding process occurs in the education sec-
tor and in particular with public schools and involves the 
OEA which represents (K-12) teachers. Cases most often 
176 
'rABLE XXXXI 
SUMMARY OF FACT-FINDING DATA 
Phase 
Requests 
Settled 
Before 
Hearing 
Unit 
Sector 
Employee Group 
Gov1t Employer 
Employee Group 
Gov1t Employer 
Parties ' Actions 
Accept 
Report 
Reject 
Report 
No 
Action 
Employee Group* 
Gov1t Employer* 
Employee Group* 
Gov1t Employer* 
Employee Group 
Gov1t Employer 
Unit With Highest 
Percent of Cases 
Education - 69 
OEA - 57 
Public Schools - 58 
OSEA (Ed.) - 64, 
AFSCME - 48 
Higher Ed - 50, County -48, 
State - 41 
OEA - 51, AFSCME - 42 
State - 44, County - 40 
AFSCME - 50, ILWU - 50 
Community College - 67 
Public Schools - 57 
Fire and Sheriff - 67 
Those dealing w/Fire and 
Sheriff - 67 and 100 
respectively 
*Others are higher but only involve 1 or 2 cases 
Strongest Statistical Associations 
Lambda 
IndeEendent Variable Dependent Variable (Asymmetric) 
Employee Organization by Employee Action 0.104 
Type of Government by Employee Action 0.059 
Employee Organization by Employer Action 0.210 
Population Category by Employee Action 0.066 
Census Type by Employer Action 0.073 
Fact-Finder by Employee Action 0.22 
Fact-Finder by Employer Action 0.22 
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settled before hearing involved the OSEA (education) and 
AFSCME employee groups, and the governmental types of higher 
education, county, and the state. 
Fact-finding reports were most often accepted by the 
OEA and the state government. The highest rejection rate 
involved AFSCME, the ILWU and the governmental units of com-
munity colleges and public schools. The no action was high-
est among employees and employers in the protective services. 
There appears to be a mild statistical relationship 
between employee actions and the employee organization and 
type of government involved. Employer actions have a mod-
erate statistical relationship with the employee group they 
are dealing with. 
Although time has little statistical association with 
parties' actions the author is reluctant to dismiss this as 
unimportant. Population and census type data reveal that 
the vast majority of cases occur in urban areas, however, 
association between this and parties' actions is mixed and 
inclusive. 
Of particular significance is the statistical associa-
tion between both parties' actions and the fact-finder. 
This aggregate data reveals much information about the 
characteristics of the fact-finding phase of Oregon's im-
passe resolution process. In order to further ascertain the 
effectiveness of fact-finding, the views of the parties were 
considered. These views are explained and analyzed in the 
next two chapters. 
CHAPTER IV NOTES 
loregon Revised Statutes, secs. 243.712 (1) and 662. 
405-.455 (1977). 
2This is considered by most labor relations experts 
as more desirable than part-time, non professional media-
tors. 
30regon Revised Statutes, sec. 243.712 (2b) (1977). 
40RS 243.712 (2c). This option is rarely used. 
50regon Revised Statutes, sec. 243.722 (1-2) (1977). 
60RS 243.722. 
70regon State Conciliation Service Rules, 15-015. 
8Nationally there is much debate on this issue. In 
Oregon the role is judicial unless both parties request 
otherwise. 
90RS 243.722 (3). 
100RS 243. 722 ( 3) • 
110RS 243.742 (4). Also see, State Conciliation Ser-
vice Rules, 15-015, No. 15. A copy may be found in Appen-
dix D. 
l20RS 243.722 (3 and 5). 
l30regon Revised Statutes, sec. 243.726 (a-d) (1977). 
l40RS 243.726 (3a). 
l50regon Revised Statutes, sec. 243.746 (1 and 2) 
(1977) • 
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160RS 243.746 (4). 
170RS 243.762. 
18Foundation for Oregon Research and Education, Col-
lective Bargaining and Tenure in Oregon Education (Portland, 
Ore.: Foundation for Oregon Research and Education, 1977), 
p. 51. Also see Oregon Legislative Assembly, 1979, Senate 
Bill 331. 
19The strength of the values of lambda (asymmetric), 
which is a PRE measure, WE're interpreted by using the fol-
lowing scale: 60+: strong, 40-60: moderately strong, 
20-40: moderate, 0-20: mild, and 0: none. Goodman-
Kruskal's tau (also a PRE measure) was computed when 
lambda = O. This is because lambda, at times, had the pro-
perty of taking on a value of zero when there may be a weak 
correlation. See Huburt M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics, 
2nd ed. (New York: McGraw, 1972), pp. 302-303. The exist-
ence of a strong or weak statistical correlation does not 
prove that one variable causes or doesn't cause another, 
rather it gives signals as to the direction of possible 
future research. Also future analysis of a longer time 
period may yield different results than the four year per-
iod covered in this study. 
20There were 26 of the 239 cases (or about 10 percent) 
that involved home rule cities and counties. 
21John E. Drothing, and David E. Lipsky, "The Outcome 
of Impasse Prccedures in New York Schools Under the Taylor 
Law," The Arbitration Journal, 26 (1971), 91-92. 
22Jack Steiber and Benjamin Wolkinson, "Fact-Finding 
Viewed by Fact-Finders: The Michigan Experience," Labor 
Law Journal, 28, No. 2 (1977), 94. 
23Drothing and Lipsky, pp. 91-92. 
24 Byron Yaffe, and Howard Goldblatt, Fact-Finding in 
Public Employment Disputes in New York State: More Promise 
than Illusion (Ithaca: School of Industrial Relations, 
Cornell Univ., 1971), p. 31. 
25 Yaffe and Goldblatt, p. 18. Also see Steiber and 
Wolkinson, p. 92. 
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26Steiber and Wolkinson, p. 93. 
27B f ' 'M' h' h ' 30 y way 0 compar1son, 1n 1C 19an t e average 15 
days. See Steiber and Wolkinson, p. 93. 
CHAPTER VI 
VIEWS OF THE NEUTRALS 
In order to further ascertain the nature and effec-
tiveness of fact-finding, the views of those involved in 
the process were solicited. This chapter covers the views 
of the mediators and fact-finders. The vehicle used to 
translate their views into written form was a questionnaire. 
The items were designed to elicit responses to pertinent 
questions about the fact-finding process. Many of the items 
resemble the types of questions asked in studies done in 
other states, and comparative information will be provided 
where appropriate. l The format of the questionnaires may 
be found in Appendix B. 
The questionnaire was administered during a personal 
interview situation, in order to provide more candor and a 
higher response rate than a mail or phone interview might. 
Furthermore, the interview was seen as a way to gain insight 
into the fact-finding process that the aggregate statistics 
and methods could not provide. 
The sampling technique employed in the interview sched-
ule was non-random because the universe of cases was the 
topic of the study. Furthermore, not all persons and/or 
categories of experts are equally experienced and important; 
and indeed, some have more insight into the process and much 
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more impact on policy-formation than others. 2 For further 
methodological details see Appendix A. The number of par-
ticipants interviewed from each subsample of mediators and 
fact-finders are as follows: 
(1) Mediators -- nine were interviewed; these nine 
account for about 90 percent of all non-home 
rule fact-finding cases requiring post-fact-
finding mediation. A list of those mediators 
interviewed is provided in Appendix B. 
(2) Fact-finders -- ten were interviewed; these ten 
account for over 64 percent of the non-home rule 
fact-finding cases going to hearing. A list of 
those fact-finders interviewed is provided in 
Appendix B. 
Both mediators' and fact-finders' views are discussed sep-
arately in the following order: first, the mediators; and 
second, the fact-finders. 
VIEWS OF THE MEDIATORS 
Mediators in Oregon are full-time employees of the 
State Conciliation Service. Of the nine interviewed all 
but one were men. Their educational background is as fol-
lows: 1 attorney, 2 with Bachelors Degrees, 2 with Masters 
Degrees, and 2 with Doctorate Degrees. All have some col-
lege. They all have had practical experience in labor rela-
tions, some in the public sector, and some in the private 
sector. 3 Over two thirds of the mediators interviewed were 
involved in both pre-fact-finding and post-fact-finding 
mediation (super-mediation). Because of this experience 
they are able to evaluate the impact of fact-finding from 
a unique position. 
Reasons for Fact-Finding 
183 
The mediators were asked to rank the five most impor-
tant reasons that cause fact-finding. The reasons should 
not be confused with the issues, which are the items to be 
settled. Although no one mediator came up with five rea-
sons, their rankings did fall into seven basic categories: 
(1) inexperience, (2) face-saving, (3) demonstration of 
determination, (4) personal venting of feelings, (5) hold 
out and delay tactics, (6) outside pressure, and (7) hard 
bargaining. Each of these is discussed in detail as fol-
lows: 
(I) Inexperience. This was ranked by mediators as 
the most important cause of fact-finding. It refers to the 
purties' lack of expertise in bargaining and inability to 
strike a bargain. Inexperience also refers to the parties' 
lack of understanding or sympathy with the philosophy of 
the collective bargaining process and its purpose. It is 
partially responsible for the large number of issues going 
to fact-finding. Given the newness of the law, it seems 
reasonable to expect a period where both parties adjust to 
their new relationship and learn by experience. 
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Several mediators mentioned that inexperience is a par-
ticular problem in the education sector, where the idealism 
of the teachers and the authoritarian and paternalistic 
background of school boards have clashed. It was suggested 
that as both parties learn more about the collective bar-
gaining process, inexperience will be less of a cause of 
fact-finding. This might be a topic for future research. 
(2) Face-saving. This was ranked by mediators as the 
second highest cause of fact-finding. It refers to the in-
ability of the parties' representatives to compromise be-
cause of their constituents' firm positions on a particular 
issue or issues. Fact-finding provides a neutral's view 
and recommendations, which are utilized as a rationale to 
settle or strike a bargain. The fact-finder in this case 
becomes the "scape goat" or the "per-diem fall guy," as the 
representative of each party can blame the fact-finder for 
the reSUlting compromise. 
This author views this cause as a positive sign that 
shows that in Oregon fact-finding does provide an avenue 
for compromise that allows the parties to save face. This 
role is particularly important during the adjustment phase 
of collective bargaining where the bitterness of a loss of 
power by one party and the eagerness of a newly gained 
power by the other party are both soothed. 
(3) Demonstration of Determination. Mediators ranked 
this as the third highest cause of fact-finding. This re-
fers to the propensity of the parties' representatives to 
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demonstrate to their constituents that they are working 
their hardest to represent the parties' interest. By not 
compromising prior to fact-finding, some negotiators feel 
that the employers or employee group will have clear evi-
dence of the negotiators' firmness and commitment to the 
parties' goals. Of course, once the fact-finders' report is 
issued, they then have a "scape goat" for further compromise 
(as do the parties themselves). 
(4) Personal Venting of Feelings. Mediators ranked 
this fourth, but very close to the previously discussed 
cause. This refers to a tendency of some negotiations to 
be marred by personal vendettas or unpleasant past relation-
ships between certain participants of each party. Evidently 
this does not just apply to the parties, but occasionally 
applies to the professional representatives (who ironically 
enough are hired because of their expertise and objective-
ity). 
Again fact-finding serves a positive function that the 
aggregate statistics cannot show, that being a stage or for-
um for the parties to vent their feelings to their groups 
and the public in a controlled environment. Such a forum 
is of great help in allowing the actors to have their say, 
which is seen equally as important as any recommendations 
that result from the fact-finders' report. 
(5) Holdout or Delay Tactics. This ranked close to 
number four and refers to some parties' tendency to use 
fact-finding as a tactic to stall or holdout offers that 
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might result in a settlement. The thought by management is 
that they have everything to gain and nothing to lose by go-
ing to fact-finding, as they know their bottom line, and 
perhaps the fact-finder will recommend something less than 
that. Some unions on the other hand, may have not been able 
to secure what they want and hope the fact-finder may recom-
mend something above what the employer offered. In both 
cases, the parties hope to use the fact-finders' report as 
an instrument of pressure against the other party in order 
to gain more favorable terms. 
Furthermore, fact-finding is used as a way of securing 
a time schedule as part of a strategy based upon budget 
deadlines or strike effectiveness. For example, a teachers' 
union may want to strike and use the required fact-finding 
process as a convenient way to pass the time during summer, 
thus ending fact-finding and instituting strike in September 
when school is in and strike is more meaningful. More spe-
cific questions relating to this will be covered later in 
this chapter. 
(6) Outside Pressure. This was not mentioned too 
often but warrants brief discussion. Some mediators feel 
that the state level of the union or employer groups indi-
rectly (or directly) put pressure on the parties to nego-
tiate an "ideal" contract. Associated with this is the 
tendency toward idealism by both the rank and file, and the 
employers. This idealism leads them to expect that an 
"ideal" contract can be achieved in short order. Thus, 
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both parties have been known to be very inflexible at the 
bargaining table because they expect, or are expected, to 
secure a contract that a central body such as the Oregon 
School Boards Association (OSBA) or the Oregon Education 
Association (OEA) suggests is desirable. Although it is 
difficult to determine the extent of such pressure, it is 
perceived as important by some experienced mediators as a 
reason for fact-finding. 
(7) Hard Bargaining. As a category this ranked last, 
but very close to number 5 and 6. As perceived by the med-
iators, some parties go to fact-finding because they have 
reached an impasse due to their differences in what they 
perceive as their final bargaining position. Again, fact-
finding provides a cooling-off period that gives the par-
ties time to re-evaluate their positions and gives a neu-
tral's view of what is reasonable and fair, thus increasing 
the chances of settlement without strike. 
In summary, the mediators essentially attributed the 
cause of fact-finding to seven reasons. These reasons are 
interrelated, and for one to suggest one or two are the 
cause of fact-finding would be misleading. The interviews 
demonstrate what we already know: that the causes of im-
passe are very complex and vary from case to case. It 
further indicates that fact-finding is a process that has 
the potential to accommodate a variety of party needs. 
Further information from the questionnaires will reveal this 
fact. 
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The Effectiveness of Fact-Finding 
In order to obtain the mediators' views as to the ef-
fectiveness of fact-finding in Oregon, eleven questions 
were asked. These questions and the mediators' responses 
are shown in Table XXXXII. Each question will be discussed 
along with additional comments obtained in the interview. 
(1) The Parties Generally Bargain in Good Faith 
Through Mediation and Fact-Finding. A sizeable majority of 
the mediators thought parties do generally bargain in good 
faith through mediation and fact-finding. Although 78 per-
cent of their responses to item one were in the agree por-
tion of the scale, they almost uniformly made comments such 
as "what is good faith," or "do you mean technically good 
faith or reasonable good faith?" In several instances med-
iators said most parties do bargain in good faith, but some 
consistently do not bargain in good faith. There was gen-
eral agreement that time and experience on the part of the 
parties might produce an atmosphere where the intent as 
well as the legal requirements for good faith bargaining 
will occur with increased frequency and consistency. The 
reasoning is that familiarity with bargaining contributes 
to the socialization of the parties to the process. This 
internalizing of the intellectual basis of the process leads 
to more effective bargaining; fact-finding is seen as con-
tributing to this socialization. 
(2) Fact-Finding Significantly Reduces Issues Causing 
Impasse. The majority of the mediators thought that fact-
TABLE XXXXII 
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I. The parties generally bargain in good faith 
through mediation and fact-finding. 0 11 11 0 5,6 22 0 100 
2. Fact-finding significantly reduces issues caus-
ing impasse. 11 0 11 44 11 11 11 99 
3. Fact-finders are a positive factor in impasse 
resolution. 11 0 11 67 11 0 0 100 
4. The fact-finders are innovative in their 
recommendations. 22 33 0 33 0 0 11 99 
5. Fact-finding causes parties to hold back offers 
in mediation. 22 0 0 22 44 11 0 99 
6. Fact-finding is a tool for negotiation strategy. 
(If so, in what way) . 11 0 0 11 44 33 0 99 
7. The fact-finders' report is the basis for post-
fact-finding settlement. 11 0 0 22 56 0 11 100 
8. One party is more prone to reject reports than 
the other. (If so, who and why?). 0 0 0 0 33 22 44 99 
9. Fact-finding aids in settlement. (Explain. ) 0 11 11 44 22 11 0 99 
10. Fact-finding detracts from settlement. 
(Explain) . 11 11 11 33 11 11 11 99 
II. Fact-finding should be abolished. (If so, 
should anything take its place?) 11 33 0 11 11 22 11 99 I-' co 
1.0 
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finding does significantly reduce the issues causing im-
passe. Sixty-six percent responded to item two in the agree 
portion of the scale. However, this can be interpreted dif-
ferently because 44 percent of that group hedged by only 
somewhat agreeing, and because of added comments during the 
interview. Such comments included "they were ready to get 
together anY\\lay," II some do, some don't, II and "minor issues 
fallout, leaving the major ones. II 
Still, overall, two-thirds of the mediators do agree 
that fact-finding significantly reduces the number of issues 
causing impasse, even if a few major ones are left to be 
settled in post-fact-finding mediation (or after strike) . 
(3) Fact-Finders Are a Positive Factor in Impasse 
Resolution. Mediators, by a sizeable majority, felt that 
the fact-finders themselves are a positive factor in impasse 
resolution. Over 78 percent of the@ responded in the agree 
portion of the scale to question three. Specific comments 
about the positive role include, "the fact-finder listens 
to their arguement without interruption,1I "he moves them 
toward settlement," "for new groups he helps educate them.1I 
However all comments were not positive. Negative comments 
were made such as, IIhe can escalate problems if there is 
confusion over his report," and "they split issues to keep 
their jobs." rrhis type of comment may also be an indication 
of professional jealousy. This reference to possible pro-
fessional jealousy refers to the mediators' role and salary 
as compared to the fact-finders'. The mediators work long 
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hard hours for the State and do not receive excessive pay-
ments for their services. Fact-finders (who are free agents) 
charge what the market will bear, and work at their conveni-
ence. Also mediators generally picture themselves as having 
superior knowledge and intuitive feel for the parties' posi-
tions and hidden agendas. 
Overall, mediators generally think fact-finders playa 
positive role in the process, but there are circumstances 
where the fact-finder may not be a positive factor. 
(4) Fact-Finders Are Innovative In Their Recommenda-
tions. Over 55 percent of the mediators felt that fact-
finders are not innovative in their recommendations. 
Further comments suggested that several mediators felt the 
fact-finders split the issues, rather than suggest innova-
tive solutions to the impasse. This response may be due to 
the fact that mediators have to, and can, be innovative in 
their suggestions, but for practical purposes the fact-
finders only have a range in which to recommend, and that 
range is stipulated by the parties. Thus, when mediators 
compare their own experience with the fact-finders' they 
conclude (and perhaps rightfully so) that fact-finders are 
not innovativE in their recommendations. 
(5) Fact-Finding Causes Parties to Hold Back Offers in 
Mediation. Of great importance is the impact fact-finding 
may have on bargaining. Over 77 percent of the mediators 
felt that parties hold back offers in bargaining and media-
tion in anticipation of fact-finding. The reasons for this 
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will be discussed when the parties' views are analyzed. The 
implication from the mediators is that fact-finding makes 
their job harder, as parties may hold back in spite of the 
quality of the mediator's effort. Again this will be ex-
plored in greater detail later in this and the next chapter. 
(6) Fact-Finding is a Tool for Negotiation Strategy. 
The purpose of this question is to further ascertain the ef-
fect the presence of fact-finding may hnve on the bargaining 
process. Over 88 percent of the mediators thought that fact-
finding is used by the parties as a tool for negotiation 
strategy. Specific comments include: "the third party de-
flates high proposals," "fact-finding creates a sense of im-
patience and to get it over with," "parties know they will 
not get much less than the fact-finders' recommendation," 
"fact-finding used according to budget time lines and elec-
tions," "used to hold back and pressure other party due to 
time lapse," "a delay tactic that costs money and brings in 
an unwelcome outsider," and "every phase used is strategy." 
These comments show that the ways in which fact-finding may 
bE: used as a tool for negotiation strategy vary consider-
ably, but further comment will be withheld until all par-
ticipants' views are discussed. 
(7) The Fact-Finders' Report is the Basis for Post-
Fact-Finding Settlement. A sizeable majority (about 78 
percent) of the mediators responded in the agree portion of 
the scale to item seven. This is a strong indication that 
although the fact-finders' reports are not accepted, they 
are very useful in impasse resolution. In Chapter V the 
more general aggregate data showed that both parties ac-
cepted the fact-finding reports in only 17 percent of the 
fact-finding cases. This, on the surface, makes the pro-
cess seem unsuccessful. However, consider two factors: 
193 
(1) the large number of issues involved in the average fact-
finding case, and (2) the use of the report after fact-
finding. First, in spite of the quality of the fact-
finders' report, the large numbers of issues make it 
improbable that both parties will accept the report in total. 
Second, mediator responses to the questionnaire show 
that acceptance of the fact-finders' report, although de-
sirable, is not necessary for the fact-finders' recommenda-
tions to be taken seriously by both parties. 
It appears that parties use the fact-finders' report 
as a basis for settlement for some issues, to clarify posi-
tions on other issues, and as a reference point in post-
fact-finding negotiations and super-mediation. Perhaps the 
report's usefulness could be more adequately measured if 
the parties had to accept or reject on an issue by issue 
basis, rather than on the entire package (the thought being 
that many of the recommendations may be acceptable, and only 
a few need further negotiation). 
In summary, the acceptance or rejection of an entire 
fact-finder's report is not an indication that the process 
has been unsuccessful in bringing the parties closer to-
gether and fostering a peaceful resolution of impasse. 
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And, over three-fourths of the medi&tors thought the reports 
are the basis for post-fact-finding settlement. 
(8) One Party is More Prone to Reject than the Other. 
This question was posed to check whether mediators had a 
clear idea of the parties' actions on fact-finding reports. 
Over 44 percent of the mediators had no opinion, which is an 
indication that the question is not a good one. For what 
it's worth, 55 percent of the mediators agree that employers 
between 1974 and 1977, were more prone to reject fact-
finders' reports. The aggregate data substantiates their 
opinions. 
However, of considerable interest is the mediators' 
views as to why employers rejected reports more often than 
employee groups. The comments include: "a deliberate 
strategy [by management] to opt out of negotiations," and 
"school boards feel they are in control--they are paternal-
istic." These comments imply that employers rejected more 
fact-finding reports due to a strategy, a demonstration of 
power, and dislike for the collective bargaining process. 
Their comments also implied that employee groups accepted 
more reports because of a strategy of appearing reasonable 
and cooperative, plus the fact that most employee groups did 
not want to, or were not powerful enough to successfully en-
gage in a 3trike. Several mediators suggested their recent 
experiences indicated a change in attitude or strategy by 
employee groups, and that the rejection rates by both par-
ties may become more equal in the future. 
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The implications drawn from these comments are that the 
high rate of rejections by employers is more due to attitud-
inal problems than problems inherent in the fact-finding 
process or the fact-finders' reports. Further comment will 
be withheld until the parties' views are considered. 
(9) Fact-Finding Aids in Settlement. A large majority 
of mediators (77 percent) thought that fact-finding does aid 
in settlement. However, 44 percent did so in a mild way 
(that is, they somewhat agreed). Their explanations as to 
why it aids are summarized as follows: "it gives the par-
ties an opportunity to publicly vent their feelings," 
"fact-finding forces the parties to re-evaluate their posi-
tions in a rational way," "fact-finding provides time to 
cool off," lithe parties' political needs are satisfied," 
and "fact-finding gives a neutral's views and recommenda-
tions." Thus, according to the state mediators, fact-
finding does aid in settlement in several ways, however, it 
also detracts from settlement as the next question shows. 
(10) Fact-Finding Detracts From Settlement. A slim 
majority of mediators felt fact-finding does detract from 
settlement as 55 percent responded to item ten in the agree 
portion of the scale. However, over 33 percent hedged by 
somewhat agreeing, which is an indication that, overall, 
fact-finding detracts to a mild degree. Specific reasons 
given for such agreement are: "there is sometimes confu-
sion over the fact-finders' recommendations," "fact-finding 
caLlses a hold back of offers, and delay tactics," "it 
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lengthens the process," "fact-fincH ng makes it more diffi-
cult to mE":diate," and "it can cause complications with 
recorrunendations that are not realistic." 
It is interesting to note that some of the aspects that 
make fact-finding an aid to settlement also can make fact-
finding a detraction from settlement. For example, the 
time lapse involved is viewed as a positive factor in that 
it gives the parties time to cool off and reassess their 
positions. However, that same time lapse can run into bud-
get and election deadlines, or be used as a delay tactic to 
cause frustration. 
The fact-finders' recommendations are also viewed from 
two ways. ThE:Y provide a neutral's views which can help the 
parties understand what is reasonable; on the other hand, if 
the recommendations are vague or unrealistic, further prob-
lems can result. 
The two questions relating to fact-finding aiding or 
detracting from settlement are not mutually exclusive. They 
show that the mediators are torn themselves between whether 
the benefits outweigh the problems of fact-finding, and 
that fact-finding (like most things in life) is a double-
edged sword. 
In order to corne to grips of whether the process should 
be retained, the next statement was posed. 
(11) Fact-Finding Should be Abolished. Mediators as a 
group are divided on this issue. About 44 percent fall in 
the agree, and 44 percent in the disagree portion of the 
197 
scale; 11 percent had no opinion. Table XXXXII shows that 
those who disagree with this statement feel stronger than 
those who agree (none somewhat disagree, where 11 percent 
somewhat agree). 
It must be emphasized that this statement is not a 
simple yes or no question; this was indicated by responses 
to the question: "should anything take the place of fact-
finding?" Of those who thought fact-finding should be 
abolished, half felt that the impasse process should con-
sist of mediation only; that is, if mediation were to fail, 
the parties would go directly to strike. It is interesting 
to note that all mediators so responding have private sec-
tor experience. The other half who favored abolishing 
fact-finding suggested substitutes for fact-finding, such as 
a thirty day cooling-off period, or binding arbitration. 
This shows that those mediators who favor abolishing fact-
finding differ significantly as to what should take its 
place. One reason for this may be that they put emphasis 
on different problems of the process. In short, only a few 
mediators suggested abolishing fact-finding with no re-
placement, and 44 percent would not abolish it al all. 
Problems Perceived by Mediators 
Although mediators did not form a clear consensus on 
retention of fact-finding, most had definite thoughts about 
what problems exist with respect to the process. Possible 
solutions to the following problems will be discussed in 
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the final chapter. 
Too Many Issues. Table XVII in Chapter V showed the 
average number of issues per case is 15. Mediators esti-
mated an average between 25-30. The difference is whether 
the subissues are counted or not. In either case, with 
large numbers of issues it makes it all but impossible for 
a fact~finding report to be accepted, or for mediation to 
be successful. This is because the parties have been un-
able to accomplish much by themselves anyway. The reason 
for so many issues lies with the parties themselves and 
their unfamiliarity of, and lack of experience with, the 
collective bargaining process. Many mediators said time, 
and increased socialization in the proces~, will solve 
this problem; in the meantime, it will have to be dealt 
with as best as possible. 
Delay Problems. The amount of time involved in fact-
finding, as shown by the aggregate data, is excessive and 
runs the impasse process past budget and election dead-
lines, and adds to the frustration levels of some parties. 
This is of particular concern to parties who go to 
interest arbitration as the law limits retroactive pay in-
creases by requiring that interest arbitration be requested 
prior to the budget deadline of July first. Therefore, if 
fact-finding has not been concluded before July first, any 
pay increases awarded in arbitration will be for the follow-
ing year, not that present fiscal year. One mediator sees 
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time as taking steam out of the institutions, which may stop 
strike, but does not contribute to equity. He stated that 
public employees in many groups are represented by low bud-
get representatives, whereas public employers have the money 
to afford 'pros' that get hired to buy time. 
Fact-Finder Problem. This problem was mentioned by 
several mediators. It refers to the expertise of the fact-
finders and their ability to communicate findings in written 
form. Some mediators thought that fact-finders need to 
write more clearly and in a similar form. Furthermore, 
cases should be handled in a similar manner, and more uni-
form fees charged. In the opinion of one mediator, many 
fact-finders are trained in the private sector and are un-
familiar with the uniqueness of public sector labor 
relations. 
Fact-Finding Too Intellectual. The success of fact-
finding rests upon the parties internalizing the intellec-
tual basis of the process. Several mediators stated that 
the law is more intelligent than the people using it; that 
is, public employee collective bargaining at this stage is 
largely politics and emotion, and therefore, fact-finding 
is used to those ends rather than used properly. The case 
is made that until the fact-finding phase is intellectual-
ized among the institutions it will not be as useful as 
the law intends. 
Miscellaneous. Other problems mentioned by the media-
tors include the thought that fact-finding is great for the 
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fact-finders as they make lots of money for writing reports 
that are not published or that the PQblic can't understand. 
Whether such comments are a result of professional jealousy 
rather than objectivity, remains for further analysis. 
Another mediator mentioned that fact-finding is a pro-
cess where the parties talk issues to death, and in essence 
expect the fact-finders to write the contract that the par-
ties were unwilling to write themselves. 
Finally, two mediators suggested that we ought to have 
a few more strikes in order to clear the air, to educate 
the parties on the seriousness of the process, and get them 
down to good faith bargaining (the aggregate data showed 
Oregon has had only seven strikes from 1974-1977). 
Post-Fact-Finding Mediation 
Lastly, the question was posed as to why so many cases 
are settled after rejection of the report, but before the 
strike. Almost to the person, mediators thought that both 
unions and employers don't want a strike and it is not un-
til after fact-finding that "push gets to shove;" that is, 
only after fact-finding does the pressure for parties to 
settle become strong. 
Another explanation is that after fact-finding the 
parties have had similar views from two neutrals, thus are 
more able to compromise and save face. Lastly, many cases 
are settled in post-fact-finding mediation through the 
hard work of the mediator. 
201 
Summary of Mediator Views 
Table XXXXIII shows a summary of the mediators' views. 
TABLE XXXXIII 
SUMMARY OF MEDIATOR VIEWS ON FACT-FINDING 
Percent Percent Percent 
Item Agree Disagree No Opinion 
I. Good Faith Bargaining 78 22 0 
2. Reduces Issues 66 22 11 
3. Positive Factor 88 22 0 
4. Innovative 55 33 11 
5. Hold Back 77 22 0 
6. Tool for Strategy 88 11 0 
7. Basis for Settlement 78 11 11 
8. One Party Rejects More 55 0 44 
9. Aids in Settlement 77 22 0 
10. Detracts from Settlement 55 33 11 
II. Abolish Fact-Finding 44 44 11 
It shows that the mediators' overall assessment of fact-
finding is both positive and negative. A strong majority 
think the parties bargain in good faith according to the 
technical meaning, but question whether they bargain toward 
settlement. A majority feel fact-finding reduces the issues 
causing impasse. The vast majority some what agree that 
fact-finders are a positive factor in impasse resolution; 
and a slim majority do not think fact-finders make innova-
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tive recommendaticns. Mediators, by a good majority, think 
fact-finding causes parties to hold back offers in negotia-
tions and mediation, and that the parties use the process as 
part of their overall bargaining strategy. A sizeable ma-
jority thinks fact-finding aids in settlement, and a slim 
majority thinks it detracts from settlement. Mediators are 
divided as to whether fact-finding should be abolished. 
Those who think it should be abolished differ considerably 
on what should replace the process. 
The next section will relate the views of the fact-
finders, and conclude with a comparison of mediator and 
fact-finder views. 
THE FACT-FINDERS' VIEWS 
The educational level, occupational status and experi-
ence of the fact-finders interviewed reveals that they are 
not average in any respect. Over 80 percent of the fact-
finders have a Ph.D. or law degree, and the remaining have 
some college. The occupational background is as follows: 
attorney, 20 percent; educator, 50 percent; and mediator-
arbitrator, 30 percent. 4 The number of years experience 
in fact-finding ranged from four to ten, with an average 
of six and one-half years. It is interesting to note that 
although there were 33 fact-finders involved in cases from 
1974-1977, the ten interviewed account for about 64 percent 
of the total cases. This is due to re-selection by the 
parties. 
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Rea~.ons for Fact-:~il!?ing 
Fact-finders attributed the cause of fact-finding to 
the same reasons as the mediators. In order not to be 
repetitious, these will not be discussed in detail but 
listed according to the frequency of response. The causes 
are: (1) hold-back strategy, (2) use as an extension of 
the bargaining process, (3) face-saving, (4) lack of good 
faith bargaining, and (5) miscellaneous items such as the 
mediator was not trusted, or the parties need more time. 
Issues 
When responding to the questions regarding the issues, 
the fact-finders indicated that most of the problems 
surrounding the issues involved in fact-finding center 
about the numbers and types of issues. 
Numbers of Issues. The number of issues going to fact-
finding is of great concern to neutrals, because they indi-
cate the degree of lack of bargaining by the parties in-
volved. The average number of issues per case, according 
to the fact-finders' estimates, ranged from 15 to 50 with 
an overall average of 25. The aggregate data in Table XVII 
showed the average number of issues was 15, however, it was 
pointed out that some issues had as many as eight sub-
issues. This accounts for the fact-finders' range in esti-
mation. The greatest number of issues reported ranged be-
tween 28 and 100, and the least number of issues ranged be-
tween one and 20. Fifty percent of the fact-finders 
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reported cases with over 50 issues. It should also be 
noted that the public schools were mentioned as the source 
of most of the cases involving large numbers of issues. 
According to the fact-finders there are several rea-
sons for this unmanageable number of issues. First, during 
the period 1974-1977, the collective bargaining law was new, 
and both parties were not very sophisticated in the art of 
collective bargaining. This lack of experience, as men-
tioned by the mediators, causes problems that result in 
impasse and eventually fact-finding. Second, there were 
certain areas in Oregon wheLe the public school employers 
deliberately would not bargain on many issues in order to 
force the Employment Relaticns Board (via an unfair labor 
practice) to clarify what were mandatory and permissive 
items. 5 Also many issues were taken to fact-finding in 
order to test the system, and the unions' strength. Third, 
some parties (again mainly in the public schools) were not 
willing to bargain and literally took the issues to fact-
finding in order to secure a contract; that is, they had 
the fact-finder write a contract by default. 
In any case, the number of issues has declined recent-
ly and it is expected by all concerned that in the future 
the average number of issues per case will not be so extra-
ordinary because of the parties' newly gained experience, 
particular ERB rulings, and past negotiations. If the 
number of issues decreases substantially, it may well be 
that the acceptance rate of fact-finding reports will 
increase, as the parties have fewer points on which to 
disagree. 
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Types of Issues. ThE: type of issues is another con-
cern to neutrals. Fact-finders were asked to rank the most 
important issues that cause fact-finding. They are: (1) 
salary and fringe benefits, (2) grievance procedures, (3) 
union rights and security, (4) just cause, (5) management 
rights, and (6) leaves. Several of these items only per-
tain to the education sector, which is expected given the 
majority of the fact-finding cases involved public schools. 
ThE: aggregate data from Tables XVIII and XIX in Chapter V 
show these issues are among the ten most frequent issues 
submitted to fact-finding. 
Issues (2), (3), and (4) show the attempt for labor 
to establish the same long--standing benefits that most 
unions have in the private sector. The most frequently 
mentioned issues that cause fact-finding were the economic 
issues (salary and fringe benefits); this may reflect the 
public employers' concern over increased expenditures in 
an atmosphere of tax revolt. One can conclude that this 
will remain the major cause of fact-finding for some time 
to come given the recent public concern in Oregon that 
clearly reflects an intolerance of increased public bud-
gets and taxes. On the other hand, if the unions respond 
to this public concern they may change their priorities 
and 'put non-economic issues at the top of their bargain-
ing list. Thus, the issues causing fact-finding could 
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shift to the non-economic arena (such as just cause) in the 
near future. 
Related to his, is the dilemma fact-finders face as 
a result of the ERB guidelines regarding mandatory, permis-
, d h'b' d' 6 S1ve an pro 1 1te lssues. As it now stands, the ERE 
guidelines are meant to assist the fact-finder in determin-
ing in which category a particular issue falls; and the 
fact-finder has tremendous discretion on how to handle per-
missive issues. As a result, three basic approaches are 
taken by fact-finders. First, a minority of fact-finders 
will not hear evidence on what they as individuals per-
ceive as permissive issues. Second, a majority will hear 
evidence on all the issues submitted, and after looking at 
the ERB guidelines, only make recommendations on those 
which are mandatory. Third, a minority will hear evidence 
and make recommendations on all issues submitted. This 
later group thinks that the parties should sort these 
things out themselves or take them to the ERB for deci-
sion. In short, fact-finders may handle issues in one of 
several ways, depending on the wording of the proposed lan-
guage and the fact-finders' personal view of this role. 
Further comment on this topic will occur in the final 
chapter. 
The Effectiveness of Fact-Finding 
To obtain the fact-finders' views as to the effective-
ness of fact-finding in Oregon, 12 questions were asked. 
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These questions and the fact-finders' responses are shown 
in Table XXXXIV. Each item will be discussed along with 
comments obtained in the interview. Because the reader is 
familiar with the items, a shortened form is used when 
titling the items. 
(1) Good Faith Bargaining. Fact-finders are divided 
as to whether parties bargain in good faith through media-
tion and fact-finding. Of the responses to item one, 30 
percent fall in the disagree categories, and 40 percent 
into the agree categories. Of interest is the fact that 
30 percent had no opinion. This may be due to their lack 
of previous involvement in the impasse. Several said 
generalizing about the parties' conduct is difficult be-
cause the circumstances surrounding a case are varied, and 
therefore, sometimes parties bargain in good faith and some-
times they do not. It was pointed out that parties may 
have bargained in good faith and have been near settlement 
when an external event occurred that may have had an adverse 
impact on the bargaining, and thus, the case ends up in 
fact-finding. Or some parties know months before negotia-
tion that they would most likely go to fact-finding. 
The indication is that fact-finders are divided as to 
whether good faith bargaining occurs because, in their 
opinion, it depends upon the parties and the circumstances 
involved. 
(2) An Effective Step. Not surprisingly, 80 percent 
TABLE XXXXIV 
FACT-FINDERS' VIEWS OF OREGON'S FACT-FINDING PROCESS 
Percent 
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UlA 0 tIlQ til C[.l 0 
1. The parties generally bargain in good faith 
through mediation and fact-finding. 0 20 .10 0 40 0 30 100 
2. Fact-finding is an effective step in the im-
passe resolution process in Oregon. 0 10 0 0 50 30 10 100 
3. The parties discuss all issues before fact-
finding. 10 20 10 0 40 20 0 100 
4. Parties use fact-finding to court favorable 
public opinion. 10 20 10 30 10 10 10 ·100 
5. Publication of the fact-finding report en-
courages resolution. 20 0 0 30 40 0 10 100 
6. The fact-finding process reduces the effec-
tiveness of mediation. 10 0 0 40 0 10 4'(} 100 
7. The cost of fact-finding serves as a deter-
rent to its use. 20 10 20 30 0 0 20 100 
8. Fact-finders should not engage in mediation. 10 0 10 20 20 '40 0 10.0 
9. Generally, parties make the fact-finder aware 
of their positions in mediation. 20 20 10 30 0 10 10 1.00 
10. Positions taken in mediation (if known) in-
fluence the fact-finder's position. 20 20 10 50 0 0 0 100 
11. The fact-finder should "call them as he sees 
them", and not split the issue. 0 0 0 20 ·30 50. 0 100 IV 
12. Fact-finding should be abolished. 40 40 0 10 10 0 0 100 
0 
co 
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of the fact-finders reported that fact-finding is an effec-
tive step in imvasse resolution. This indicates that the 
fact-finders think the process is useful and worthwhile, 
although none mentioned that fact-finding is also a lucra-
tive business for those involved. Ten percent had no opin-
ion and 10 percent felt fact-finding was not effective. 
In comparison, Yaffe and Goldblatt reported in their 
New York State study that 72 percent of the fact-finders 
thought fact-finding was effective; 15 percent had no opin-
ion, and 13 percent thought it ineffective. 7 
(3) Issues Discussed Before Fact-Finding. Fact-
finders generally agreed that the parties discuss all issues 
before fact-find~ng. Sixty percent responded in the agree 
portion of the scale. However, 40 percent responded in 
the disagree portion of the scale, indicating that in some 
cases parties have not seriously bargained on all issues, 
yet they expect the fact-finder to propose a reasonable 
solution. Again this problem reflects the inexperience of 
those parties, the unfavorable attitudes of some public em-
ployers toward the collective bargaining process, and ERB 
scope of bargaining decisions. Still, the majority did 
agree that all issues are discussed prior to fact-finding. 
This is one indication of good faith bargaining prior to 
fact-finding. 
(4) Courting Public Opinion. Fact-finders were di-
vided in their opinions of whether parties used fact-finding 
to court favorable public opinion. Some fact-finders 
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suggested that the pari .. es do not care about public opinion 
or are not worried abom:.:. the impact public opinion has on 
settlement because it does not exist. Others thought par-
ties used the hearing as a forum to express themselves and 
educate the public as to the parties' reasons for particular 
positions. It appears that in some areas public opinion is 
taken more seriously than in others, and therefore the par-
ties' use of fact-finding as a way to educate the public 
varies. 
(5) Publication of the Report. A majority of fact-
finders (70 percent) think that publication of the fact-
finders' report encourages resolution. However, this 
agreement is mild as 30 percent of that group only somewhat 
agree; 20 percent strongly disagree with the statement. 
Fact-finders believe publication does affect public opin-
ion, and that the threat of adverse public opinion causes 
parties to settle. It is important to note that publication 
consists of releasing the report to the wire service, not to 
the hometown newspaper. This topic will be discussed under 
the parties' views. 
(6) Effect on Mediation. When questioned as to 
whether the fact-finding process reduces the effectiveness 
of mediation, 50 percent of the fact-finders agreed. How-
ever, 40 percent of that group hedged by only somewhat 
agreeing, and 40 percent had no opinion. The point was made 
by several fact-finders that the answer to this questions is 
"it depends." For example, if parties are too far apart for 
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a mediator to be of much service, he will put parties into 
fact-finding. After fact-finding the mediator becomes more 
effective in resolving the impasse during the cooling-off 
period where post-fact-finding mediation is so often used. 
In other cases the parties hold back in mediation knowing 
that fact-finding exists, thus using fact-finding as an 
extension of the bargaining process. In short, fact-finding 
may help or hinder mediation efforts depending on the par-
ties involved and the circumstances, but there is no strong 
feeling by fact-finders that the process generally hinders 
mediation efforts. 
(7) Cost As a Deterent to Use. Fact-finding theorists 
suggest that if the parties bear the cost of fact-finding 
it will serve as a deterent to its use. Oregon fact-finders 
generally disagree on this subject as 50 percent responded 
in the disagree portion of the scale, 30 percent in the 
agree portion, and 20 percent had no opinion. Several fact-
finders stated that the cost did deter use of fact-finding 
in smaller bargaining units. However, in larger units costs 
were not seen as an important consideration in going to 
fact-finding. In the case of a small unit these costs might 
be so burdensome that they could not afford to take legiti-
mate issues to fact-finding. In such cases they may have 
to accept a contract that was a result of their lack of eco-
nomic power rather than as a result of good faith bargain-
ing by both parties. 
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One fact-finder suggested that the costs were too high, 
but added that they are evidently fair as the market forces 
of supply and demand dictate the prices. Presently the cost 
of a fact-finder ranges between $200 and $300 per day (the 
average is $225) plus travel and secretarial expense. Be-
cause the average number of issues is high, it is not un-
usual for a case to cost several thousand dollars. 
was reported to cost nine thousand dollars.) 
(One 
One might seriously question whether these uncontrolled 
market forces of supply and demand act in the interest of 
the parties, to say nothing of the cost to the taxpayer. 
Further discussion about the cost of fact-finding will oc-
cur in later chapters of this dissertation. 
(8) Fact-Finders as Mediators. One area of contro-
versy among labor relation theorists is whether fact-
finders jhould mediate. In Oregon the ERB discourages 
mediation efforts by fact-finders. However, individual 
fact-finders have their own opinions about this subject. 
Eighty percent of the fact-finders generally agreed with 
the statement that fact-finders should not engage in medi-
ation, which is consistent with ERB policy and state law. 
It is interesting to note that 10 percent strongly dis-
agreed. One fact-finder suggested a fact-finder should be 
willing to assume the role of a mediator in the event that 
both parties request the fact-finder to mediate. 
By comparison, in Michigan (where fact-finders are also 
not supposed to mediate)over two-thirds of the fact-finders 
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considered mediation appropriate and only one-third thought 
it inappropriate. 8 In the next chapter the parties' views 
will be compared to the fact-finders and further comments 
made. 
(9) Positions in Mediation. Fact-finders had mixed 
feelings about the statement that generally parties make 
the fact-finder aware of their position in mediation. 
Fifty percent responded in the disagree portion of the 
scale. But 30 percent hedged by responding in the some-
what agree portion of the scale. Their comments suggested 
that parties do sometimes directly or indirectly present 
the other parties (or their own) position taken in media-
tion to the fact-finder. The reason for this is an attempt 
by the parties to show how unreasonable the other is, or 
to hope that the fact-finder will not make a recommendation 
less than the other parties offer in mediation. 
The problem posed by such information, and the reason 
for the question, is that such information may bias the 
fact-finder. Also such information could be construed by 
the other party as a breach of confidence (as discussion 
during mediation is intended to be confidential). 
As a result of experiences reSUlting in such conse-
quences, some public school employer representatives have 
insisted that the union representative sign a letter of 
understanding stating that all positions taken in mediation 
remain confidential. According to these representatives 
this document must be signed by the other party before 
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mediation begins or the party will not cooperate. A sample 
of such a document may be found in Appendix D. Further dis-
cussion regarding this letter will occur in the chapter on 
the views of the parties. 
(10) Mediation Positions Influence the Fact-Finder. 
The statement that positions taken in mediation (if known) 
influence the fact-finders' position was presented in order 
to determine whether the concerns demonstrated in question 
nine are realistic. The fact-finders were evenly divided 
(50-50) in their responses in the agree and disagree por-
tion of the scale. However, there was greater strength in 
the disagreement area (20 percent strongly disagreed, 20 
percent disagreed and 10 percent somewhat disagreed) • 
This is in comparison to the 50 percent who hedged by only 
somewhat agreeing. 
This question asks a lot of fact-finders in that it 
requires they admit that information that is supposed to be 
confidential actually biases their recommendations. The 
impressive thing is that 50 percent do admit they are some-
what biased by this information. One fact-finder summed it 
up by suggesting that it is impossible to disregard such 
information, just as it is impossible for a jury to com-
pletely disregard the judge's direction to forget about a 
damaging comment that was made out of order in a court room. 
Given this problem, it is understandable that some employ-
ers have insisted that the letter of understanding be signed 
before the process begins. 
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(11) Split the Issues? Fact-finders were asked to 
react to the statement that fact-finders should, as ex-
pressed in the jargon, "call them as they see them," and 
not split the issues. Splitting of the issues refers to a 
report that is favorable in fairly equal amounts to both 
parties. The intent of this question was to find Oregon 
fact-finders' attitude about the controversial subject of 
whether fact-finders should write reports that represent 
what the fact-finder thinks is just, or write a report that 
is acceptable to both parties. 
Their reaction was the most unified in the survey as 
100 percent fell into the agree side of the scale. In com-
parison, Yaffe and Goldblatts' New York State study showed 
acceptability (where the power relationship is considered) 
and compromise (splitting the difference) were the most im-
portant criteria in development of fact-finder recommenda-
. 9 tlons. 
The ramifications of the question are considerable, 
and the key word is "should" as opposed to "do." A few 
comments implied that, of course, the fact-finder should 
look for the most reasonable recommendations and put ec.ch 
case into perspective; that is, consider what is realis-
tic in terms of parties accepting or rejecting, and the 
parties' future attitude toward that fact-finder. ThE di-
lemma is that if the fact-finder report favors one party too 
much, the other party may not select that fact-finder in the 
future. In this case, honesty is not the best policy 
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because a fact-finder risks losing future business. How-
ever, there is the view that most parties do not pick fact-
finders solely on their decisions, but by their logic. 
The claim is that if the fact-finders' reasoning is clear, 
the parties do not fault the fact-finder, although the 
recommendation may not be to the parties' liking. Further 
discussion about this issue will occur in the next chapter 
where the parties' views are considered. 
(12) Abolish Fact-Finding? The vast majority of fact-
finders in Oregon are strongly opposed to the idea of abol-
ishing fact-finding. Eighty percent of the responses were 
in the strongly disagree and disagree portion of the scale. 
In spite of the problems involved, fact-finders think the 
benefits outweigh those problems. The benefits they mention 
are similar to those mentioned by mediators. In the mean-
time, fact-finders are very aware of some serious problems 
involved in the process. 
Problems Perceived by Fact-Finders 
The following problems are perceived by fact-finders 
as serious impediments to the success of Oregon's fact-
finding process. Although they will be discussed below, 
possible solutions will be presented in the final chapter. 
Time. The amount of time that the process involves is 
too extensive. It results in additional expense and allows 
the parties to establish their own time frame in order to 
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strike at the most effective time, or to purposely go past 
budget deadlines, and to frustrate the other party. This 
type of strategic use of fact-finding undermines its 
purpose. 
Costs. Some fact-finders say the costs that profes-
sionals have to charge are higher than "moonlighters" be-
cause of overhead. Therefore, a more competent and desir-
able fact-finder may not be chosen by the parties due to 
cost considerations. Related to costs is the problem that 
parties are often not prepared when they go to hearing, and 
fact-finders then are forced to use extensive time study-
ing materials; which is reflected in the expense of the 
process. 
Too Many Issues. Parties take too many issues to 
fact-finding which increases the time involved considerably. 
Some parties bring issues to fact-finding that had been 
tentatively agreed to. They do this because they believe 
the fact-finder may split the issues and they may be able 
to gain by submitting issues already "lost" by tentative 
agreement. This again distorts the intended purpose of 
fact-finding. 
Another related problem mentioned was that of the in-
experience of some fact-finders that results in inlproper 
handling of the hearing and/or reports. This problem can 
result in the neutral adding to the parties' problems and 
further complicating the issues, thus, reducing the possi-
bility of settlement. 
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Research Data. Some fact-finders think that there is 
a need of a research service provided by ERB to further aid 
the fact-finder in his recommendations. While one might 
sympathize with this, the intent of the law is for the 
parties to do the research and present the facts in a hear-
ing. Such research is seen as a way to force the parties 
to view their situation more seriously. The fact-finder is 
in a quasi-judicial position. If parties were aware that 
ERB would provide a research service, they may be less prone 
to do their own homework and be even less prepared and less 
objective than they are at the present time. 
On the other hand, there is a need for a better index-
ing system of fact-finders' opinions. This would allow 
fact-finders to share their experiences and reasoning with 
one another and the parties, which could aid in more con-
sistent and understandable recommendations and more sophis-
tication by the parties effected. 
Scope of Bargaining. Of considerable interest is the 
problem posed by the Employment Relations Board's handling 
of the "scope of bargaining." Their decisions which have 
deemed some issues permissive, rather than mandatory, has 
led to a situation that prevents the parties from discuss-
ing important issues during collective bargaining and media-
tion. In some cases, parties (especially the OEA) will take 
such issues to fact-finding in order to have their posi-
tion aired, knowing full well the fact-finder may not give 
a recommendation about such permissive issues. This will 
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be discussed further in later chapters. 
Personalities. Another problem rests upon various 
personalities among the parties and their negative views 
about public sector collective bargaining, one another, and 
the neutrals. Time, suggests one fact-finder, will take 
care of this problem. 
Structural. Others feel that time is not enough; 
that there are structural problems built into the process. 
For example, because the protective services go to binding 
arbitration, fact-finding becomes a waste of time. Also 
in requiring all impasses to go to fact-finding, excessive 
time and monies are wasted, as parties know what they want 
(e.g. strike). The view here is that fact-finding should 
not be abolished totally (except for the protective ser-
vices) but instituted upon the mediators' or parties' re-
quest. The call here is for more flexibility. 
Summary of Fact-Finder Views 
Table XXXXV is a summary of fact-finders' views. It 
shows that fact-finders are divided as to whether parties 
bargain in good faith prior to fact-finding. They general-
ly agree that all issues are discussed before fact-finding. 
They are divided as to whether parties use the process to 
court public opinion. A majority think publication of the 
report encourages resolution. Fact-finders mildly agree 
that the process reduces the efforts of mediation. They 
do not think cost is a deterrent to its use. There is 
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agreement that fact-finders should not mediate. They are 
divided as to whether parties advise them of positions 
taken in mediation, and whether such knowledge bias their 
judgment. They are to the person in agreement that the 
fact-finder should recommend what is just, rather than what 
is acceptable to the parties. Because of the benefits de-
rived from fact-finding, they are strongly opposed to the 
idea of abolishing the process. However, they are aware 
of some problems that need to be resolved before it can be 
as effective as was originally hoped by the legislature. 
TABLE XXXXV 
SUMMARY OF FACT-FINDERS' VIEWS ON FACT-FINDING 
Item 
1. Good Faith Bargaining 
2. Effective Step 
3. Discuss Issues 
4. Court Public Opinion 
5. Publication Encourages 
Resolution 
6. Harms Mediation 
7. Cost Deters Use 
Percent 
Agree 
40 
80 
60 
50 
70 
50 
30 
8. Fact-Finders do not Mediate 80 
9. Positions in Mediation 
Known 
10. #9 Influences Report 
11. Shouldn't Split Issues 
12. Abolish Fact-Finding 
40 
50 
100 
20 
Percent 
Disagree 
30 
10 
40 
40 
20 
10 
50 
20 
50 
50 
o 
80 
Percent 
No Opinion 
30 
10 
o 
10 
10 
40 
20 
o 
10 
o 
o 
o 
By way of comparison and sUWiiary the mediators and 
fact-finders' views will be presented. 
SUMMARY OF THE NEUTRALS'VIEWS 
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Tables XXXXIII and XXXXV provided a summary of mediator 
and fact-finder responses to questions regarding the fact-
finding process. From the tables and the previous discus-
sion the following general observations are made. 
Both mediator and fact-finders generally agree that 
good faith bargaining (in a legal, not a practical sense) 
occurs thr0ugh mediation and fact-finding. The majority 
also agree that fact-finding is an effective step because 
it reduces the number of issues causing impasse, and the 
report is the basis for settlement. 
Both neutrals indicate mediation efforts can be some-
what reduced since the parties may be prone to hold back 
offers and use fact-finding as a part of an overall bar-
gaining strategy. They are also in agreement as to the 
basic reasons that cause fact-finding. These are inexperi-
ence, face-saving, hold back strategy, and hard bargaining 
(although other reasons may be present). 
The basic problem confronting the process, as perceived 
by both neutrals, is that of too many issues. Other prob-
lems seen by mediators are delay, the fact-finders them-
selves, and the parties' lack of socialization in the pro-
cess. Fact-finders saw the major problems as the lack of 
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research data, ERB scope of bargaining decisions, the per-
sonalities involved, and structural aspects. 
Although these problems exist, the combined opinion of 
the neutrals was in opposition to abolishing fact-finding, 
with the fact-finders feeling more strongly than the media-
tors. In short, it was implied that the process has more 
positive than negative aspects. The positive aspects are 
that fact-finding allows parties to save-face thrc,ugh third 
party views and recommendations, it provides a forum to vent 
feelings, an opportunity to re-evaluate positions, and time 
for emotions to ebbe. 
Conclusions and recommendations regarding those views 
and problems will be presented in the final chapter, which 
follows the next chapter that deals with the views of the 
parties. 
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CHAPTER VII 
VIEWS OF THE PARTIES 
This chapter of the dissertation will complete the 
analysis of fact-finding in Oregon. Its purpose is to 
discuss the views of the parties involved in the procese. 
A questionnaire similar to that given to the neutrals was 
administered to both employee and employer representatives 
during a personal interview situation. In order to avoid 
repetition, the reader is referred to the discussion in 
Chapter VI concerning the interviews and questionnaires, 
and to Appendix A where the methodological notes are pro-
vided. The following is the subsample of the parties: 
(1) Employee Groups -- eight repr~sentatives of five 
unions were interviewed -- these unions account for almost 
71 percent of all requests for fact-finding and over 80 
percent of all non home rule cases going to hearing. It 
is assumed that the state level of these unions represent 
the general views of the locals and also formulate general 
union policy. A list of those interviewed is provided in 
Appendix B. 
(2) Employers -- eight employer representatives were 
interviewed -- these representatives are from a cross-section 
of governments and include public schools, state, city and 
counties, special districts, and protective services~ thus 
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the areas of concern are represented. A list of those in-
terviewed is provided in Appendix B. 
The approach taken here is to discuss both parties' 
views, question by question. The comparative data intro-
duced is for information and is not intended to provide a 
comparative analysis. 
Reasons for Fact-Finding 
Those interviewed were asked to rank the five most im-
portant reasons that cause fact-finding. They listed many 
causes similar to those listed by mediators and fact-
finders; they also added their own. Details of those re-
sponses may be found in Appendix B. Although no one reason 
stood out as a single cause of fact-finding, there were 
several that were m~ntioned more frequently. It became 
clear upon analysis that several of the reasons are inter-
related and not separable into neat categories. An attempt 
has been made in the following presentation to incorporate 
the parties' comments into the discussion of the causes. 
Lack of Experience. Both parties mentioned this most 
frequently as a cause of fact-finding, although union repre-
sentatives ranked it higher than did management representa-
tives. Union representatives' comments relating to this 
were: "som~ negotiators don't know how to cut a deal," and 
"there's a lacy of understanding the issues and collective 
bargaining process." 
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Union representatives also mentioned that at times per-
sonality conflicts become entwined in the negotiations, thus 
causing confusion and obstinance among parties. This also 
reflects lack of experience among the laymen on both sides 
who sometimes attempt to negotiate or involve themselves in 
some type of complex strategy. 
Employer representatives' comments relating to inexper-
ience were that "parties use fact-finding to do collective 
bargaining," and "the union believes it will get more by go-
ing to fact-finding." 
In short, both groups think lack of experience is an 
important cause of fact-finding; the implication being that 
with more experience and socialization the parties will be 
less likely to go to fact-finding. However, other causes 
may make this wishful thinking, in particular the at,ti-
tudes of the parties. 
Attitudes. Although only a few respondents from each 
group specifically mentioned attitude as a cause of fact-
finding, there were several responses such as "unreasonable 
board or union" which are indications of an attitudinal 
problem. The union representatives' responses indicate that 
they think many employers do not really bargain. They claim 
this is especially true with school boards who are seen as 
paternalistic, unfamiliar, and even hostile to the collec-
tive bargaining process. One union representative suggested 
many of the school boards follow the Oregon School Board As-
sociation guidelines, whether they are reasonable or not. 
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In the meantime, the OEA claims to have spent more than one-
half million dollars over the last five years to train nego-
tiators in order to reduce the problems caused by lack of 
experience. 
Employer representatives mention that employee groups I 
attitude is one of "wanting their cake and eating it too," 
that the unions have unrealistically high expectations and 
therefore bring on fact-finding. 
These comments support the neutrals' position that in-
experience and unfamiliarity with the collective bargaining 
process has been the cause of many fact-finding cases. 
At Impasse. Employer representatives suggested more 
often than employee representatives that a major cause of 
fact-finding is that the parties are really at impasse, that 
they really disagree on certain issues and therefore do not 
easily compromise on these issues. It seems then, that 
what may be construed by the employees to be a poor atti-
tude, is merely hard bargaining in the eyes of the employ-
ers. Further examples of important reasons that are inter-
related with experience and attitudes follow. 
Strategy. Both parties mentioned in equal frequencies 
that a major cause of fact-finding is strategy by one or 
both parties. This includes parties holding back offers in 
anticipation that the fact-finder will "split the baby" and 
recommend a compromise of the parties' final offer, whether 
reasonable or not. There also exists a strategy of stalling 
in order to run past budget deadlines and special elections, 
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or to just wear down the other party. There is not much one 
can say about the parties using fact-finding as part of a 
strategy, except that such pragmatism makes the procedure 
much less effective than it would be if this were not the 
practice. 
ERB Rulings. Both parties expressed the view that cer-
tain ERB rulings that separate mandatory and permissive is-
sues in collective bargaining have been the cause of fact-
finding. This is especially true in education where employ-
ee representatives claim that some very important issues 
have been declared permissive. The employee representatives 
feel that in order to air opinion and show the importance of 
collective bargaining on such issues, they must take these 
issues to fact-finding, even though a fact-finder may not 
rule on permissive issues. Employer representatives see 
the ERB rulings as an upholding of management perogatives, 
and that unions taking such issues to fact-finding are en-
croaching upon management rights. 
In short, one cause of fact-finding centers about the 
serious debate among the parties over the ERB rulings as 
to what is bargainable under the law. Only a change in ERB 
rulings or consistence in upholding these rulings can reduce 
such use of fact-finding in the future. 
Other Reasons. Other reasons mentioned were saving 
face, complex issues, mediators, and the parties' represen-
tatives showing they are working. To avoid repetition these 
causes will not be discussed here, and the reader is 
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referred to the previous chapter for more detailed discus-· 
sion. 
Summary of Reasons 
In summary, the reasons that cause fact-finding, as 
listed by the parties, are often interrelated and therefore 
do not fall into neat categories. However, analysis of the 
parties' responses indicates that the major causes of fact-
finding are (or are related to) inexperience and attitudes. 
The unions' representatives are particularly critical of the 
bargaining technique, and the purported unsophisticated and 
paternalistic view taken by the employers (especially 
school baords). Employer representatives think unions have 
unrealistically high eXf:ectations, and that fact-finding 
comes about because of hard biirgaining and the employees 
trying to get more by going to fact-finding, rather than 
by employer attitudes. 
Both parties point out that strategy, ERB rulings, and 
saving face are also important causes of fact-finding. 
The Effectiveness of Fact-Finding 
In order to ascertain the parties' views regarding the 
effectiveness of Oregon's fact-finding process, questions 
pertaining to that were asked. Tables XXXXVI, XXXXVII, and 
XXXXVIII show a summary of the questions and the parties' 
individual and combined responses in percentage terms. Each 
question will be discussed separately and all data presented 
are in reference to these tables. 
Item 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
6 . 
7. 
8. 
9 . 
10. 
11. 
12. 
TABLE XXXXVI 
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES' VIEWS OF OREGON'S FACTo-FINDING PROCESS 
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The other party generally bargains in good 
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Fact-finding causes parties to hold back 
offers in mediation. 
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TABLE XXXXVII 
EMPLOYER REPRESENTATIVES' VIEWS OF OREGON'S FACT-FINDING PROCESS 
Item 
1. Fact-finding is useful in impasse resolution. 
Why or why not? 
2. Generally we have confidence in fact-finders. 
3. Fact-finders are a positive factor in impasse 
resolution. 
4. The cost of fact-finding serves as a deterrent 
to its use. 
5. Fact-finders engage in mediation (if so, at 
whose~request?) . 
6. Fact-finders' recommendations are neutral 
(given the facts). 
7. The other party generally bargains in good 
faith prior to fact-finding. 
8. Fact-finding causes parties to hold back 
offers in mediation. 
9. All issues are discussed before fact-finding. 
10. Fact-finding reopens some issues. 
11. The publication of a fact-finder's report en-
courages impasse resolution. 
12. Fact-find~ng should be abolished 
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TABLE XXXXVIII 
COMBINED EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER VIEWS OF OREGON'S FACT-FINDING PROCESS 
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l. Fact-finding is useful in impasse resolution. 
Why or why not? 6 22 11 17 17 28 0 101 
2. Generally we have confidence in fact-finders. 6 17 6 28 33 6 6 102 
3, Fact-finders are a positive factor in impasse 
resolution. 0 17 22 22 17 17 6 10) 
4. The cost of fact-finding serves as a deterrent 
to its use. 56 28 0 6 6 6 0 102 
5. Fact-finders engage in mediation (if so, at 
whose~request?). 11 22 28 28 6 6 0 101 
6. Fact-finders' recommendations are neutral 
(given the facts). 0 11 17 11 33 17 11 100 
7. The other party generally bargains in good 
faith prior to fact-finding. 22 11 6 17 39 6 0 101 
8. Fact-finding causes parties to hold back 
offers in mediation. 0 39 6 11 28 11 6 101 
9. All issues are discussed before fact-finding. 0 22 11 0 33 28 6 100 
10. Fact-finding reopens some issues. 6 33 11 17 17 17 0 101 
11. The publication of a fact-finder's report en-
courages impasse resolution. 39 11 17 11 17 6 0 101 
12. Fact-finding should be abolished. 50 6 6 a 33 6 0 101 
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(1) Fact-Finding is Useful in Impasse Resolution. 
Why or Why Not? This question was asked in order to obtain 
the general thoughts of the parties regarding the process. 
A majority of both union and management responses fell into 
the agree side of the scale. Unions had 64 percent in the 
agree side, and of that, 38 percent in the strongly agree 
column indicating strong feelings. However, a strong minor-
ity of 38 percent of the union responses were in the dis-
agree portion of the scale. Employer responses were 60 
percent in the agree side and 40 percent in the disagree 
side, with a 20 percent distribution in all categories ex-
cept strongly disagree. This reflects a lack of strong 
consensus of employer representatives with respect to this 
statement 
By way of comparison, Yaffe and Goldblatt reported in 
their New York State study that 51 percent of the parties 
found fact-finding very effective in impasse resolution. l 
In Oregon, the majority from both parties who think 
fact-finding is useful (in one degree or another) made the 
follmving comments: "it brings parties to reality and 
separates the wishbook issues from important issues," "it 
gives a new basis for bargaining through the third party 
influence," "it gives the super-mediator a report as a 
basis," "it is an educational tool in the backwater areas," 
"it allows parties to save face," "it provides a cooling-
off period," "it helps to prevent strikes," and "it intro-
duces more gentlemanly conduct into the collective 
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bargaining process." 
The sizeable minority from both sides criticize fact-
finding's usefulness by suggesting that: "it is not useful 
when both parties are experienced, informed and rational," 
"it is a waste of time for the protective services that go 
to binding arbitration," "it is too easy for parties who 
are insecure to leave the bargaining to a third party," 
"professionals are using fact-finding as a strategy," "it 
doesn't resolve anything the parties couldn't do at the 
table," "it causes holdback that undermines the negotiation 
process," "its benefits are over-shadowed by the substan-
tial costs and time involved," "it doesn't get to the real 
issues that keep parties apart," and "fact-finders often 
try to be mediators or arbitrators." 
In sum, a majority of both union and management repre-
sentatives generally think fact-finding is useful, with the 
unions more positive than management. However, a strong 
minority on both sides (unions more negative than manage-
ment) point out some serious problems that lead them to 
think it is not too useful. Suggestions on how some prob-
lems might be resolved will be presented in the last chap-
ter of this study. 
(2) Generally We Have Confidence in Fact-Finders. 
The intent of this question and the next question (# 3) was 
to obtain a general feeling of the parties about the fact-
finders themselves. The purpose was to obtain more informa-
tion that relates to the hi']h correlation between the 
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fact-finders and the acceptance rate that was shown by the 
aggregate data in Chapter v. 
Both unions and management responses indicate a gen-
eral confidence in fact-finders as 63 percent of unions and 
70 percent of management responded in the agree portion of 
the scale. 
In comparison, Word reported that in Wisconsin 100 per-
cent of the employers and 79 percent of the employees had a 
moderate to substantial degree of confidence in the fact-
finder; and in New York it was 83 percent and 85 percent 
.1 2 respectlve y. 
In Oregon, only 26 percent of union and 30 percent of 
management responses fell into the disagree portion of the 
scale, with management indicating more negative thoughts as 
10 percent strongly disagreed and 20 percent disagreed. How-
ever, this should not be construed as a feeling of great 
confidence in fact-finders by both parties. A sizeable ma-
jority of both parties hedged by responding in the somewhat 
agree column (25 percent of union and 30 percent of manage-
ment respcnses). This suggests that although both sides 
have confidence in fact-finders, it is a reserved confidence. 
Furthermore, it was mentioned by several individuals on both 
sides that they have more confidence in some fact-finders 
than others, and that the ones they deemed more competent 
were always busy and difficult to get. Still, 68 percent 
of the combined responses were in the agree portion of 
the scale, indicating a general confidence in fact-
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finders by both parties. 
(3) Fact-Finders Are a Positive Factor in Impasse 
Resolution. Again, like question two, this question is 
intended to obtain the parties' overall view of the fact-
finders' role. Seventy-five percent of the union responses 
fell into the agree portion of the scale, indicating a 
strong feeling as to the positiveness of the fact-finders' 
role. Management views deviated from question two, as 40 
percent responded on the agree side, and 50 percent on the 
disagree side of the scale. An explanation for this change 
may be that employer representatives have a general confi-
dence in the fact-finders' capabilities, but do not feel 
the fact-finder can do much good, as the problems have to 
be worked out by the parties themselves. 
In short, 75 percent of the unions, compared to 40 
percent of management responses, indicate agreement that 
fact-finders are a positive factor. Management, by a slim 
majority does not view the fact-finders as a positive 
factor. 
(4) The Cost of Fact-Finding Serves As a Deterrent 
to Its Use. The intent of this question is to ascertain 
whether the parties consider cost a serious deterrent to 
fact-finding. A very strong majority by both parties dis-
agreed with the statement. Of the union responses, 88 
percent, and of the management responses 80 percent were 
in the strongly disagree and disagree columns of the 
scale. 
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By comparison, Word reported that in Wisconsin 56 per-
cent of the parties said cost was not a deterrent to use, 
and in New York over three-fourths said if they had to pay 
it would not even moderately deter them from using fact-
f " d" 3 lon long. 
There was one qualification regarding smaller bargain-
ing units (say, under 50). In this case, the cost of 
fact-finding may be a serious burden. The claim was made 
that employers could take advantage of the situation in 
that a union, because it could not afford fact-finding, 
might agree to a contract that was not a real compromise 
rather than face the financial problems caused by fact-
finding. It was also mentioned that if fact-finding were 
free, more cases would result. In short, in Oregon cost 
is not a deterrent to either parties' use, except perhaps 
under circumstances involving a small bargaining unit. 
(5) Fact-Finders Engage in Mediation. If So, At Whose 
Request? The purpose of this question is to find whether 
fact-finders assume a mediation or judgmental role; and 
therefore whether they are consistent with the law and ERB 
guidelines that expect the role to be that of adjudicator. 
A majority of both union and management representatives dis-
agreed to question five. Sixty-one percent of their com-
bined responses were in the disagree portion of scale, which 
indicates that mediation by the fact-finder usually does not 
occur. Of the union responses 38 percent somewhat agreed, 
indicating that sometimes it does occur. Union 
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representatives I comments regarding this show that they do 
not approve of fact-finders who attempt to mediate. In 
fact, in several instances they evidently let the fact-
finder know that his mediation efforts were "not on. II 
Although the majority (60 percent) of management rep-
resentatives also disagree to the statement, they do not 
to the same intensity as unions. Of the management re-
sponses there were zero responses in the strongly disagree, 
20 percent in the disagree, and 40 percent in the somewhat 
disagree columns. Furthermore, 40 percent did fall into 
the agree portion of the scale. Several comments by manage-
ment representatives suggest that most fact-finders do not 
mediate, but some do and it's usually their (the fact-
finders ' ) idea. Said one interviewee, IISome think they 
should -- you know shot putters always envy discus 
throwers. II 
A unique problem has occurred when parties from Oregon 
have a fact-finder from the neighboring state of Washington. 
In Washington, fact-finders are encouraged to mediate, and 
some have attempted this practice in Oregon, only to find 
a cool reception by those involved. However, this is evi-
dently not a serious problem at the present time. 
By way of comparison, New York, like Washington, does 
not discourage mediation by the fact-finder; therefore 
Word's study showed two-thirds of the parties perceived 
mediation by the fact-finder. In Wisconsin, where mediation 
by fact-finders is discouraged, three-fourths of the parties 
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reported only a little mediation. In both cases the parties 
prefer the judicial rather than mediator approach. 4 
In summary, the combined views of both parties show a 
majority (61 percent) think fact-finders do not generally 
mediate. However, a strong minority (40 percent) did fall 
into the agree portion of the scale indicating that some do, 
in spite of ERB guidelines and the state law. This evi-
dently is not a serious problem as the parties usually dis-
courage such action on the spot. This and the general com-
ments indicate that the parties support the concept that 
fact-finding should be more adjudicatory rather than 
mediatory. 
(6) Fact-Finders' Recommendations Are Neutral (Given 
the Facts). This question is intended to obtain the gen-
eral views of the parties regarding the neutrality and fair-
ness of fact-finders. Overall the parties see the fact-
finders as neutral, as 61 percent of the combined responses 
were in the agree portion of the scale. Of the union repre-
sentatives' responses, 64 percent were in the agree portion 
of the scale and 38 percent of those strongly agreed. Man-
agement responses were equally as positive as 60 percent 
fell in the agree portion of the scale (of which 50 percent 
were in the agree column). 
From this question arose the question of what type of 
recommendations should the fact-finder make? That is, 
should the fact-finder recommend what he thinks is reason-
able and fair, or recommend what he thinks is acceptable to 
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both parties? 
Both parties overwhelmingly preferred recommendations 
that are fair over recorrmendations that are based upon 
acceptance. Of the union responses, 100 percent, and of 
the management responses, 80 percent, said fact-finders 
should "call them as they see them" (recommend what he 
thinks is reasonable) and not "split the baby" (recommend 
what is acceptable). Furthermore, 75 percent of the union 
and 50 percent of the employer responses indicated fact-
finders usually do "split the baby. 115 What the parties 
prefer and what they get appear to be quite different. 
Their comments indicated that parties are prone to be 
more firm in negotiations, and to take weaker and greater 
numbers of issues to fact-finding due to the fact-finders' 
reports following the acceptability doctrine. This is be-
cause in order to get what they consider a fair settlement, 
parties throw in some "losers" so the fact-finder can have 
something to take away from them as he splits the issues. 
Both sides further indicated that it would be a great 
service to all concerned if fact-finders really did make 
recommendations that they thought were fair, rather than 
recommend what is acceptable. It is difficult to say 
whether the parties are kidding themselves, however, their 
enthusiasm indicates that further research in this area 
could prove very valuable. The concluding chapter of this 
study has some of this author's thoughts on the subject. 
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(7) The Other Party Generally Bargains in Good Faith 
Prior to Fact-Finding. This question is intended to pro-
vide an indication of whether good faith bargaining precedes 
fact-finding, the implication being that the presence of 
fact-finding may have a negative effect on the bargaining 
process. There is disagreement among union and management 
as to whether one-another bargains in good faith prior to 
fact-finding. A majority of union representatives did not 
think employers generally bargain in good faith, as 63 per-
cent of their responses were in the disagree portion of the 
scale. The intensity of their feeling is shown by the 38 
percent who strongly disagreed with the statement. Manage-
ment representatives thought the opposite. Seventy percent 
felt the unions do generally bargain in good faith. Rea-
sons for the differences may be that the union responses 
may refer to good faith bargaining from a practical view, 
and management from a legalistic view. Also, certain pub-
lic employers in Oregon have a reputation of being very 
difficult, and at times unreasonable at the bargaining 
table. Public schools and state government were often 
mentioned by neutrals and labor as falling into this 
category. 
It is interesting to compare the conflicting responses 
in a recent Oregon survey that showed the majority of union 
and management speakers felt the presence of fact-finding 
did not have a substantially detrimental effect upon nego-
tiations prior to fact-finding. 5 This may be interpreted 
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as supportive of the concept above; that is, particular 
parties' attitudes, not fact-finding itself, are the major 
causes of lack of good faith bargaining. 
It is expected that both sides will have occasion to 
state limy side is always reasonable," however when 63 per-
cent of a cross-section of union representatives suggest 
there is generally bad faith bargaining, it becomes of 
great concern with respect to the effectiveness of fact-
finding. That is, it is questionable if fact-finding can 
be as effective as theorists believe if either or both of 
the parties do not bargain toward settlement in the first 
place. Further research might be directed to the reasons 
labor and management so strongly disagree about this 
statement. 
(8) Fact-Finding Causes Parties to Hold Back Offers 
In Mediation. The intent of this question is to further 
ascertain the impact fact-finding has on good faith bar-
gaining. The parties perceive their actions much differ-
ently. About 63 percent of the union responses were in the 
disagree portion of the scale, compared to 70 percent of 
management responses that were in the agree portion of the 
scale. Party responses showed that while 70 percent of 
employer representatives admit to hold back, only 26 percent 
of the union representatives do so. 
By way of comparison, Wolkinson and Steiber reported 
in their Michigan study that 27 percent of the employers and 
16 percent of the unions said they did hold back in 
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anticipation of fact-finding. 7 
The Oregon data may be interpreted in one of two ways. 
First, it may be viewed as supportive of the union repre-
sentatives' feeling that employers often do not bargain in 
good faith (from a practical view, not a legalistic view); 
this sustains the concept that the parties' attituee, not 
fact-finding, causes bad faith bargaining. Or, second, the 
employers do hold back offers in anticipation of fact-
finding, not because of uncooperative attitudes. One ex-
planation for such action is that when the offers made in 
mediation are not confidential, a party may hold back 
offers because they think the fact-finder will use such 
information as a basis for the fact-finding report. This 
explains employer concern over confidentiality in mediation, 
and the use of the letter of understanding that was dis-
cussed earlier. 
However, there is another way to view this, consider-
ing the comments made by the mediators, and the management-
mediator consensus regarding hold back. It is possible that 
the unions do in fact hold back but do not perceive their 
actions in this way. An explanation for the unions' repre-
sentatives not agreeing that they hold back is that unions 
may not know where their final position really is. The re-
sult is that at anyone time they think they are not holding 
back, when in reality (after heavy negotiations, mediation 
and fact-finding) they settle well below what they thought 
their final position was. In other words, they may have 
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fooled themselves. 
It is reasonable that all of these factors are present 
in different degrees depending upon the circumstances and 
the parties involved. Furthermore, it is of great concern 
to all involved that such a high percentage of management 
representatives admit to a hold back strategy because of 
its impact on the negotiation process. Further research 
into the causes of, and circumstances surrounding hold 
back could be very useful to policy-makers. 
(9) All Issues Are Discussed Before Fact-Finding. 
The intent of this statement is to obtain parties' re-
sponses relating to their ability to bargain on issues 
prior to fact-finding in order to further ascertain the 
effect fact-finding has on negotiations. A sizeable major-
ity of union representatives indicated that they think all 
issues are discussed at the bargaining table prior to fact-
finding (76 percent are in the agree portion of the scale). 
Employer re.presentatives are split on this issue, as 50 per-
cent are in the agree and 50 percent in the disagree portion 
of the scale. One possible reason that management deviates 
from the union fact-finder consensus regarding this state-
ment is that in management's opinion, some issues are not 
discussed thoroughly at the table (rather than not discussed 
at all). 
In comparison, the Michigan study showed that 80 per-
cent of the parties concurred that all proposals and count-
er-proposals had'been discussed before fact-finding;8 in a 
New York study about 75 percent concurred that this was 
the case. 9 
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In summary, collectively the parties agree (61 percent 
agree and strongly agree) that all issues are discussed 
prior to fact-finding, however, management agrees to a 
lesser extent than labor. 
(10) Fact-Finding Reopens Some Issues. This statement 
is intended to reveal parties' thoughts concerning fact-
finding's impact on prior tentative agreements made during 
negotiation. The parties' views differ. A majority (76 
percent) of union representative responses were in the dis-
agree portion of the scale, indicating that they do not 
think issues are reopened in fact-finding. Management, on 
the other hand, generally agree that fact-finding does re-
open some issues (60 percent were in the agree portion of 
the scale). 
By way of comparison, the Michigan study showed that 
in 93 percent of the cases the parties indicated that fact-
finding did not have the effect of reopening previously 
1 d . 10 sett e lssues. 
The disagreement among Oregon parties may be explained 
by the fact that sometimes several issues are related to one 
another and if one is not settled then they all are sent to 
fact-finding. Also issues may be reopened because of stra-
tegic reasons. For example, a party may feel they have 
everything to gain and nothing to lose by taking a tenta-
tively settled issue to fact-finding. It has also been 
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suggested that one employer's settlement may hinge on other 
employers settling also (e.g. school districts). In this 
case a tentative settlement may go to fact-finding because 
of a situation in another district. 
However, the comments made here are made from a general 
perspective provided by the study, and it is not exactly 
clear why union and management representatives disagree as 
to whether fact-finding reopens some issues, given the in-
formation collected in the questionnaire. 
(11) The Publication of a Fact-Finders' Report 
Encourages Impasse Resolution. The intent of this question 
is to find whether parties agree with the theory that publi-
cation of the report brings about public pressure which en-
courages the parties toward settlement. Contrary to fact-
finders' opinions, it is clear that both parties do not 
think publication encourages settlement to a significant 
degree. A majority of union representatives (63 percent in 
the disagree portion of the scale) and a majority of manage-
ment representatives (70 percent in the disagree portion of 
the scale) discount the importance of publication of the 
report. Comments by both parties indicate that the public 
is really not interested and not able to understand many 
complicated issues. 
In comparison, the studies done in Michigan, Wisconsin, 
and New York State also indicate that publication of the 
report and public pressure does not significantly encourage 
h · 1 11 t e partles to sett e. 
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However, there are several reasons that parties in 
Oregon may be less concerned than they would be otherwise. 
First, many of the reports are not published because one or 
both parties take no action on the report (this was dis-
cussed in the previous chapter). Second, although the ERB 
gives the report to the wire service, that does not guar-
antee the local paper will pick it up or understand or 
clarify issues. Under circumstances such as these, it is 
not possible to really know what impact adequate publica-
tion would have on impasse resolution. Additional comments 
concerning publication will be made in the concluding chap-
ter of the study. 
(12) Fact-Finding Should Be Abolished. Again, the in-
tent of this question is to find whether, on balance, the 
parties prefer to abolish fact-finding. The majority of 
the combined responses were against the abolishment of fact·-
finding. However, the parties differed. 
The unions strongly disagree with the idea of abolish-
ing the fact-finding process as 76 percent of the responses 
were in the strongly disagree and disagree portion of the 
scale. Employers, on the other hand, were divided with 50 
percent in the~ree portion and 50 percent in the disagree 
portion of the scale. However, the strength of employer 
disagreement was greater than those agreeing (40 percent 
strongly disagreed and 50 percent only somewhat agreed). 
This indicates that one-half of management repr~sentatives 
hedged as to whether to abolish fact-finding; and none 
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agreed or strongly agreed to the statement. 
The combined percentages were 62 percent against 
abolishing and 38 percent for abolishing fact-finding. In 
addition, one-half of those against abolishing fact-finding 
strongly di.sagreed to such a proposal. Reasons for the 
positions are the same as those under question one. When 
the 38 percent who would see fact-finding abolished were 
queried as to what should replace fact-finding, their re-
sponses were considerably varied. One suggestion was that 
the process should go from mediation directly to strike; 
another that fact-finding should be dropped if binding arbi-
tration is present; another to replace fact-finding with a 
30 day cooling-off period, then super-mediation before 
strike. It was noticed that those individuals who have had 
private sector experience were most prone to favor abolish-
ing fact-finding and not replacing it with anything (an 
emulation of the private sector). This is ironic given 
the recent serious discussion in the private sector about 
using fact-finding and arbitration to a greater extent in 
order to avoid costly strikes. 
In short, a majority of union representatives and 50 
percent of management would not abolish fact-finding. This 
however, does not suggest that serious problems do not ex-
ist. On the contrary, when asked about the problems of 
fact-finding in Oregon, parties' responses were numerous. 
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Problems Perceived By Parties 
The parties perceived some problems similar to those 
perceived by the neutrals. To avoid repetition only those 
problems which are dissimilar will be discussed in detail 
in the following order: lack of preparation, non-binding 
recommendations, protective services, cost, fact-finders, 
time, inexperience, and others. 
Lack of Preparation. Union representatives in the ed-
ucation sector suggest there is a lack of preparation on the 
part of some school districts who have a tendency to not 
take fact-finding seriously. This puts the fact-finder in 
the position of having to do his own research. Also it is 
claimed that management in such cases does not take what the 
fact-finder recommends seriously, thus the purpose of fact-
finding is thwarted. 
Non-Binding Recommendations. Because the recommenda-
tions are not-binding, either party can use the process for 
strategic reasons and not suffer any dire consequences. 
Says one union representative, "fact-finding eliminates 
strikes, but slows the process to the benefit of the em-
ployer;" this statement is made because if either party will 
not compromise after the report is issued, strike is the 
only weapon left to resolve the impasse--which unions are 
reluctant to do. 
Protective Service. Several representatives from both 
sides thought fact-finding for police and fire is a waste 
of time and money. They pointed out that in this case, 
fact-finding merely served as a trial or practice run for 
binding arbitration. 
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Cost. High and vague costs were mentioned more often 
by union representatives as being a problem. This is be-
cause tax monies are used by public employees to cover fact-
finding costs, whereas unions cover their cost from a very 
limited base of union dues. Furthermore, there have been 
instances where the fact-finder fees changed from that re-
flected on the Conciliation Service resume sent to the 
parties. One union representative suggested state limits 
on fact-finders' fees be instituted. 
Fact-Finders. Both sides are concerned about the fact-
finders themselves as a problem with the process. Some 
fact-finders have had less experience than the parties, and 
have been unfamiliar with the problems involved. They claim 
there is too much variety among approaches, use of criteria 
of judgment, and overall competency. They think that the 
ERB screening process, training, guidelines, and feedback 
mechanisms are inadequate. 
Time. Both sides emphc,size how the time involved in 
the process poses serious problems with respect to budget 
deadlines, arbitration award rules, and frustration levels. 
Inexperience. Several union representatives suggested 
the major problem with fact-finding is that the parties 
themselves are inexperienced, immature, and don't really 
want to bargain. As a result the process is used as a ve-
hicle for stalling. One management representative 
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supported this concept by pointing out that critics are in 
the way of the process; that they do not try to use it ef-
fectively and therefore it doesn't work well many times. 
Miscellaneous Problems. Complications in bargaining 
caused by the inherent conflict between Civil Service regu-
lations and collective bargaining was mentioned as a reason 
that fact-finding is not so successful. Also, ERB rulings 
have complicated, in the view of some parties, the entire 
collective bargaining process, which of course includes 
fact-finding. 
Summary of Parties' Views 
The data from Tables XXXXVI-XXXXVIII show that both 
union and management representatives generally agree that 
fact-finding is useful in impasse resolution. They have 
general confidence in the fact-finders, but d~sagree as to 
whether the fact-finder can bE: a positive factor, given the 
state of the art. Both union and management agree that the 
cost is not a deterrent to its use, except under unusual 
circumstances. Both sides also generally agree that fact-
finders do not often attempt to mediate, and that the par-
ties like it that way. The parties view the fact-finders' 
recommendations as neutral, but complain that fact-finders 
more often split the issues than not. The parties disagree 
as to whether one another bargain in good faith; the union 
representatives indicating management does not, and manage-
ment indicating that unions do, generally bargain in good 
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faith. 
Both disagree as to whether fact-finding causes par-
ties to hold back during negotiations and mediation, with 
the unions indicating they do not hold back and management 
admitting they do. Both generally agree that all issues 
are discussed before fact-finding, but they disagree as to 
whether fact-finding reopens issues. According to both 
parties, publication of the report does not seem to encour-
age resolution. Union representatives strongly oppose 
abolishing fact-finding, where employer representatives 
are divided on the issue. They both point out serious 
problems with the process, although overall they would not 
like to see it abolished. 
The views of the parties and those of the neutrals will 
be contrasted in the following chapter, which presents a 
summary, conclusions and recoIlU1l2ndations. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the 
characteristics and effectiveness of Oregon's fact-finding 
process. This was accomplished through a review of rele-
vant literature and Oregon law, analysis of aggregate data 
pertaining to fact-finding, and by structured interviews 
of participants engaged in fact-finding. 
Review of the literature demonstrated that public sec-
tor collective bargaining is recent and occurs at all levels 
of government and in all states. It has as its objectives 
the bringing of order into public sector labor relations. 
The present and potential impact this recent phenomenon has 
for our traditional political and economic power structure 
is considerable. These changes have, and will continue to 
have, a significant impact on urban areas, where most of the 
population resides and union membership exists. Of particu-
lar concern is the impact this has on the allocation of 
limited resources in the budgetary process, and the threat 
of work stoppages (strikes) that interrupt the provision of 
vital public services. Of paramount importance has been the 
development of impasse resolution procedures which are in-
tended to protect the public from strikes, while encouraging 
voluntary collective bargaining in the public sector. The 
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Oregon Legislature's response to this challenge was the pas-
sage of a very progressive and comprehensive public sector 
labor law in 1973. 
Oregon Public Sector Law 
The intent of Oregon's 1973 public employee bargaining 
law was to establish uniform procedures for labor relations 
in the public sector. It embraces the philosophy that it is 
in the public interest to have harmonious relations between 
governmental units and their employees, and that collective 
bargaining is a vehicle that can accomplish this. The law 
extends bargaining rights to public employees that are simi-
lar to those granted the private sector in the 1930's. The 
law grants the right to strike to all but those employees in 
the protective services. In order to protect the public 
from public employee strikes, the law established a mUlti-
step impasse resolution procedure should collective negotia-
tions break down. 
Oregon's impasse resolution procedure may be viewed as 
a filtering process with each step significantly contribut-
ing to the orderly resolution of disputes, reducing the pos-
sibility of public employee strikes, and encouraging the 
parties to settle voluntarily. Figure 3 is a flow chart 
showing the basic steps in the process. Each step introduces 
a higher level of intervention by the neutral third party. 
It is the fact-finding process that is most controversial 
and the topic of this dissertation. 
COOLING-OFF 
PERIOD 
STRIKE 
or 
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~ 
FACT-FINDING 
INTEREST 
ARBITRATION 
~ 
MEDIATION 
~ 
IMPASSE 
~ 
NEGOTIATIONS 
Figure 3. Oregon's Impasse Resolution Process 
Oregon's Public Sector 
The present and potential impact of public sector col-
lective bargaining in Oregon was couched in terms of an im-
pact or penetration study. 
It showed that there are almost 1,600 governmental 
units in Oregon (including school and special districts) 
that could be potentially involved in collective bargaining; 
furthermore there are over 1,000 bargaining units that are 
currently involved in collective bargaining and/or meet-and-
confer discussions. 
The study also provided estimates of the percent of the 
total governmental units in each sector that are involved in 
collective bargaining. The most conservative estimates of 
penetration are as follows: public schools - 95 percent, 
corrIDunity colleges - 100 percent, state - 77 percent, coun-
ties - 56 percent, cities - 41 percent, and special dis-
tricts - 10 percent. 
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The potential impact could result in some 150,000 pub-
lic employees being organized, and involve over 2,400 separ-
ate bargaining contracts. 
Given this high level of activity, it is of great con-
cern that the impasse resolution process be an effective way 
to avoid public sector strikes while encouraging voluntary 
collective bargaining. 
The Concept of Fact-Finding 
The concept of fact-finding is that the issuance of a 
neutral's findings and recommendations, along with public 
pressure, will encourage the parties to drop extreme posi-
tions and to settle voluntarily. Oregon law requires the 
parties to bear the cost of fact-finding as an inducement to 
settle in mediation prior to fact-finding. Furthermore, 
publication of a rejected report is thought to be a way to 
place public pressure on the parties to settle. This dis-
sertation generated information to describe the character-
istics and ascertain the effectiveness of this process. 
Summary of the Aggregate Data 
The aggregate data reported shows that one intention of 
Oregon's impasse resolution procedure is working: that is, 
each step significantly reduces the number of impasses and 
therefore the number of potential strikes. The fact-
finding phase accomplishes this also as almost 35 percent of 
the fact-finding cases were settled prior to the hearing, 
and only 5 percent of the cases going to hearing resulted in 
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a strike. 
The aggregate data further shows that the greatest use 
of fact-finding occurs in the education sector, and in par-
ticular, involves public schools and the OEA which repre-
sents (K-12) teachers. There appears to be a mild statis-
tical association between employee actions and the employee 
organization and type of government involved. Employer ac-
tions have a mild statistical association with the employee 
group they are dealing with. 
Although time has little statistical association with 
the parties' actions, the author is reluctant to dismiss 
this as unimportant because of information provided by the 
interviews and questionnaires. Population and census type 
data reveal that the vast majority of cases occur in urban 
areas; however, statistical association between census type 
and parties' actions is mixed and inconclusive. Of partic-
ular interest is the moderate statistical association be-
tween both parties' actions and the fact-finder himself. 
Even though the statistical measures indicated only 
mild association between most of the variables, it may be 
that future research will yield different results as longer 
time periods are studied, and as the parties gain more ex-
perience with the process. 
Furthermore, the fact that only 17 percent of the fact-
finding reports are accepted should not be construed to mean 
the process is ineffective in encouraging the parties to 
settle voluntarily; evidence from the interviews suggest 
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the contrary. 
Summary of the Participants' Views 
The information gained from the interviews and ques-
tionnaires indicate that there is a tremendous range of 
viewpoints among the categories of participants and within 
each category. The information shows that some assumptions 
about fact-finding are confirmed, while others are not. 
It also shows that while fact-finding in Oregon does fulfill 
some particular needs, it also results in certain problems. 
Both the problems and benefits will be discussed after the 
participants' views are summarized. Their views are covered 
as follows: 
Usefulness. A majority of the parties and the neutrals 
agree that fact-finding is useful in impasse resolution be-
cause it allows parties to save face through third party 
recommendations, it provides the opportunity for parties to 
reassess their positions, it acts as a forum to vent feel-
ings under controlled conditions, it gives time for emo-
tions to ebb, and it is a vehicle to socialize or educate 
the parties in the collective bargaining process. 
Cost. Both parties and neutrals agree that the cost 
of fact-finding does not serve as a deterrent to its use. 
The only exception might be those small units (under 50) 
where there are not enough members to offset the fact-
finding costs without undue burdens. Their comments indi-
cated, however, that if it were free there probably would 
be a higher usage of fact-finding. 
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Hold Back. Mediators and management concur that fact-
finding causes hold backs during negotiation and mediation. 
Unions view this as not the case. However, there is evi-
dence that anti-collective bargaining attitudes, not just 
presence of fact-finding, also cause hold-backs. 
Publication. The parties do not see publication of the 
report as encouraging resolution. Although fact-finders 
disagree with the parties, it is concluded that public pres-
sure due to publication is not regarded as a viable force 
toward settlement. 
Issues Discussed. Fact-finders and both parties agree 
that generally all issues are discussed prior to fact-
finding. This indicates that the presence of fact-finding 
does not significantly affect the number of issues going to 
fact-finding. The large average number of issues per case 
are attributed mainly to the parties' inexperience and 
attitud~s. 
Mediation. The parties and the fact-finders agree that 
the role of the fact-finder should be adjudicatory, and med-
iation efforts should not be made by the fact-finder. This 
is supportive of the philosophy embodied in Oregon law. 
Confidence. The parties and mediators have a guarded 
general confidence in fact-finding, but disagree whether 
fact-finders can be very effective. 
Neutrality. Both parties perceive the fact-finders as 
neutral but think recommendations should be based upon fair-
ness not acceptability. Fact-finders agree to the person 
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with this philosophy. 
Good Faith Bargaining. Mediators and management concur 
that the parties bargain in good faith prior to fact-
finding, while the fact-finders are divided, and the unions 
disagree. The key to this disagreement is whether good 
faith bargaining has occurred in a legalistic or practical 
sense. There is evidence that some employees, in pa~ticular 
the public school and state sectors, often do not bargain 
toward settlement prior to fact-finding. 
Abolish Fact-Finding? The unions and fact-finders 
strongly oppose this suggestion, while mediators and manage-
ment are divided in their opinions. The overall opinion of 
the participants is to retain the fact-finding process. The 
majority, who oppose abolishing the process see the benefits 
as outweighing the problems. The minority see the opposite. 
" A brief summary of the benefits and problems listed by those 
interviewed follows. 
Benefits of Oregon's Fact-Finding Process 
The items discussed below are generally perceived by 
various participants as being beneficial. Of course several 
items are also the source of some problems. 
Neutral's Recommendation. Many are convinced (in par-
ticular the neutrals) that a neutral's recommendations are 
necessary in order to help the parties put the issues into 
perspective, and provide the parties and the public with a 
relatively unbiased view. The report is seen as being in 
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the interest of both the parties and the public. For ex-
ample, in this age of "tax revolt," the fact-finder can tell 
the public what is fair and reasonable, thus making it eas-
ier for employers to make decisions regarding increased 
expenditures. 
Face-Saving. Both the parties and the neutrals are 
convinced that the fact-finding phase provides an avenue 
for compromise that allows the pa~ties to save face. This 
has been particularly important during the first years under 
the law, where both parties have been adjusting to their new 
relationship. Its potential usefulness could be consider-
able if the home rule issue is settled in favor of the state 
law. 
Education of the Parties. Although many of the parties 
disagree, the neutrals see fact-finding as a way to educate 
the parties in the collective bargaining process and impasse 
resolution, especially during the first years under the new 
law. 
Time. The time involved in the process is seen as a 
period in which the parties have the opportunity to cool off 
and re-assess their positions. 
Vent Feelings. The neutrals point out that the hear-
ings serve a psychological function as parties can publicly 
vent their feelings under controlled conditions. In this 
case a party may be ready to settle once they have "had 
their say." 
Fewer Issues. According to mediators, fact-finding 
does contribute to reducing the number of issues leading 
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to impasse, making settlement easier in super-mediation, in 
spite of the fact that the vast majority of the reports are 
not accepted in total. 
Few Strikes. Only five percent of the cases going to 
hearing result in strike. This implies that the fact-
finding process contributes significantly to the reduction 
of impasses going to strike. 
Problems of Oregon's Fact-Finding Process 
Inexperience. The most often mentioned problem is the 
parties' inexperience with the philosophy and techniques of 
collective bargaining. 
Attitude. Related to inexperience are the attitudes 
of parties who are immature and allow personal feelings and 
past practice to interfere with collective bargaining and 
the usefulness of fact-finding. This is reflected in the 
number of issues taken to fact-finding. 
Fact-Finders. Some fact-finders have been inexperi-
enced. Generally, there is lack of consistency in format 
and criteria of judgment on permissive issues. 
Structural Problems. Fact-finding has not been effec-
tive in cases that go to binding arbitration. 
Time. The excessive length of time involved poses many 
conflicts with budget and interest arbitration deadlines. 
Furthermore, it is seen as causing frustration among parties. 
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Costs. Excessive and non-standardized fact-finder fees 
are seen as a impediment to obtaining the most competent 
fact-finders. 
Summary 
In summary, the aggregate data and interviews show that 
the fact-finding process in Oregon's impasse resolution pro-
cedure does accomplish its purposes in that (I) it contri-
butes significantly to the reduction of impasses, and thus 
the potential number of strikes, and (2) it encourages the 
parties to settle voluntarily as it provides a way for par-
ties to re-assess their position, an opportunity to save-
face, and to publicly vent their feelings, and a vehicle to 
socialize the parties in the collective bargaining process. 
Because of these advantages the majority of the partic-
ipants do not want to abolish Oregon's fact-finding process; 
rather they view it as a double-edged sword that provides 
many problems as well as benefits. The final section of this 
chapter will propose various recommendations that are in-
tended to reduce the severity of many of these problems, 
and thus, improve Oregon's fact-finding process. 
PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
It is recommended that the fact-finding process be 
retained because of its overall effectiveness in reducing 
the possibility of strikes and encouraging the parties to 
settle voluntarily. Many of its problems can be partially 
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legislative action would not result in any serious negative 
aspects. 
Quality of Fact~Finder~ 
The interviews indicated that the parties and neutrals 
alike felt that serious problems exist with respect to the 
competency of some fact-finders. This was further demon-
strated by the aggregate data that showed that although over 
30 fact-finders were on the list, about 65 percent of all 
cases went to 10 fact-finders. Re-selection of those 10 is 
due to tDe parties not knowing some, and finding others 
incompetent. 
Most of the problems relating to the quality of fact-
finders could be alleviated by the Conciliation Service 
placing and retaining only the most qualified on the fact-
finders' list. This would require a more careful training 
and screening process. To accomplish this, the following 
is recommended: 
(1) Fact-Finder Training. It is recommended that both 
pre-entry and post-entry training be required of fact-finders 
on the list. 
Pre-Entry Fact-Finding Apprenticeship. It is re-
commended that the State Conciliation Service institute and 
supervise a fact-finding apprenticeship program. The intent 
of such an apprenticeship would be to insure a reasonable 
and consistent quality and quantity of fact-finders. In-
terested individuals, who are identified by the service to 
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solved, or at least curbed, by administrative directions 
from the ERB and the State Conciliation Service Division. 
Other problems can only be dealt with effectively by an act 
of the legislature. The following problem areas and recom~ 
mendations are not discussed in order of importance. They 
are discussed in the following order: protective services, 
quality of fact-finders, issuance of reports, number of is-
sues, parties' action on reports, pUblication of reports, 
fact-finder fees, scope of bargaining, attitudes, and bud-
get deadlines. 
Protective Services 
The aggregate data and interviews showed that those 
groups required by law to use binding arbitration as the 
final stage of impasse resolution do not find fact-finding 
useful. Neutrals agree that in this case, fact-finding is 
little more than a trial run for the arbitration hearing, 
and that it uses up precious time causing some cases to go 
past the July first budgetary deadline for arbitration re-
quests. In short, fact-finding for protective services 
wastes time and money (about two months and 2,000 dollars 
per case). It also adds to the frustration of the parties 
involved, and thus, is counterproductive. 
Therefore, it is recommended that fact-finding for the 
protective services be instituted only when the ERB deems it 
is in the public interest, or when both parties voluntarily, 
and mutually, request such services. In my opinion, such 
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be potentially successful, would work with experienced fact-
finders that have a reputation for their expertise in the 
field. Because fact-finding involves many skills that can-
not be totally learned from a book, an apprenticeship would 
smooth the rough edges, just as a student teacher learns 
the "tricks of the trade" from a master teacher, so would 
an apprentice fact-finder learn from a master fact-finder. 
Post-Entry Inservice Training. It is recommended 
that the State Conciliation Service continue and expand its 
efforts to update and train present fact-finders in the 
areas of writing format, use of consistent criteria of judg-
ment, other fact-finders' finding, and fact-finding tech-
niques. The purpose of such training would be to cultivate 
consistency throughout the process, from the hearing to the 
written reports. Such training could occur in workshop form 
several times a year, and attendance of a certain amount re-
quired in order for a fact-finder to remain on the list. 
(2) Evaluation of Fact-Finders. It is recommended 
that some type of a formal evaluation system be developed 
by the State Conciliation Service in order to become aware 
of any consistent problems the parties may be having with 
particular fact-finders. Presently the parties have no 
formal way of sharing their "fact-finder" problems and only 
learn by trial and error; this is not too effective and im-
poses great costs of the parties, and indeed, the public. 
It also reduces confidence in the system. The proposed 
evaluation would give ERB administration a relatively fast 
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and objective way to help improve the quality of fact-
finders and the level of confidence the parties have in the 
service. 
(3) The Fact-Finder List and Fees. It is recommended 
that the State Conciliation Service's fact-finders' list re-
flect the fees of all fact-finders on that list. Further-
more, it is recommended that fact-finders be required to 
submit a written notice to the Service 60 days prior to a 
change in fees; and be prevented from changing the fees 
after the selection process. This would allow the Service 
to update the list prior to any selection, and protect the 
parties from unanticipated fee changes. 
Issuance of the Report 
It is recommended that the State Conciliation Service 
take serious action to encourage fact-finders to issue their 
reports within the thirty day period as required by law. 
Obviously, some situations, such as cases requiring post-
hearing briefs, warrant as much as a two week extension. 
However, as the aggregate data indicated, over 60 percent 
of the reports take over one month to be issued, and of 
that over 20 percent take over six weeks, which, except for 
extraordinary circumstances, is far too long. It does not 
seem unreasonable that the ERB enforce the thirty day limit 
to a practical degree given the law, the high fees parties 
pay, and the frustrations caused by excessive time lapses. 
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Parties' Actions on Reports 
It is recommended that the ERB require parties to 
either accept or reject a report within the five day period 
as proscribed by law. It is also recommended that the par-
ties be required to take action on an issue by issue basis, 
rather than on the total report. 
In the first instance, ERB would merely be helping to 
enforce the law, with the side effects of being able to re-
lease to the press the fact-finders' report for publication. 
The aggregate data showed employee groups were involved in 
no action in 28 percent, and employers in 13 percent of the 
cases going to hearing. Presently, in cases where one party 
accepts and one takes no action, ERB cannot release the re-
port for publication, thus relieving the parties of poten-
tial public pressure. 
In the second instance, if parties were required to 
take action on an issue by issue basis, it would allow them 
to immediately determine the areas of agreement, narrow any 
unresolved issues, and identify the major issues. Further-
more, this would make it easier for both parties and neu-
trals to formally and consciously see the usefulness of 
fact-finding reports, and could further any super-mediation 
efforts. 
Publication of Reports 
It is recommended that the ERB release fact-finding re-
ports to the local hometown newspapers in order to encourage 
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the intent of the law and the philosophy behind publication 
of the report. The parties indicated in the interviews 
that pUblication of the report does not, in their view, 
serve to encourage impasse resolution to a significant de-
gree. However, considering that as many as 28 percent of 
the reports are not published due to no action by parties, 
and considering that ERB releases the reports to the wire 
service, not the local papers, it is difficult to tell to 
what extent pUblication might encourage resolution. It is 
realized that pUblication still may not serve its intended 
purpose. However, such action by ERB would, at least, re-
sult in the public having the opportunity to become aware 
and express their opinions concerning a particular case. 
Fact-Finders' Fees 
It is recommended that consideration be given to a 
state-wide fee system. The reasons for such consideration 
are two-fold. First, the interviews showed that many of the 
parties, particularly the unions, were concerned about the 
high fees that fact-finders charge. High fees are a par-
ticular burden to smaller units and the unions (who pay from 
dues), and much less so for the public employer who derives 
its income from taxes. Second, because the parties are ob-
ligated to use the process under law, there is justifica-
tion to not allow the unrestrained market to set the price. 
This is especially so where demand is excessive (due to gov-
ernment requirements) and supply limited (and not encouraged 
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by government aid) . 
Related to this are the unusual circumstances where 
parties have refused to pay a fact-finder for one reason 
or another. Perhaps the ERB should consider a partial pre-
payment system as well to relieve this problem. 
Again, it was also recommended that fact-finders be re-
quired to give the State Conciliation Service a 60 day no-
tice of any fee change. This would allow the Service to 
update the list with regard to any change in fact-finder 
fees prior to the selection process. Furthermore, it is 
recommended that once selected, the fact-finder could not 
charge a fee greater than that reflected on the list pro-
vided to the parties involved. 
Scope of Bargaining 
It is recommended that the ERB make some decision re-
garding the discretion of fact-finders in order to add con-
sistency in hearings and reports. Both neutrals and parties 
have indicated that a major problem in the fact-finding pro-
cess is the uncertainty on what are permissive and mandatory 
issues, and whether a fact-finder will hear and/or make 
recommendations on such issues. It is realized that such 
action might place further burdens on the ERB. However, 
only ERB, and not the fact-finders, are equipped to deal 
with such problems. 
Attitudes 
It is recommended that ERB conduct workshops to social-
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ize or educate the parties in the overall concepts and phil-
osophy underlying collective bargaining and impasse resolu-
tion under Oregon law. These workshops would include both 
parties and be held on neutral territory such as university 
and/or community college campuses. They would be conducted 
by recognized and qualified experts in public section labor 
relations. 
The reasoning behind such a recommendation is that the 
aggregate data and the interviews indicate the parties' at-
titudes (in particular public school employers) are anti-
collective bargaining; these attitudes subvert the intent 
of negotiations and thus the fact-finding process. Many 
suggest that time and experience will take care of some of 
these problems; however, it is suggested here that an ef-
fort by ERB to help educate and socialize the parties is 
appropriate. The parties need to be reminded about the 
positive aspects of Oregon law, its intent, and philosophy. 
Workshops such as these would certainly not hurt, and could 
prove very beneficial to the parties' use of the process, 
and the public interest. 
Budget Deadlines 
It is recommended that the legislature enact some type 
of negotiations-impasse deadline in order that fact-finding 
does not run past budget deadlines. The interviews indi-
cated that a major problem with fact-finding is that it 
takes many cases past budget deadlines, thus making it 
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difficult to institute the agreement into the budget. A 
deadline would force parties to bargain earlier and finish 
the process before the budget was due. This could be ac-
complished by any of the following ways: 
(1) Copy the old meet-and-confer law; that is, fact-
finding would have to be finished by, say, March or April, 
thus the parties are obliged to bargain earlier (say late 
fall) in order to finish by the June budget deadline. The 
advantages are that bargaining would be tied to the budget 
period, adding some fiscal sense to the situation (if em-
ployers have to guess what to allocate employees in their 
budget they have essentially determined their top line be-
fore conclusion of negotiations). Presently, the fact-
finders' recommendations may not be feasible without a 
special election. Also such a deadline encourages both par-
ties to get to the nitty-gritty and to not stall; that is, 
it would encourage more serious bargaining during negotia-
tions. 
(2) Change the fiscal year for schools (where most of 
the problems exist) from July 1 - June 31, to Septelooer 1 -
August 31. This has proven reasonably successful in the 
State of Washington, where even if bargaining begins late, 
say March, the parties have all summer to finish fact-
finding and sign a contract. Of course if labor decides to 
strike it would be much less effective in mid summer than 
near the end of a term. Such a change would also spread 
out the burden on the Conciliation Service and on fact-
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finders, as all public employees are now on a July 1 - June 
31 fiscal year and under this proposal they would be stag-
gered (education September 1 - August 31, all others July 1 
- June 31). 
Summary 
In summary, these recommendations are intended to re-
duce the severity of many of the problems with Oregon's 
fact-finding process. Fact-finding for most public sector 
impasse cases has more positive than negative aspects, and 
provided the problems are alleviated, the process can go a 
long way toward accomplishment of its purported goal. 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The aggregate data and interviews generated certain 
questions to which future research could be guided with in-
teresting and potentially useful results. First, the aggre-
gate data suggested that employer actions on fact-finders' 
reports are associated with the employee organization in-
volved. Further TPsearch might address the question whether 
this is a result of tradition, personalities of the actors, 
or other variables. Such research might prove very useful 
in future understanding of public employee labor relations 
on a national scale. Second, research might be conducted 
that measured parties' attitudes in relation to time lapse. 
This could give the legislature an idea of how to build 
realistic time deadlines. Third, more research could be 
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directed to the relationship between exogenous factors (such 
as population, unemployment, etc.) of the areas involved and 
the parties' actions on fact-finder reports. Fourth, and of 
particular interest, would be research into what attributes 
the parties consider important for a successful fact-finder, 
and furthermore if the parties really want fact-finders to 
recommend what they consider fair, rather than acceptable. 
Fifth, research is needed in the general area of the col-
lective bargain model, to direct the employer-employee rela-
tionship in more positive directions. 
THE FUTURE 
This study has shown that fact-finding in Oregon is suc-
cessful in reducing impasses and thus the potential number of 
strikes. This has also shown that the process is more suc-
cessful than not in reducing the issues causing impasse, 
educating or socializing the parties in the collective bar-
gaining process, and encouraging good faith bargaining. Be-
cause of its effectiveness it is recommended the process be 
refined rather than abolished. The problems, however, are 
numerous and serious. Some of the problems can be alle-
viated by instituting recommendations like those presented 
in this study; others will take dramatic institutional 
changes before they are significantly reduced. 
I specifically refer to the attitudes of the parties in 
an adversary collective bargaining model such as that which 
exists in U. S. labor relations. The best impasse resolu-
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tion procedure will not be successful unless the parties 
bargain in good faith. In order to bargain in good faith, 
the parties have to be socialized toward a common goal and 
commitment that is beyond their immediate self interest 
(for example, "good" education). Furthermore, the adminis-
trators of public services have to reflect a common commit-
ment by including all persons, to some de~ree, in the 
decision-making process. What is being suggested here is 
that participatory, or democratic management, is a vehicle 
through which labor problems can be avoided in the first 
place, and common goals reached. 
The real problem with Oregon's fact-finding process is 
the problem with most aspects of U. S. labor relations: a 
lack of sense of control and fair play by one or both par-
ties. It is to this end that future efforts might prove 
invaluable. 
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APPENDIX A 
METHODOLOGICAL NOTES 
Multiple operationism is employed in this disserta-
tion in that different methods of data collection are used. 
According to Cambell, et ale the value of this procedure is 
that "it diminishes the slippage between the conceptual and 
operative specifications," because more than one method of 
measurement is utilized. a 
The procedures used and related problems involved in 
the general aggregate data and the elite or authoritative 
survey are discussed as follows. 
I. General Aggregate Data. The general aggregate data 
provide the first accurate and comprehensive data base avail-
able in Oregon from which to describe and analyze this 
state's fact-finding process. It also provides a starting 
point for exploration of the possible association between 
variables and the generation testable hypotheses. 
The data was produced from the files of the Oregon 
State Conciliation Service and the population of 239 cases 
that occurred from 1974 through 1977. Data were analyzed 
with the Statistical Program for the Social Sciences (SPSS). 
The 19 variables involved are: 
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(1) Year. This variable provided information as to 
the frequency and rate of change in fact-finding cases 
from 1974 through 1975. 
(2) Fact-Finder. This information allowed identifica-
tion of those fact-finders most involved in the process, 
which was useful in determining who to interview. Also 
it was possible to compare the fact-finder and the par-
ties' actions on their reports in order to find whether 
any association exists. It proved very valuable in 
terms of suggesting directions for future research and 
substantiating some of the parties' concerns. 
(3) Type. This variable measured possible differences 
between the education and the non-education sectors. 
(4) and (5) Employee Organization and Employer. These 
variables provided data on unions and governmental par-
ticipation and actions in each phase of the process. 
Cross tabulations were used to determine possible asso-
ciations between actors and other variables. 
(6) Home Rule Status. Because the home rule issue 
caused confusion and inconsistant use of the process 
it was dropped from the aggregate data. This variable 
accounts for the major source of missing data. 
(7) Settled-Before Hearing. This variable was used 
to isolate those cases where a request for fact-find-
ing occurred but where the parties settled prior to a 
hearing. It provided a means to compare the part.ici-
pants' actions in this phase and provided information 
that led to insights as to the filtering concept of 
the impasse process. 
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(8) and (9) Employee and Employer Actions. These var-
iables refer to the parties' action taken on the fact-
finding report. Three actions were possible: accept, 
reject, and no action. This provided frequency dis-
tributions and allowed for cross tabulations between 
action and employee and employer categories. This was 
paramount in describing the effectiveness of the pro-
cess and pointing to the direction of further question-
ing and problems. 
(10) and (11) Time Request to Hearing, and Hearing to 
Report. These variables provided measurement of the 
time involved in the process. There were four time 
categories: 0-4 weeks, 4-6 weeks, 6-8 weeks, and over 
8 weeks. This provided information relating to the 
time schedule required by the law, and allowed for 
cross tabulations between time and the parties' ac-
tions. The data generated wer~ interesting, and 
useful in that many other questions arose from that 
data. In future research it will be more useful to 
measure time in days rather than intervals. This 
would allow averages to be obtained and more rigorous 
statistical analysis to be applied. 
(12) Reports Published. This va.riable is important 
because of the idea that publishing the report will 
put pressure on the parties to settle. Unfortunately, 
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the lack of consistent record keeping made this varj,-
able so nnreliable that it was not utilized in the 
analysis. But in the process of attempting to collect 
this data, important weaknesses in the process were 
sighted. These weaknesses were the way it was pub-
lished, and the parties' use of no action as a way to 
avoid publication. 
(13) Strike Notice. This variable was used to gen-
erate the frequency of strike notices as required 
under Oregon law. 
(14) and (15) Settled With and Without Mediation. 
These variables allowed identification of those cases 
where reports were rejected and super-mediation was 
required, as opposed to those cases where the parties 
settled themselves without further assistance by a 
neutral third party. It proved valuable in recogniz-
ing super-mediation as a very important step in the 
impasse process. 
(16) Arbj,trated. This provided the frequency of cases 
going to arbitration and added information on the fil-
tering conc~pt of the imp3sse process. It also allowed 
an understanding of the usefulness of fact-finding when 
it is integrated with binding arbitration. 
(17) Strike. The purpose of the impasse process is to 
prevent public sector strikes. This variable was use-
ful in generating the frequency of strikes among various 
sectors and the percentage of cases going to fact-
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finding that went on to strike. 
(18) and (19) Population and Census Type. These vari-
ables were utilized to gain information on the relation 
of cases and action to population and census type. The 
population categories were: under 2,500; 2,500 -
10,000; 10,000 - 50,000; and over 50,000. The census 
type definitions were based upon Bureau of Census defi-
nitions. They are: rural (under 2,500); suburban 
(contiguous to a central city, incorporated, larger 
than 2,500 -- in the "urban fringe"); and urban (over 
2,500 and not suburban). These variables allowed some 
description and analysis as to where most fact-finding 
cases occurred, and allowed cross tabulations with par-
ties' actions. 
Problems with the Aggregate Data. Some data were miss-
ing because not all fact-finding records are complete. How-
ever, much of the missing data on records was compensated 
for through interviews of key people at the Service. Infor-
mation not recalled by them was reported as missing. 
Most of the missing data involved home rule cities and 
counties; thus the reason for dropping them the analysis. 
This meant that although generalizations about the fact-
finding process could be done, analysis pertaining to home 
rule cities and counties was not possible. 
II. Elite or Authoritative Survey. This type of survey pro-
vided a systematic basis (for the first time in Oregon) to 
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obtain and evaluate the views of representatives from all 
four categories of participants involved in Oregon's fact-
finding process mediators, fact-finders, unions, and 
government employers. 
In using the elite survey method it is assumed that all 
persons and/or categories of experts are not equally impor-
tant, and that some have more insight into the process and 
much more impact on policy formation than others. b 
The data were collected through a questionnaire admin-
istered in a personal interview situation. This format 
allowed for candor and higher response rates compared to a 
mail or phone interview format. c Respondents were guaran-
teed complete anonymity. 
A scaling technique was employed to allow the parties 
to express full intensity of their feelings and provide for 
more in-depth analysis. The scale was intentially designed 
to prevent the parties from taking a neutral stand, thus 
forcing them to scale their level of agreement or disagree-
ment. Most of the questions were closed-ended. 
The personal interview situation allowed parties to 
explain the reasons they felt as they did, and to provide 
additional information beyond their choice on the scale --
thus, giving the analysis a frame-work of measured opinions 
about which further interpretation could occur given the 
comments during the interviews. 
The length of the questionnaire was designed so the 
interview would take between 30-45 minutes. As a result, 
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the questions were limited to those perceived to be most im-
portant. 
A non-random sampling technique was employed and those 
interviewed were selected on the basis of information pro-
vided in the aggregate data and discussion with practition-
ers in the field. 
The subsamples were as follows: Fact-finders -- ten 
were interviewed and these ten account for over 64 percent 
of the total fact-finding cases going to hearing. Mediators 
nine were interviewed and they account for 95 percent of 
all non-home rule fact-finding cases requiring post-fact-
finding m-diation. Employees -- representatives of five 
unions were interviewed; these five unions account for over 
80 percent of the total non-home rule fact-finding cases go-
ing to hearing. It was assumed the state level of these 
unions represent the general views of the locals and also 
formulate general union policy. Employers -- ten were in-
terviewed; seven from the education sector (which accounts 
for 70 percent of all non-home rule fact-finding cases go-
ing to hearing), and three others representing state, county 
and municipal, and special district units of government; 
thus all major types of governments were represented. 
This technique made it possible to interview those who 
are in especially good positions to supply information; and 
share useful insights. However, it does not provide an ade-
quate enough base from which to test for statistical signif-
icance. Generalizations derived from the interviews about 
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the fact-finding process are made based upon the author's 
judgement and the known facts about the subsample described 
d 
above. One important advantage of the survey was the pro-
visions of information that the aggregate statistics could 
not show, and the revelation of many problems and benefits 
of the process that could not be found by the aggregate 
analysis or a mailed questionnare. 
In doing further research it would be useful to design 
the questionnaire so that each category was answering the 
same questions. In this study this could not be accomp-
lished because there was no data base from which to work, 
and the time for interviews had to be limited. 
aDonald T. Cambell, Richard D. Schwartz, and Lee 
Sechrest, Unobtrusive Measures (Chicago: Rand McNally, 
1971), pp. 1-34. 
bLewis A. Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing 
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 7-8. 
CHerbert F. Weisberg, and Bruce D. Bowen, Survey Re-
search and Data Analysis (San Francisco: Freeman, 1977), 
p. 59. 
dHubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics, 2nd ed. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 528. 
APPENDIX B 
SUPPORT INFORMATION ON INTERVIEWS 
The following may be found in this appendix: 
Title 
List of Neutrals Interviewed 
List of Parties Interviewed 
Questionnaire for Mediators 
Questionnaire for Fact-Finders . 
Questionnaire for Parties 
Neutrals' Ranking of Reasons 
That Cause Fact-Finding . . . 
Parties' Ranking of Reasons 
That Cause Fact-Finding 
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298 
300 
302 
304 
305 
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LIST OF NEUTRALS INTERVIEWED 
Mediators 
1. John Abernathy 
2. Lowell Ashbaugh 
3. Robert Bell 
4. Ken Brown 
5. Hugh Lovell 
6. Robert Hipps 
7. Kathy Mistler 
8. Alton Smedstad 
9. John Vale 
Fact-Finders 
1. John Abernathy 
2. William Hammond 
3. Lafayette Harter 
4. Hugh Lovell 
5. R. W. Nahstoll 
6. Leroy Smith 
7. Carlton Snow 
8. Roger Tilbury 
9. Timothy D. Williams 
10. Ron Loew 
LIST OF PARTIES INTERVIEWED 
Government Employer Representatives 
1. Andrew Alexander, Director of Employee Relations, 
Beaverton School District, #15 
2. John Bodilly, Negotiator, Medford Area 
3. Michael Cunningham, Employee Relations Manager, 
Port of Portland 
4. Jerry Martin, Director of Field Service and Labor 
Relations, Oregon School Boards Association 
5. Richard Miller, Attorney, Negotiator, Springfield, 
Eugene Area 
6. Lon Mills, President, Mills and Associates, Inc., 
Negotiators, Eugene Area 
7. Bryan Mullen, Attorney, Negotiator, Medford Area 
8. Edward P. Rosenlund, Supervisor, Employee Relations, 
Personnel Division, State of Oregon 
296 
9. H. Kenneth Zinger, Attorney, Negotiator, Hillsboro Area 
10. Donald W. Scott, Labor Consultant, Local Government 
Personnel Institute 
Public Employee Labor Organization Representatives 
1. Robert Crumpton, Executive Secretary, Oregon Education 
Association (OEA) 
2. Roy Dancer, OEA Uniserve Consultant, Clackamas 
3. Jerry Dodge, American Federation of Teachers 
4. Robert Ellis, Field Representative, Oregon School 
Employees Association 
5. William Greer, Jr., Attorney, represents public sector 
labor organizations 
6. Dick Hoit, Executive Director, American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees 
7. Charlene Sherwood, Attorney, Oregon State Employees 
Association 
8. Steve Straugham, OEA Uniserve Consultant, Medford 
Others 
1. Melvin Cleveland, Chairperson, Employment Relations 
Board, State of Oregon 
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2. Roy Edwards, Senior Hearings Officer, Employment Rela-
tions Board, State of Oregon 
3. Jorge Haynes, Program Analyst, Public Employment Rela-
tions Board, State of California 
4. Dr. Paul Kleinsorge, Professor of Economics, University 
of Oregon 
5. John P. McCarthy, Presiding Conciliator, California 
State Conciliation Service, State of California 
6. Karen Norton, Public Employment Relations Reporter, 
CaliforLia Research, Inc. 
7. James Redden, Attorney General, State of Oregon 
8. Marvin L. Schurke, Executive Director, Public Employ-
ment Relations Commission, State of Washington 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEDIATORS . 
The purpose of this research is to study the factfinding 
process. The intent of Oregon's impasse procedure is to act as 
a filtering process where 'each step reduces the number of impasses 
and brings the parties closer to resolution, thus encouraging 
good faith bargaining and reducing possible strikes. 
Please respond to the following questions. If you have 
any additional comments or explanations you may wish to make, 
they would be appreciated; you may use the back of this sheet 
for that purpose. 
Name Educational Background 
1. Generally, have you been the mediator before and after 
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factfinding? Yes_____ No _____ 
2. Rank the five most important reasons that cause factfinding. 
1. __________________ __ 2. ________________ _ 30 ______________ __ 
4. __________________ __ 5. ______________ __ 
3. Why are so many cases settled after rejection of the report, 
but before strike? 
Rate the following statements aeording to the scale at the right. 
Mark your responses in the space provided. 
n~ 
no 
opinion 
-3 
strongly 
disagree 
-2 
disa~ree 
-1 
somewhat 
disagree 
+1 
somewhat 
agree 
+2 
agree 
+3 
strongly 
agree 
4. The parties generally engage in good faith bargai~ing through 
mediation and factfinding. 
5. Factfinding significantly reduces issues causing impasse. 
6. Factfinders are a positive factor in impasse resolution. 
Questionnaire for Mediators 
7. The factfinders are innovative in their recommendations. 
8. Factfinding cau:;es parties to hold back oi'fers in mediation. 
9. Factfinding is a tool for negotiation strate~y. 
(If so, in what way?) 
10. The i'actfinder's report is the basis for post-facti'inding 
settlement. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
One party is more prone to reject reports than the other. 
(If so, who and why?) 
Factfinding aids in settlement. 
(Explain) 
Factfinding detracts from settlement. 
(I~xplain ) 
tolhat are the problems \oTt th Orcgo!1' s factfinciing process 
and how could the process be improved? 
15. Factfindin~ should be abolished. (If so, should anything 
take its place?) 
16. Other comments: 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FACTFINDERS 
The purpose of this research is to study the factfinding 
process. The intent of Oregon's impasse procedure is to act as 
a filtering process where each step reduces the number of impasses 
and brings the parties closer to resolution, thus encouraging 
good faith bargaining and reducing possible strikes. 
Please resnond to the following quest tons. If you have 
any additional comments or explanations you may wish to make, 
they would be appreciated; you may use the back of this sheet 
for that purpose. 
Name Profession Educational Background 
1. How many years have you been serving as a factfinder in Oregon? 
2. What has been the average number of issues per case? 
3. What is the most number of issues in one case? 
4. What is the least number of issues in one case? 
5. What are the four most important issues that cause factfindine? 
1. ________________________ _ 2. ________________________ _ 
3, ________________________ _ 4. ______________________ _ 
6. Rank the five most important reasons that parties ,go to factfinding. 
1. __________________ __ 2. 
----------------
3. ______________ __ 
4. __________________ __ 5. ______________ __ 
Rate the following statements according to the scale at the right. 
Mark your responses in the space provided. 
nh 
no 
opinion 
-3 -2 
strongly disagree 
disagree 
-1 
somewhat 
disagree 
+1 
somewhat 
agree 
+2 
agree 
+3 
strongly 
agree 
7. Factfinding is an effective step in the impasse resolution 
process in Oregon. 
8. The parties generally bargain in good faith prior to fact-
finding. 
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9. The parties discuss all issues before factfinding. 
10. Parties use factfinding to court favorable public opinion. 
11. Publication of the factfinding report encourages resolution. 
12. The factfindin~ process reduces the effectiveness of mediation. 
13. The cost of factfinding serves as a deterrent to its use. 
14. Factfinders should not engage in mediation. 
15. The fact finder should 'call them as he sees them', and not 
'split the issues'. 
16. Generally parties make the factfinder aware of their 
positions in mediation. 
17. Positions taken in mediation (if known) influence the 
factfinder's position. 
IS. \oJhat are the problems with Oregon's factfindine process 
and how could the process be improved? 
19. Factfindinp, should be abolished. (If so, should anything 
take its place?) 
20. Other comments: 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PARTIES 
The purpose of this research is to study the factfinding 
process. The intent of Oregon's impasse procedure is to act as 
a filtering process where each step reduces the number of impasses 
and brings the parties closer to resolution, thus encouraging 
good faith bargaining and reducing possible strikes. 
Please respond to the following questions. If you have 
any additional comments or explanations you may wish to make, 
they would be appreciated; you may use the back of this sheet 
for that purpose. 
Name Title Organization 
1. Rank the five most important reasons that cause factfinding. 
1. ______ _ 2. ____________ __ 3-_________ _ 
4-______ _ 5. ________ _ 
Rate the following statements according to the scale at the right. 
Mark your responses in the space provided. 
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n/9-
no 
opinion 
-3 -2 
strongly disagree 
disagree 
-1 
somewhat 
disagree 
+1 
somewhat 
agree 
+2 
agree 
+) 
strungly 
agree 
2. Factfinding is useful in impasse resolution. 
Why or why not? 
). Generally we have confidence in factfinders. 
4. Factfinders are a positive factor in impasse resolution. 
5. The cost of factfinding serves as a deterrent to its use. 
6. Factfinders engage in mediation (if so, at whose request?) 
Questionnaire for Parties 
7. Factfinders' recommendations are neutral (given the facts). 
8. The other party general~y bargains in good faith prior to· 
factfinding. 
9. Factfinding causes parties to hold back offers in mediation. 
10. All issues are discussed before factfinding. 
11. Factfinding reopens some issues. 
12. The publication of a factfinder's report encourages 
impasse resolution. 
13. What are the problems "~th Ore~on's factfindin~ process 
and how could the process be improved? 
14. Factfinding should be abolished. (If so, should anything 
take its place?) 
15. Other comments: ______________________________________________ ___ 
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NEUTRALS' RANKING OF REASONS THAT CAUSE FACT-FINDING 
Fact-Finders' Ranking 
Reason 1 2 3 4 5 
Another step 3 
At impasse 1 
Strategy 3 1 1 
Lack of good faith bargaining 1 1 
Need more time 1 
Mediator not trusted 1 
Face saving 2 
Mediators' Ranking 
Reason 1 2 3 4 5 
Show they are working 1 1 
Inexperience 2 2 
Hard bargaining 1 
Strategy 1 
Lack of good faith bargaining 1 
Vent feelings 1 
Hidden adjenda 1 
Face-saving 3 1 
Outside pressure 2 
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PARTIES I RANKING OF REASONS THAT CAUSE FACT-FINDING 
Unions I Ranking 
Reason 2 3 4 5 
Attitudes of parties 1 
Unreasonable board 1 2 
Lack of experience 2 1 3 
Pace-saving 1 
Parties at impasse 1 1 
Stall tactics 1 1 
Don't bargain 1 2 
Complex issues 2 
ERB 1 
Management's Ranking 
Reason 1 2 3 4 5 
Attitudes of parties 2 
Unreasonable union 1 1 
Lack of experience 1 4 
Face-saving 1 2 
At impasse 1 2 1 
Stall tactics 2 
Don't bargain 
Complex issues 
ERB 2 
Have to 1 
High expectations 1 1 
APPENDIX C 
SUPPORT DATA ON FACT-FINDING REPORTS 
The following may be found in this appendix: 
Title 
List of Fact-Finding Reports Analyzed 
Teaching Cases . . 
Non-Teaching Cases . 
Number of Issues Submitted to 
Fact-Finding, 1974-1977 
Types of Issues Submitted to Fact-Finding 
1974-1977 
Teaching Cases 
Non-Teaching Cases . . 
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310 
311 
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LIST OF FACT-FINDING REPORTS ANALYZED, 
TEACHING CASES, 1974-1977 
Union School District 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4 . 
5. 
6. 
7. 
B. 
9. 
10. 
II. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
lB. 
19. 
20. 
2l. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
2B. 
29. 
30. 
3l. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
G:..--eai:er Albany 
Educators 
OEA 
OEA 
AFT 
Association of 
ProfessorE' 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
OEA 
Oregon City 
Beaverton 
North Clackamas 
West Linn 
Lake Oswego 
Central Point 
Gervais 
Salem 
Clackamas Community College 
Ontario 
Scappoose 
Adrian 
Albany 
Corbett 
Springfield 
Southwestern Community College 
Southern Oregon College 
Eagle Point 
Coquille 
Molalla 
MCMinnville 
Eugene 
Lake Oswego 
Umpqua 
Jackson County 
South Lane 
Clatsop Community College 
Springfield 
Pleasant Valley 
Chemeketa Community College 
Coos Bay 
Willamina 
Central Point 
Klamath County 
Roseburg 
Pine Eagle 
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Year 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'76 
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Union School District Year 
37. OEA Jefferson County '76 
38. OEA Crook County '76 
39. OEA Oregon City '76 
40. OEA Jefferson '76 
4l. OEA Corvallis '76 
42. OEA Eugene '76 
43. OEA Albany '76 
44. OEA Salem '76 
45. OEA Stayton '76 
46. OEA Woodburn '76 
47. OEA Clackamas Community College '76 
48. OEA Albany '76 
49. OEA Coos Bay '76 
50. OEA Gervais '76 
5l. '76 
52. OEA Astoria '76 
53. OEA Carlton '76 
54. OEA Warrenton '76 
55. OEA West Linn '76 
56. OEA Scappoose '77 
57. OEA Roseburg '77 
58. OEA Baker '77 
59. OEA Tigard '77 
60. OEA Bandon '77 
6l. OEA Klamath County '77 
62. OEA South Umpqua '77 
63. OEA Reynolds '77 
64. OEA Reedsport '77 
65. OEA Dallas '77 
66. OEA Bethel '77 
67. OEA Redmond '77 
68. OEA Estacada '77 
69. OEA Riddle '77 
70. OEA Salem '77 
7l. OEA Powers '77 
72. OEA Pleasant Hill '77 
73. OEA Clackamas Community College '77 
74. OEA Ashland '77 
75. OEA Woodburn '77 
76. OEA Cascade '77 
77. OEA Corbett '77 
78. AFT Lane Community College '77 
79. '77 
80. '77 
8l. OEA West Linn '77 
-Indicates parties are unknown 
LIST OF FACT-FINDING REPORTS ANALYZED, 
NON-TEACHING CASES, 1974-1977 
Union 
1. ILWU, Local 40 
2. Oregon Nurses Assn. 
3. Jackson Co. Employees 
Assn. 
4. Coalition of Employees 
5. OSEA 
6. AFSCME, Local 1995 
7. School Patrol Assn. 
8. ILWU, Local 40 
9'. AFSCME, Local 2753 
10. Communication Workers, 
Local 9255 
11. School Patrol Assn. 
12. ILWU, Local 40 
13. Airfield Emergency 
Assn., Local 1062 
14. AFSCME, Local 1847 
15. OSEA 
16. OSEA 
17. OSEA 
18. OSEA 
Employer 
Port of Portland 
Marion County 
Jackson County 
State of Oregon 
State of Oregon 
Multnomah Co. IED 
Portland School Dist. #1 
State of Oregon 
Wasco County 
Lincoln County 
Portland School Dist. #1 
Port of Portland 
Port of Portland 
Port of Portland 
Springfield School Dist. 
Hood River County 
South Lane School Dist. 
Reedsport School Dist. 
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Year 
'74 
'74 
'74 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'75 
'76 
'76 
'76 
'76 
'76 
'76 
'76 
'77 
'77 
'77 
'77 
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NUMBER OF ISSUES SUBMITTED TO FACT-FINDING, 1974-1977 
Frequency Frequency 
No. of Non No. of Non 
Issues Teach. Teach. Total Issues Teach. Teach. Total 
I. 2 2 32. 1 1 
2. 13 2 15 33. 
3. 5 4 9 34. 1 1 
4. 4 4 8 35. 1 1 
5. 5 5 36. 1 1 
6. 3 2 5 37. 1 1 
7. 38. 
8. 4 1 5 39. 
9. 1 1 40. 1 1 
10. 3 3 43. 1 1 
II. 2 2 57. 2 2 
12. 3 3 90. 2 2 
13. 1 1 
14. 3 1 4 
15. 2 1 3 Total 81 18 99 
16. 3 3 
17. 2 1 3 
18. 1 1 1 
19. 1 1 
20. 4 4 
2I. 2 2 
22. 2 2 
23. ·1 1 
24. 
25. 
26. 1 1 
27. 2 2 
28. 
29. 
30. 
3I. 2 2 
- Denotes zero 
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TYPES OF ISSUES SUBMITTED TO FACT-FINDING, 
TEACHING CASES, 1974-1977* 
Fre-
Issue quency Issue 
1. Salary 79 38. 
2. Insurance 71 39. 
3. Grievance procedure 34 40. 
4. Duration of agreement 29 
5. Fair share 26 41. 
6. Prep. period 15 42. 
7. X-duty pay 28 
8. X-duty schedule 25 43. 
9. Lockout/strike clause 25 
10. Management rights 20 44. 
11. Funding 15 
12. Just cause 23 45. 
13. Teaching day 21 46. 
14. Teaching load 21 47. 
15. Teaching calendar 28 
16. Class size 11 48. 
17. Contract services 6 
18. Specialists 6 49. 
19. Aides 9 50. 
20. Vacancy & transfer 20 
21. Teacher evaluation 27 51. 
22. Teacher files 8 52. 
23. Complaint procedure 73 53. 
24. Leave, sick 24 54. 
25. Leave, maternity 10 
26. Leave, parental 5 55. 
27. Leave, emergency 5 56. 
28. Leave, personal 19 57. 
29. Leave, professional 22 58. 
30. Leave, bereavement 7 59. 
31. Leave, unpaid absence 11 60. 
32. Leave, association 12 61. 
33. Retirement pay 4 
34. Auto allowance 5 62. 
35. Summer pay 4 
36. Union rights 20 63. 
37. Substitutes 15 64. 
Fre-
quency 
Extended contract 10 
Student fund 1 
Pay schedule -
level to level 13 
Teacher-adm. liaison 4 
Personal/academic 
freedom 26 
Evaluation of 
Administration 6 
Modification 
agreement 9 
Sucessor agreement 6 
Affirmative Action 4 
Tuition reimburse-
ment 19 
Classroom disci-
pline 23 
Reduction in staff 23 
Dues/payroll deduc-
tions 16 
Separability clause 7 
School closure 3 
Contract language 2 
Disciplinary action 
procedure 3 
Special children 2 
Adequate facilities 8 
Staffing 3 
Personnel policies 2 
Textbooks 7 
Meal allowance 1 
Maintenance of 
standards 19 
Instructional 
program 9 
Required meetings 5 
Contract compliance 1 
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Fre- Fre-
Issue quency Issue quency 
65. Job description 1 76. Unit determination 
66. Curriculum development 6 77. Compliance w/master 
67. Prior practice clause 1 contract 
68. Use of equipment 2 78. Severance pay 
69. Tenure 3 79. Assault & battery 
.70. College governance 2 80. Grading 
7l. Teaching assignments 9 8l. Tuition waiver 
72. Division organization 1 82. Teaching apparel 
73. Secretarial assistance 1 83. Telephone calls 
74. Professional growth 7 84. Recognition 
75. Emergency clause 1 85. Teaching conditions 
*Based upon a sample of 81 of 93 reports issued; because some 
issues were consolidated only 86 issues appear on this list 
2 
7 
3 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2 
6 
TYPES OF ISSUES SUBMITTED TO FACT-FINDING 
NON-TEACHING CASES, 1974-1977* 
Fre-
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Issue quency Issue 
Fre-
quency 
I. Salary 16 33. Ed. leave 1 
2. Insurance 11 34. Duties 2 
3. Management rights 1 35. Supervisor 1 
4. Permanent status 1 36. Relocation allowance 1 
5. Workload 2 37. Parking 1 
6. Paid negotiation time 4 38. Rules 1 
7. Union security 3 39. Shift differential 2 
8. Maternity leave 2 40. Uniform allowance 1 
9. Vacation 8 
10. Holiday 5 
II. Ed. incentive pay 1 
12. Union rights 2 
13. Personnel records 1 
14. Severance pay 1 
15. Sick leave 5 
16. Emergency leave 2 
17. Probation 1 
18. Dismissal 2 
19. Termination 2 
20. Vacancies 2 
2I. Reclassification 3 
22. Reimbursable expenses 2 
23. Status of agreement 8 
24. Grievance 3 
25. Recognition 1 
26. Sen'iori ty 3 
27. Medical leave 1 
28. Retirement 1 
29. Hours 1 
30. Successor clause 2 
3l. Fair share 2 
32. Discipline. 1 
*Based upon a sample of 18 of 38 reports issued. 
APPENDIX D 
STATUTES AND RELATED INFORMATION 
The following may be found in this appendix: 
Title 
State Statutes: Negotiation Impasse 
Procedures in 1972 . . . . 
State Conciliation Service Fact-
Finding Rcles • . . . . . . . 
Sample Letter of Understanding 
Regarding Mediation . • . . 
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316 
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STATE STATUTES: NEGOTIATION IMPASSE PROCEDURES IN 1972 
Up to Arbitration 
Hc(li- Fllct- the Voluntary --Conlpu 1 sc.ry 
ation finding State Covera~e Parties Advisory flinding Advisory Cindill'.! 
Alaska Teachers X 
California Municipal X 
Connectucut Municipal X X X 
Teachers X X 
Delaware State , Municipal X X 
Teachers X X 
Public Transit X 
Florida Teachers X 
Firefighters X 
Georgia Firefighters 1 'X 
Hawaii Public Employees X X X 
Idaho Teachcr5 X X 
Fircfighters X 
Illinois Firefiyhters X 
Public Transit X 
Iowa Firefighters 1 X 
lCanSliS Public Employees X X 
Louisiana P •• blic 1'ransit 
Maine Municipal X X X X 
Maryland Teachers X 
Massachusetts State X X 
Municipal X X 
PubUc ,'ransit. X X X 
Michigan Police & Firefighter~ X X 
State & Municipal X X 
Minnesota State & Municipal X 
Teachers X X 
Nonprofi t 1J0spitals X X 
Missouri Firefighters X 
Montana Teachers X 
Nebraska Public Employees X X 
Teachers X 
Nevada Municipal , Nurses X X X 
New Hampshire State X X 
New Jersey Publi c f:mployees 1 X X X 
New York Puhlic 1:l1lployecs X X X 
North Dakota Public Employees X 
Teachers X X 
X2 Oklahoma Police , Firefighters 
Oregon State & Municipal X X X 
Pennsylvania Police & Firefighters 
Public Employees X _X X X 
Public Transi t X 
Rhode Island Stale Employees) 
Municipal r.mployees X X 
Teachers X X X 
Police 
South Dakota 
Firefighters 1 
Puhlic Employees X X 
Police' Firefighters 
Vermont St" te t:mployees X X 
Municipal Employees X X X 
'l'eachers X X 
Was"~ngton conununi ty College 
Ac"demic /':mployees X 
Municipal t:mployees X 
'I'eachers X 
Public Utility 
Districts 1 
Wisconsin State Employees X X 
Municipal r.mployees X X 
Wyoming Firefighters 
Source, Gilroy, Thomas P. and Sincropi, Anthony V. pg"p~!£.~tt1eme.!'..L!n the Public Sector: 
The State of the Art, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972. 
Iprocedure may be nrgotialed by the parties in lieu of procedures noted or including 
procedures noted. 
2If the municipality accepts the advisory dccioion, it is binding on the parties. 
31~ rulode Island, procedures may be n~90tiated by the parties but law seto out no proccdure8 
that muat be included or proce~ures to be used in lieu of a negotiated procedure. 
4FireCiqhlers only. 
J( 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X4 
X 
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STATE CONCILIATION SERVICE FACT-FINDING RULES 
15-015 Factfindi~g If the di.spute has not been settled after 15 days of 
mediation, either party may r'~quest the board to initiate factfinding, or 
the board, on its own motiop, may initiate such factfinding if it deems it 
appropriate and in the public interest. 
1. Selection of Factfinder(s) If the board decides to initiate 
factfinding, it shall so notify the parties and they shall 
have five days after receipt of such notice in which to mutually 
select their own factfinder. If they fail to do so, the board 
will submit to them a list of five qualified factfinders. From 
that list each party shall alternately strike two names, with 
the order of striking being determined by lot. The remaining 
individual shall be the fact finder. 
If both parties should desire a panel of three factfinders, they 
shall so notify the board and the t )ard will then submit a list 
of seven factfinders. From that list each party shall alternately 
str1.ke two names, with the order of striking being determined by 
lot. The remaining three persc...s shall be the factfinders. 
The parties shall advise the board of their choice within five 
days after receipt of the list. If they fail to do so, the 
board shall appoint the factfinder{s) from the list. 
If, however, one of the parties strikes the names as provided 
above and the other party fails to do so, the board shall appoint 
the fact finder only from the names remaining on the list. If 
the factfinder so selected is unable to accept his appointment, 
the parties shall so notify the board and the board shall then 
submit another list of names. 
2. Qualifications of Factfinder No person shall serve as a fact-
finder in any factfinding in which he has any financial or 
personal in~erest in the result of the factfinding, unless the 
parties, in writing, waive such disqualification. 
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3. Notice of A~!.ntment Upon selection of the factfinder, the 
parties shall notify the board and the fact finder of his selection. 
4. Disclosure ~ Factfinder of Disqualifj .~ation Prior to accepting 
his appointment, the prospective fact finder shall disclose any 
circumstances likely to create a presumption of bias or which 
he believes might disqualify him as an impartial factfinder. 
Upon receipt of such information, the board shall immediately 
disclose it to the parties. If either party declines to waive 
the presumptive disqualification, the vacancy thus created shall 
be filled in the same manner as that governing the making of 
the original appointment. 
5. Vacancies If any fact finder should resign, die, withdraw, 
refuse or be unable to or disqualified to perform the duties 
of his office, the board shall, upon proof satisfactory to it, 
declare the office vacant. Vacancies shall be filled in the 
same manner as that governing the making of the original appoint-
ment, and the matter shall be reheard by the new factfinder. 
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6. Time and Place .. EL.li-earing The fact finder shall fix the time and 
place for each hearing. 
7. B£P.resentation by Counsel Any party lIIay be represented by counsel 
or by other authorized representative. 
8. List of Issues Each party shall submit a written list of the 
issues it intends to submit to factfinding to the factfinder 
and to the other party at least seven days before the date of 
the fact finding hearing. 
9. Subpo~ If the parties wish subpoenas, they may request them 
of the Public Employe Relations Board not less than five days 
prior to the c1ate set for the fact finding hearing. 
10. Attendance at Hearings TIle factfinding hearing shall be open to 
the public unless otherwise mutually agreed to by the parties. 
11. Adjournments The factfinder, for good cause shown, may adjourn the 
hearing upon the reques't of a party or upon his own initia,tive, 
and shall adjourn when all parties agree thereto. 
12. Oaths In the discretion of the factfinder, all witnesses who 
testify at the hearing may be sworn or make an affirmance. 
13. Order of Proceedinr~ The order of presentation at the hearing 
shal,! be as mutually agreed between the parties or as determined 
by the fact finder. 
14. Exhibits Each exhibit introduced by a' party shall be filed with 
the factfinder and a copy shall be provided to the other party. 
The exhibits filed with the factfinder shall be retained by him 
unless the parties otherwise agree, or unless the factfinder 
otherwise permits. 
15. Evidence The parties may offer such evidence as they desire and 
shall produce such additional evidence as the factfinder may deem 
necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute. 
The factfinder shall be the judge of the relevancy and materiality 
of the evidence offered and conformity to legal rules of evidence 
shall not be necessary. All evidence shall be taken in the pre-
sence of all of the parties except where any of the parties is 
absent in default or has waived his right to be present. In 
making his findinGs of fact and rccommcndations, the factfinder 
shall consider the factors set forth in ORS 243.746(4). 
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16. Factfinding in the Absence of a Party The fa'ctfinder may proceed 
in the absence of any party, who, after due notice. fails to be 
present or fails to obtain an adjournment. Findings of fact and 
recommendations shall not be made solely on the default of a party. 
The fact finder shall require the other party to submit such evi-
dence as he may require for the making of findings of fact and 
recommendations. 
17. Closing of Hearings The fact finder shall inquire of all parties 
whether they have any further proofs to offer or witnesses to 
be heard. Upon receiving negative replies, the factfinder shall 
declare the hearings closed and the time thereof shall be recorded. 
If briefs of other documents are to be filed, the hearings shall 
be declared closed as of the final date set by the factfinder for 
filing of the briefs. 
18. Reopening of Hearings The hearings may be reopened by the fact-
finder on his own motion, or on the motion of either party for good 
cause shown, at any time before the findings of fact and recommenda-
tions are made, but if the reopening of the hearing wou~d prevent 
the making of the findings of fact and recommendations within the 
specific time provided by law, the matter may not be reopened, 
unless both parties agree upon an extension of such time limit. 
19. Waiver of Rules Any party who proceeds with the factfinding after 
knowledge that any prOVision or requirement of these rules has 
not been complied with and who fails to state his objection thereto 
in writing, shall be deemed to have waived his right to object. 
20. Waiver of Oral Hearing The parties may provide, by written agree-
men~ for the waiver 6f oral hearings. 
21. Serving of Notices Any papers, notices or process necessary or 
proper for the initiation or continuation of factfinding under 
these rules may be served upon a party (a) by mail addressed to 
such party or his attorney at his last knQwn address, or (b) by 
personal service. 
22. Time of Findings of Fact and Recommendations Not more than 30 
days from the date of conclusion of the hearings, the fact finder 
shall make written findil1gs of fact and recommendations for reso-
lution of the dispute and shall serve such findings and recommenda-
tions upon the parties and upon the board. Service may be personal 
or by registered or certified mail. 
23. Form of Find~of Fact and Recommendations The findings of fact 
and recommendations shall be in writing and shall be signed either 
by the factfinder or by a concurring majority, if there be more 
than one factfinder. 
24. Expenses The expenses of witnesses for either side shall be paid 
by the party producing such witnesses. Expenses of the factfinding, 
including required traveling and other expense of the fact finder 
and the expenses of any witnesses or the cost of any proofs pro-
duced at the direct request of the factfinder, shall be borne 
equally by the parties. 
25.· !ntcIjl..I£.!~i0I!.._~!.lc:L~'pp..!.!..catig.!!.._~ ___ RlI}.!!~ The factfinder shall 
interpret and apply these rules insofar as they relate to his 
powers and duties. ~len there·is more than one factfinder and 
a difference arises anlong them concerning the meaning or applica-
tion of any such rules, it shall be decided by majority vote. 
26. ~arties' Respon~!bility after Factfin~ Not more than five 
working days after the findings and recommendations have been 
sent. the parties shall notify the board and each other whether 
or 1I0t they accept the recommendations of the factfinder. 
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SAMPLE LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING MEDIATION 
LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
and 
LINCOLN COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
, 1978 -----------
UNDERSTANDING REGARDING MEDIATION 
The mediation process in confidential. 
The agreements made during mediation are tentative. 
No evidence may be introduced by either party at the 
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fact-finding about tentative agreements made, nor even pro-
posals advanced during mediation by either party on items 
which go to the factfinder for recommendation. 
If final agreement of an entire contract is not reached 
during mediation, only the items tentatively agreed upon 
during negotiations and mediation that the parties, after 
mediation, mutually agree will not go to the factfinding for 
recommendation shall be left out of factfinding. 
LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
By ______________________________ __ 
LINCOLN COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
By ____________________________________ _ 
